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Oct. 24th – Presenter Bios 
Moderator 
 
Adam S. Herbst, Esq.  
Senior Vice President, Chief Legal and Strategic Planning Officer of Blythedale’s Children 
Hospital; Adjunct Professor at New York Law School teaching Health Law and Policy; Co-director 
of the NYLS Health Law and Patient Safety Project; Lecturer, Mailman School of Public Health at 
Columbia University 
Adam S. Herbst, Esq., is Senior Vice President, Chief Legal, Compliance, Planning, and 
Government Relations Officer for Blythedale Children’s Hospital. In this role, Mr. Herbst has 
legal and compliance oversight for the Hospital and is responsible for developing corporate 
planning strategies and administering government relations. In addition, he oversees human 
resources, advocacy and community relations. 
Mr. Herbst has devoted a considerable portion of his career specializing at the intersection of 
where health care law meets with communications, technology and employment issues. He has 
extensive experience structuring agreements on behalf of the Hospital while advising on risk 
mitigation and offering solutions on operations, board governance, and regulatory matters. 
Mr. Herbst has worked on issues related to housing, education, public health, economic 
development and has trial experience in both federal and state courts, as well as arbitrations 
throughout the country. He is a frequent speaker on health care access and is an adjunct law 
professor focusing on health policy and advocacy.  
Mr. Herbst received his Juris Doctor cum laude from Albany Law School, Masters in Business 
Administration from Union College and his Bachelor of Arts cum laude from American 
University. Mr. Herbst is admitted to practice law in New York and New Jersey.  
Distinguished Panelists 
 
Honorable Richard N. Gottfried  
New York State Assembly (District 75) & Chairman of the Assembly's Committee on Health and 
Sponsor of the New York Health Act 
Richard N. Gottfried has chaired the New York State Assembly Committee on Health since 1987.  
He is a Democrat representing a Manhattan district including Chelsea, Hell’s Kitchen, Midtown, 
and part of the Upper West Side. 
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He sponsors the N.Y. Health Act to create a universal “improved Medicare for all” single-payer 
health plan for New York.  He is a leading proponent of patient autonomy and reproductive 
freedom.  He was the sponsor of the law to allow medical use of marijuana in New York and the 
HIV Testing and Confidentiality Law.  
He works to protect funding for Medicaid, community health centers, school health clinics, 
HIV/AIDS services, and other health concerns, and creating and expanding public health 
insurance programs in New York, including Child Health Plus. 
His legislative work includes: promoting primary and preventive care; the Health Care Proxy 
Law (which allows people to designate an agent to make health care decisions for them if they 
lose decision-making capacity); the Family Health Care Decisions Act (which enables family 
members to make health care decisions for incapacitated patients who have not signed a health 
care proxy); managed care reforms; giving patients access to information about a doctor's 
background and malpractice record; licensing of midwives; and insurance coverage for midwife 
services.   
He is a graduate of Cornell University (1968) and Columbia Law School (1973).  He is licensed to 
practice law in New York, but does not maintain a private practice; his only occupation is 
Assembly Member.  He is a member of the New York Academy of Medicine, the National 
Academy for State Health Policy, the Public Health Association of New York City, and the New 
York Civil Liberties Union.  He was first elected to the Assembly in 1970 while in law school. 
 
Niyum Gandhi  
Executive Vice President and Chief Population Health Officer, Mount Sinai Health System 
Niyum Gandhi is the Executive Vice President and Chief Population Health Officer of the Mount 
Sinai Health System.  In this role, he oversees Mount Sinai’s transition from a primarily fee-for-
service model of care to one that is focused on value and risk-based population health. 
  
Niyum leads Mount Sinai Health Partners and helps align the Health System’s clinical and 
economic transformations in support of Mount Sinai’s vision to be the leading population 
health manager in the competitive New York market, as well as the best possible partner to 
plan sponsors, health insurers, and other population health managers who are responsible for 
total cost of care of patient groups.  This includes fostering care management and clinical model 
redesign to ensure that high-value care is delivered by the Health System and its partners, and 
working with payers and employers to establish the new economic models that support the 
delivery of value-based care. 
  
Prior to his position at Mount Sinai, Niyum served as a Partner in the Health and Life Sciences 
consulting practice of Oliver Wyman in Chicago, where he focused on value-based health care 
strategy and transformation for physician groups, hospitals, and health plans. At Oliver Wyman, 
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Niyum also worked with a variety of Accountable Care Organizations (ACOs) and other 
population health management companies, helping them design and implement value-based 
clinical models, develop value-based contracts and integrated product distribution strategies, 
align physician incentives toward value, and establish the appropriate infrastructure to support 
population health management.  
  
Niyum holds an A.B. in economics and finance from Harvard University. He has authored 
several articles on ACOs, payer/provider partnerships, and physician engagement, and served 
as a conference speaker on a variety of issues related to population health and value-based 
care. He also serves as an Assistant Professor in the Department of Health System Design and 
Global Health at the Icahn School of Medicine at Mount Sinai.  
 
Honorable Gustavo Rivera  
New York State Senate (33rd District), and Chairman of the Senate's Committee on Health and 
Sponsor of the New York Health Act 
State Senator Gustavo Rivera represents the 33rd Senate District in the Bronx, which includes the 
neighborhoods of Kingsbridge Heights, Belmont, Fordham, University Heights, Van Nest, East 
Tremont, Crotona and Mount Hope.   
 
Since taking office, Senator Rivera has focused his efforts on addressing issues of health inequity 
both legislatively and on the ground.   
 
In 2018, his passion to improve the health of New Yorkers led Majority Leader Andrea Stewart-
Cousins to appoint Senator Rivera as the Chair of the New York State Senate’s Health Committee. 
As the Chair, Senator Rivera’s goal is to collaborate with his colleagues, stakeholders, and 
constituents to improve health outcomes, increase access to health coverage, and ensure a 
financially viable system for the 20 million New Yorkers he proudly serves.   
 
Prior to his appointment as Chair, Senator Rivera served as the ranking member of the Senate 
Health Committee for six years. As a sitting member of the committee, Senator Rivera passed 
three laws to ban smoking around schools, after schools, and libraries, and has been a champion 
of public health and harm reduction policies.  
 
In March 2017, he became the main sponsor of the “New York Health Act,” an innovative bill to 
create a single payer health system in New York State.  In 2011, Senator Rivera launched the 
Bronx CAN (Changing Attitudes Now) Health Initiative. The goal of this community oriented 
health initiative is not only to encourage Bronx residents to develop healthy behaviors, but to 
shape policies that will help tear down some of the institutional barriers that stand in the way 
of Bronxites having a healthier lifestyle.    
 
5
Senator Rivera also worked as a community organizer on New York State campaigns, as well as 
on President Barack Obama’s 2008 campaign. He has worked as a college professor and briefly 
was a staff member for U.S. Senator Kirsten Gillibrand. 
 
Michael S. Sparer, J.D., Ph.D. 
Professor and Chair in the Department of Health Policy and Management at the Mailman School 
of Public Health at Columbia University 
Michael S. Sparer, J.D., Ph.D. is Professor and Chair in the Department of Health Policy and 
Management at the Mailman School of Public Health at Columbia University.  Professor Sparer 
studies and writes about the politics of health care, with a particular emphasis on the health 
insurance and health delivery systems for low-and-middle income populations, both in the 
United States and globally.  His current projects include a study of efforts to enact “public 
option” insurance programs, the impact of federalism on the implementation of the Affordable 
Care Act, and the rise (and demise) of non-profit insurance “cooperatives.”  He is a two-time 
winner of the Mailman School’s Student Government Association Teacher of the Year Award, 
the recipient of a 2010 Columbia University Presidential Award for Outstanding Teaching, and a 
two-time winner of the Core Curriculum Teaching Excellence Award.  Professor Sparer spent 
seven years as a litigator for the New York City Law Department, specializing in inter-
governmental social welfare litigation.  After leaving the practice of law, Sparer obtained a 
Ph.D. in Political Science from Brandeis University.  Sparer is the former editor of the Journal of 
Health Politics, Policy and Law, and the author of Medicaid and the Limits of State Health 




New York Health Act 
A.5248 (Gottfried); S.3577 (Rivera) 
Underlined text is new law to be added.  Text in brackets [  ] is existing law being repealed.  
Footnotes are only for explanation and are not part of the actual bill. 
 
AN ACT to amend the public health law and the state finance law, in  relation to enacting the 
"New York health act" and to establishing New York Health  
The People of the State of New York, represented in Senate and Assembly, do enact as 
follows:  
    Section 1. Short title. This act shall be known and may be cited as the "New York health 
act".  
    § 2. Legislative findings and intent. 1. The state constitution states: "The protection and 
promotion of the health of the inhabitants of the state are matters of public concern and 
provision therefor shall be made by the state and by such of its subdivisions and in such 
manner, and by such means as the legislature shall from time to time determine." (Article 
XVII, §3.) The legislature finds and declares that all residents of the state have the right to 
health care. While the federal Affordable Care Act brought many improvements in health 
care and health coverage, it still leaves many New Yorkers without coverage or with 
inadequate coverage. Millions of New Yorkers do not get the health care they need or face 
financial obstacles and hardships to get it. That is not acceptable. There is no plan other than 
the New York health act that will enable New York state to meet that need. New Yorkers - as 
individuals, employers, and taxpayers - have experienced a rise in the cost of health care and 
coverage in recent years, including rising premiums, deductibles and co-pays, restricted 
provider networks and high out-of-network charges. Many New Yorkers go without health 
care because they cannot afford it or suffer financial hardship to get it. Businesses have also 
experienced increases in the costs of health care benefits for their employees, and many 
employers are shifting a larger share of the cost of coverage to their employees or dropping 
coverage entirely. Including long-term services and supports (LTSS) in New York Health is 
a major step forward for older adults, people with disabilities, and their families. Older adults 
and people with disabilities often cannot receive the services necessary to stay in the 
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community or other LTSS. Even when older adults and people with disabilities receive 
LTSS, especially services in the community, it is often at the cost of unreasonable demands 
on unpaid family caregivers, depleting their own or family resources, or impoverishing 
themselves to qualify for public coverage. Health care providers are also affected by 
inadequate health coverage in New York state. A large portion of hospitals, health centers 
and other providers now experience substantial losses due to the provision of care that is 
uncompensated. Individuals often find that they are deprived of affordable care and choice 
because of decisions by health plans guided by the plan's economic interests rather than the 
individual's health care needs. To address the fiscal crisis facing the health care system and 
the state and to assure New Yorkers can exercise their right to health care, affordable and 
comprehensive health coverage must be provided. Pursuant to the state constitution's charge 
to the legislature to provide for the health of New Yorkers, this legislation is an enactment of 
state concern for the purpose of establishing a comprehensive universal guaranteed health 
care coverage program and a health care cost control system for the benefit of all residents of 
the state of New York.1 
    2. (a) It is the intent of the Legislature to create the New York Health program to provide a 
universal single payer health plan for every New Yorker, funded by broad-based revenue 
based on ability to pay. The legislature intends that federal waivers and approvals be sought 
where they will improve the administration of the New York Health program, but the 
legislature intends that the program be implemented even in the absence of such waivers or 
approvals. The state shall work to obtain waivers and other approvals relating to Medicaid, 
Child Health Plus, Medicare, the Affordable Care Act, and any other appropriate federal 
programs, under which federal funds and other subsidies that would otherwise be paid to 
New York State, New Yorkers, and health care providers for health coverage that will be 
equaled or exceeded by New York Health will be paid by the federal government to New 
York State and deposited in the New York Health trust fund, or paid to health care providers 
and individuals in combination with New York Health trust fund payments, and for other 
program modifications (including elimination of cost sharing and insurance premiums). 
1 This subdivision is meant to lay a constitutional foundation. 
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Under such waivers and approvals, health coverage under those programs will, to the 
maximum extent possible, be replaced and merged into New York Health, which will operate 
as a true single-payer program.  
    (b) If any necessary waiver or approval is not obtained, the state shall use state plan 
amendments and seek waivers and approvals to maximize, and make as seamless as possible, 
the use of federally-matched health programs and federal health programs in New York 
Health. Thus, even where other programs such as Medicaid or Medicare may contribute to 
paying for care, it is the goal of this legislation that the coverage will be delivered by New 
York Health and, as much as possible, the multiple sources of funding will be pooled with 
other New York Health funds and not be apparent to New York Health members or 
participating providers.  
    (c) This program will promote movement away from fee-for-service payment, which tends 
to reward quantity and requires excessive administrative expense, and towards alternate 
payment methodologies, such as global or capitated payments to providers or health care 
organizations, that promote quality, efficiency, investment in primary and preventive care, 
and innovation and integration in the organizing of health care.  
    (d) The program shall promote the use of clinical data to improve the quality of health care 
and public health, consistent with protection of patient confidentiality. The program shall 
maximize patient autonomy in choice of health care providers and health care decision 
making. Care coordination within the program shall ensure management and coordination 
among a patient's health care services, consistent with patient autonomy and person-centered 
service planning, rather than acting as a gatekeeper to needed services.  
    3. This act does not create any employment benefit, nor does it require, prohibit, or limit 
the providing of any employment benefit.2 
    4. In order to promote improved quality of, and access to, health care services and promote 
improved clinical outcomes, it is the policy of the state to encourage cooperative, 
collaborative and integrative arrangements among health care providers who might otherwise 
be competitors, under the active supervision of the commissioner of health. It is the intent of 
2 This subdivision is meant to make clear that this does not violate ERISA. 
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the state to supplant competition with such arrangements and regulation only to the extent 
necessary to accomplish the purposes of this act, and to provide state action immunity under 
the state and federal antitrust laws to health care providers, particularly with respect to their 
relations with the single-payer New York Health plan created by this act.3  
    § 3. Article 50 and sections 5000, 5001, 5002 and 5003 of the public health law are 
renumbered article 80 and sections 8000, 8001, 8002 and 8003, respectively, and a new 
article 51 is added to read as follows:  
    ARTICLE 51  
    NEW YORK HEALTH Section 5100. Definitions.  
    5101. Program created.  
    5102. Board of trustees.  
    5103. Eligibility and enrollment.  
    5104. Benefits.  
    5105. Health care providers; care coordination; payment  
    methodologies.  
    5106. Health care organizations.  
    5107. Program standards.  
    5108. Regulations.  
    5109. Provisions relating to federal health programs.  
    5110. Additional provisions.  
    5111. Regional advisory councils.  
    § 5100. Definitions. As used in this article, the following terms shall have the following 
meanings, unless the context clearly requires otherwise:  
    1. "Board" means the board of trustees of the New York Health program created by 
section fifty-one hundred two of this article, and "trustee" means a trustee of the board.  
    2. "Care coordination" means, but is not limited to, managing, referring to, locating, 
coordinating, and monitoring health care services for the member to assure that all medically 
necessary health care services are made available to and are effectively used by the member 
3 This language, and similar language in the body of the bill, lays the foundation for a “state-action” 
exemption from anti-trust laws. 
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in a timely manner, consistent with patient autonomy. Care coordination does not include a 
requirement for prior authorization for health care services or for referral for a member to 
receive a health care service.  
    3. "Care coordinator" means an individual or entity approved to provide care coordination 
under subdivision two of section fifty-one hundred five of this article.  
    4. "Federally-matched public health program" means the medical assistance program 
under title eleven of article five of the social services law, the basic health program under 
section three hundred sixty-nine-gg of the social services law,4 and the child health plus 
program under title one-A of article twenty-five of this chapter.5  
    5. "Health care organization" means an entity that is approved by the commissioner6 under 
section fifty-one hundred six of this article to provide health care services to members under 
the program.  
    6. "Health care provider" means any individual or entity legally authorized to provide a 
health care service under Medicaid or Medicare or this article. "Health care professional" 
means a health care provider that is an individual licensed, certified, registered or otherwise 
authorized to practice under title eight of the education law to provide such health care 
service, acting within his or her lawful scope of practice.  
    7. "Health care service" means any health care service, including care coordination, 
included as a benefit under the program.  
    8. "Implementation period" means the period under subdivision three of section fifty-one 
hundred one of this article during which the program will be subject to special eligibility and 
financing provisions until it is fully implemented under that section.  
    10. "Medicaid" or "medical assistance" means title eleven of article five of the social 
services law and the program thereunder. "Child health plus" means title one-A of article 
twenty-five of this chapter and the program thereunder. "Medicare" means title XVIII of the 
4 The basic health program is authorized by the federal Affordable Care Act.  It operates under the name 
“Essential Plan” in New York. 
5 New York’s Child Health Insurance Program. 
6 In the Public Health Law, “commissioner” means the Commissioner of Health. 
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federal social security act and the programs thereunder. "Affordable care act" means the 
federal patient protection and affordable care act, public law 111-148, as amended by the 
health care and education reconciliation act of 2010, public law 111-152, and as otherwise 
amended and any regulations or guidance issued thereunder. "Basic health program" means 
section three hundred sixty-nine-gg of the social services law and the program thereunder.  
    11. "Member" means an individual who is enrolled in the program.  
    12. "New York Health", "New York Health program", and "program" mean the New York 
Health program created by section fifty-one hundred one of this article.  
    13. "New York Health trust fund" means the New York Health trust fund established 
under section eighty-nine-j of the state finance law.7 
    14. "Out-of-state health care service" means a health care service provided to a member 
while the member is temporarily out of the state and (a) it is medically necessary that the 
health care service be provided while the member is out of the state, or (b) it is clinically 
appropriate that the health care service be provided by a particular health care provider 
located out of the state rather than in the state. However, any health care service provided to 
a New York Health enrollee by a health care provider qualified under paragraph (a) of 
subdivision three of section fifty-one hundred five of this article that is located outside the 
state shall not be considered an out-of-state service and shall be covered as otherwise 
provided in this article.  
    15. "Participating provider" means any individual or entity that is a health care provider 
qualified under subdivision three of section fifty-one hundred five of this article that provides 
health care services to members under the program, or a health care organization.  
    16. "Person" means any individual or natural person, trust, partnership, association, 
unincorporated association, corporation, company, limited liability company, proprietorship, 
joint venture, firm, joint stock association, department, agency, authority, or other legal 
entity, whether for-profit, not-for-profit or governmental.  
    17. "Prescription and non-prescription drugs" means prescription drugs as defined in 
section two hundred seventy of this chapter, and non-prescription smoking cessation 
7 See below in the bill. 
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products or devices.  
    18. "Resident" means an individual whose primary place of abode is in the state, without 
regard to the individual's immigration status, as determined according to regulations of the 
commissioner.  
    § 5101. Program created. 1. The New York Health program is hereby created in the 
department. The commissioner shall establish and implement the program under this article. 
The program shall provide comprehensive health coverage to every resident who enrolls in 
the program.  
    2. The commissioner shall, to the maximum extent possible, organize, administer and 
market the program and services as a single program under the name "New York Health" or 
such other name as the commissioner shall determine, regardless of under which law or 
source the definition of a benefit is found including (on a voluntary basis) retiree health 
benefits.8 In implementing this article, the commissioner shall avoid jeopardizing federal 
financial participation in these programs and shall take care to promote public understanding 
and awareness of available benefits and programs.  
    3. The commissioner shall determine when individuals may begin enrolling in the 
program. There shall be an implementation period, which shall begin on the date that 
individuals may begin enrolling in the program and shall end as determined by the 
commissioner.  
    4. An insurer authorized to provide coverage pursuant to the insurance law or a health 
maintenance organization certified under this chapter may, if otherwise authorized, offer 
benefits that do not cover any service for which coverage is offered to individuals under the 
program, but may not offer benefits that cover any service for which coverage is offered to 
individuals under the program. Provided, however, that this subdivision shall not prohibit (a) 
the offering of any benefits to or for individuals, including their families, who are employed 
or self-employed in the state but who are not residents of the state, or (b) the offering of 
benefits during the implementation period to individuals who enrolled or may enroll as 
members of the program, or (c) the offering of retiree health benefits.  
8 Retiree health benefits are covered by contracts and ERISA.  §5102(8)(b) requires the board to develop 
further proposals for dealing with retiree benefits. 
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    5. A college, university or other institution of higher education in the state may purchase 
coverage under the program for any student, or student's dependent, who is not a resident of 
the state.  
    6. To the extent any provision of this chapter, the social services law, the insurance law or 
the elder law:  
    (a) is inconsistent with any provision of this article or the legislative intent of the New 
York Health Act, this article shall apply and prevail, except where explicitly provided 
otherwise by this article; and  
    (b) is consistent with the provisions of this article and the legislative intent of the New 
York Health Act, the provision of that law shall apply.  
    7. The program shall be deemed to be a health care plan for purposes of utilization review 
and external appeal under article forty-nine of this chapter. An enrollee may designate a 
person or entity, including, but not limited to, a representative of the enrollee's care 
coordinator, a health care organization providing the service under review or appeal, or a 
labor union or Taft-Hartley fund of which such enrollee or enrollee's family member is a 
member to serve as the enrollee's designee for purposes of that article, if the person or entity 
agrees to be the designee.  
    8. (a) No member shall be required to receive any health care service through any entity 
organized, certified or operating under guidelines under article forty-four of this chapter, or 
specified under section three hundred sixty-four-j of the social services law, the insurance 
law or the elder law. No such entity shall receive payment for health care services (other than 
care coordination) from the program.  
    (b) However, this subdivision shall not preclude the use of a Medicare managed care 
("Medicare advantage") entity or other entity created by or under the direction of the 
program where reasonably necessary to maximize federal financial participation or other 
federal financial support under any federally-matched public health program, Medicare or the 
Affordable Care Act. Any entity under this paragraph shall, to the maximum extent feasible, 
operate in the background, without burden on or interference with the member and health 
care provider, without depriving the member or health care provider of any right or benefit 
14
under the program and otherwise consistent with this article.9  
    9. The program shall include provisions for an appropriate reserve fund.  
    10. (a) This subdivision applies to every person who is a retiree of a public employer, as 
defined in section two hundred one of the civil service law, and any person who is a 
beneficiary of the retiree's public employee retiree health benefit. Any reference to the retiree 
shall mean and include any beneficiary of the retiree. This subdivision does not create or 
increase any eligibility for any public employee retiree health benefit that would not 
otherwise exist and does not diminish any public employee retiree health benefit.  
    (b) This paragraph applies to the retiree while he or she is a resident of New York state. 
The retiree shall enroll in the program. If, by the implementation date, the retiree has not 
enrolled in the program, the appropriate public employee retirement system and the 
commissioner shall enroll the retiree in the New York Health program. If the retiree's public 
employee retiree health benefit includes any service for which coverage is not offered under 
the New York Health program, the retiree shall continue to receive that benefit from the 
public employee retirement program.  
    (c) For every retiree, while he or she is not a resident of New York state, the appropriate 
public employee retirement system shall maintain the retiree's public employee retiree health 
benefit as if this article had not been enacted.  
    § 5102. Board of trustees. 1. The New York Health board of trustees is hereby created in 
the department. The board of trustees shall, at the request of the commissioner, consider any 
matter to effectuate the provisions and purposes of this article, and may advise the 
commissioner thereon; and it may, from time to time, submit to the commissioner any 
recommendations to effectuate the provisions and purposes of this article. The commissioner 
may propose regulations under this article and amendments thereto for consideration by the 
board. The board of trustees shall have no executive, administrative or appointive duties 
except as otherwise provided by law. The board of trustees shall have power to establish, and 
9 This enables the program to use insurance- or managed care-like entities so the program can fit into some 
requirements of Medicaid or the ACA to continue to draw federal support.  The entities would operate “in the 
background,” so patients and health care providers would see no difference from the ordinary operation of 
New York Health. 
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from time to time, amend regulations to effectuate the provisions and purposes of this article, 
subject to approval by the commissioner.10  
    2. The board shall be composed of:  
    (a) the commissioner, the superintendent of financial services, and the director of the 
budget, or their designees, as ex officio members;  
    (b) twenty-six trustees appointed by the governor;  
    (i) six of whom shall be representatives of health care consumer advocacy organizations 
which have a statewide or regional constituency, who have been involved in issues of interest 
to low- and moderate-income individuals, older adults, and people with disabilities; at least 
three of whom shall represent organizations led by consumers in those groups;  
    (ii) two of whom shall be representatives of professional organizations representing 
physicians;  
    (iii) two of whom shall be representatives of professional organizations representing 
licensed or registered health care professionals other than physicians;  
    (iv) three of whom shall be representatives of general hospitals, one of whom shall be a 
representative of public general hospitals;  
    (v) one of whom shall be a representative of community health centers;  
    (vi) two of whom shall be representatives of rehabilitation or home care providers;  
    (vii) two of whom shall be representatives of behavioral or mental health or disability 
service providers;  
    (viii) two of whom shall be representatives of health care organizations;  
    (ix) two of whom shall be representatives of organized labor;  
    (x) two of whom shall have demonstrated expertise in health care finance; and  
    (xi) two of whom shall be employers or representatives of employers who pay the payroll 
tax under this article, or, prior to the tax becoming effective, will pay the tax;  
    (c) fourteen trustees appointed by the governor; five of whom to be appointed on the 
recommendation of the speaker of the assembly; five of whom to be appointed on the 
recommendation of the temporary president of the senate; two of whom to be appointed on 
10 This subdivision is modeled largely on the Public Health and Health Planning Council. 
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the recommendation of the minority leader of the assembly; and two of whom to be 
appointed on the recommendation of the minority leader of the senate.  
    3. After the end of the implementation period, no person shall be a trustee unless he or she 
is a member of the program, except the ex officio trustees. Each trustee shall serve at the 
pleasure of the appointing officer, except the ex officio trustees.  
    4. The chair of the board shall be appointed, and may be removed as chair, by the governor 
from among the trustees. The board shall meet at least four times each calendar year. 
Meetings shall be held upon the call of the chair and as provided by the board. A majority of 
the appointed trustees shall be a quorum of the board, and the affirmative vote of a majority 
of the trustees voting, but not less than ten, shall be necessary for any action to be taken by 
the board. The board may establish an executive committee to exercise any powers or duties 
of the board as it may provide, and other committees to assist the board or the executive 
committee. The chair of the board shall chair the executive committee and shall appoint the 
chair and members of all other committees. The board of trustees may appoint one or more 
advisory committees. Members of advisory committees need not be members of the board of 
trustees.  
    5. Trustees shall serve without compensation but shall be reimbursed for their necessary 
and actual expenses incurred while engaged in the business of the board.  
    6. Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, no officer or employee of the 
state or any local government shall forfeit or be deemed to have forfeited his or her office or 
employment by reason of being a trustee.  
    7. The board and its committees and advisory committees may request and receive the 
assistance of the department and any other state or local governmental entity in exercising its 
powers and duties.  
    8. No later than two years after the effective date of this article:  
    (a) The board shall develop proposals for: (i) incorporating retiree health benefits into 
New York Health; (ii) accommodating employer retiree health benefits for people who have 
been members of New York Health but live as retirees out of the state; and (iii) 
accommodating employer retiree health benefits for people who earned or accrued such 
benefits while residing in the state prior to the implementation of New York Health and live 
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as retirees out of the state. The board shall present its proposals to the governor and the 
legislature.  
    (b) The board shall develop a proposal for New York Health coverage of health care 
services covered under the workers' compensation law, including whether and how to 
continue funding for those services under that law and whether and how to incorporate an 
element of experience rating.  
    § 5103. Eligibility and enrollment. 1. Every resident of the state shall be eligible and 
entitled to enroll as a member under the program.  
    2. No individual shall be required to pay any premium or other charge for enrolling in or 
being a member under the program.  
    3. A newborn child shall be enrolled as of the date of the child's birth if enrollment is done 
prior to the child's birth or within sixty days after the child's birth.  
    § 5104. Benefits. 1. The program shall provide comprehensive health coverage to every 
member, which shall include all health care services required to be covered under any of the 
following, without regard to whether the member would otherwise be eligible for or covered 
by the program or source referred to:  
    (a) child health plus;  
    (b) Medicaid;  
    (c) Medicare;  
    (d) article forty-four of this chapter or article thirty-two or forty-three of the insurance law;  
    (e) article eleven of the civil service law, as of the date one year before the beginning of 
the implementation period;  
    (f) any cost incurred defined in paragraph one of subsection (a) of section fifty-one 
hundred two of the insurance law, provided that this coverage shall not replace coverage 
under article fifty-one of the insurance law;  
    (g) any additional health care service authorized to be added to the program's benefits by 
the program; and  
    (h) provided that where any state law or regulation related to any federally-matched public 
health program states that a benefit is contingent on federal financial participation, or words 
to that effect, the benefit shall be included under the New York Health program without 
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regard to federal financial participation.11 
    2. No member shall be required to pay any premium, deductible, co-payment or co-
insurance under the program.  
    3. The program shall provide for payment under the program for:  
    (a) emergency and temporary health care services provided to a member or individual 
entitled to become a member who has not had a reasonable opportunity to become a member 
or to enroll with a care coordinator; and  
    (b) health care services provided in an emergency to an individual who is entitled to 
become a member or enrolled with a care coordinator, regardless of having had an 
opportunity to do so.  
    § 5105. Health care providers; care coordination; payment methodologies. 1. Choice of 
health care provider. (a) Any health care provider qualified to participate under this section 
may provide health care services under the program, provided that the health care provider is 
otherwise legally authorized to perform the health care service for the individual and under 
the circumstances involved.  
    (b) A member may choose to receive health care services under the program from any 
participating provider, consistent with provisions of this article relating to care coordination 
and health care organizations, the willingness or availability of the provider (subject to 
provisions of this article relating to discrimination), and the appropriate clinically-relevant 
circumstances.  
    2. Care coordination. (a) A care coordinator may be an individual or entity that is 
approved by the program that is:  
    (i) a health care practitioner who is: (A) the member's primary care practitioner; (B) at the 
option of a female member, the member's provider of primary gynecological care; or (C) at 
the option of a member who has a chronic condition that requires specialty care, a specialist 
health care practitioner who regularly and continually provides treatment for that condition to 
11 Many provisions of NY’s Medicaid and other laws say they only apply if there is “federal financial 
participation” (i.e., if it would qualify for federal matching funds).  But under NY Health, services covered by 
Medicaid would be covered for all New Yorkers, even though they might not be federally Medicaid eligible.  
This language makes sure these benefits would be fully available. 
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the member;  
    (ii) an entity licensed under article twenty-eight of this chapter or certified under article 
thirty-six of this chapter, or, with respect to a member who receives chronic mental health 
care services, an entity licensed under article thirty-one of the mental hygiene law or other 
entity approved by the commissioner in consultation with the commissioner of mental health;  
    (iii) a health care organization;  
    (iv) a Taft-Hartley fund or labor union, with respect to its members and their family 
members; provided that this provision shall not preclude a Taft-Hartley fund or labor union 
from becoming a care coordinator under subparagraph (v) of this paragraph or a health care 
organization under section fifty-one hundred six of this article; or  
    (v) any not-for-profit or governmental entity approved by the program.  
    (b)(i) Every member shall enroll with a care coordinator that agrees to provide care 
coordination to the member prior to receiving health care services to be paid for under the 
program. Health care services provided to a member shall not be subject to payment under 
the program unless the member is enrolled with a care coordinator at the time the health care 
service is provided.  
    (ii) This paragraph shall not apply to health care services provided under subdivision three 
of section fifty-one hundred four of this article.  
    (iii) The member shall remain enrolled with that care coordinator until the member 
becomes enrolled with a different care coordinator or ceases to be a member. Members have 
the right to change their care coordinator on terms at least as permissive as the provisions of 
section three hundred sixty-four-j of the social services law relating to an individual 
changing his or her primary care provider or managed care provider.  
    (c) Care coordination shall be provided to the member by the member's care coordinator. 
A care coordinator may employ or utilize the services of other individuals or entities to assist 
in providing care coordination for the member, consistent with regulations of the 
commissioner.  
    (d) A health care organization may establish rules relating to care coordination for 
members in the health care organization, different from this subdivision but otherwise 
consistent with this article and other applicable laws.  
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    (e) The commissioner shall develop and implement procedures and standards for an 
individual or entity to be approved to be a care coordinator in the program, including but not 
limited to procedures and standards relating to the revocation, suspension, limitation, or 
annulment of approval on a determination that the individual or entity is not competent to be 
a care coordinator or has exhibited a course of conduct which is either inconsistent with 
program standards and regulations or which exhibits an unwillingness to meet such standards 
and regulations, or is a potential threat to the public health or safety. Such procedures and 
standards shall not limit approval to be a care coordinator in the program for economic 
purposes and shall be consistent with good professional practice. In developing the 
procedures and standards, the commissioner shall: (i) consider existing standards developed 
by national accrediting and professional organizations; and (ii) consult with national and 
local organizations working on care coordination or similar models, including health care 
practitioners, hospitals, clinics, and consumers and their representatives. When developing 
and implementing standards of approval of care coordinators for individuals receiving 
chronic mental health care services, the commissioner shall consult with the commissioner of 
mental health. An individual or entity may not be a care coordinator unless the services 
included in care coordination are within the individual's professional scope of practice or the 
entity's legal authority.  
    (f) To maintain approval under the program, a care coordinator must: (i) renew its status at 
a frequency determined by the commissioner; and (ii) provide data to the department as 
required by the commissioner to enable the commissioner to evaluate the impact of care 
coordinators on quality, outcomes and cost.  
    (g) Nothing in this subdivision shall authorize any individual to engage in any act in 
violation of title eight of the education law.  
    3. Health care providers. (a) The commissioner shall establish and maintain procedures 
and standards for health care providers to be qualified to participate in the program, 
including but not limited to procedures and standards relating to the revocation, suspension, 
limitation, or annulment of qualification to participate on a determination that the health care 
provider is not competent to be a provider of specific health care services or has exhibited a 
course of conduct which is either inconsistent with program standards and regulations or 
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which exhibits an unwillingness to meet such standards and regulations, or is a potential 
threat to the public health or safety. Such procedures and standards shall not limit health care 
provider participation in the program for economic purposes and shall be consistent with 
good professional practice. Such procedures and standards may be different for different 
types of health care providers and health care professionals. Any health care provider who is 
qualified to participate under Medicaid, child health plus or Medicare shall be deemed to be 
qualified to participate in the program, and any health care provider's revocation, suspension, 
limitation, or annulment of qualification to participate in any of those programs shall apply to 
the health care provider's qualification to participate in the program; provided that a health 
care provider qualified under this sentence shall follow the procedures to become qualified 
under the program by the end of the implementation period.  
    (b) The commissioner shall establish and maintain procedures and standards for 
recognizing health care providers located out of the state for purposes of providing coverage 
under the program for out-of-state health care services.  
    (c) Procedures and standards under this subdivision shall include provisions for expedited 
temporary qualification to participate in the program for health care professionals who are (i) 
temporarily authorized to practice in the state or (ii) are recently arrived in the state or 
recently authorized to practice in the state.  
    4. Payment for health care services. (a) The commissioner may establish by regulation 
payment methodologies for health care services and care coordination provided to members 
under the program by participating providers, care coordinators, and health care 
organizations. There may be a variety of different payment methodologies, including those 
established on a demonstration basis. All payment rates under the program shall be 
reasonable and reasonably related to the cost of efficiently providing the health care service 
and assuring an adequate and accessible supply of the health care service. Until and unless 
another payment methodology is established, health care services provided to members under 
the program shall be paid for on a fee-for-service basis, except for care coordination.  
    (b) The program shall engage in good faith negotiations with health care providers' 
representatives under title III of article forty-nine of this chapter, including, but not limited 
to, in relation to rates of payment and payment methodologies.  
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    (c) Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, payment for drugs provided by 
pharmacies under the program shall be made pursuant to title one of article two-A of this 
chapter. However, the program shall provide for payment for prescription drugs under 
section 340B of the federal public service act where applicable. Payment for prescription 
drugs provided by health care providers other than pharmacies shall be pursuant to other 
provisions of this article.  
    (d) Payment for health care services established under this article shall be considered 
payment in full. A participating provider shall not charge any rate in excess of the payment 
established under this article for any health care service provided under the program and 
shall not solicit or accept payment from any member or third party for any such service 
except as provided under section fifty-one hundred nine of this article. However, this 
paragraph shall not preclude the program from acting as a primary or secondary payer in 
conjunction with another third-party payer where permitted under section fifty-one hundred 
nine of this article.  
    (e) The program may provide in payment methodologies for payment for capital related 
expenses for specifically identified capital expenditures incurred by not-for-profit or 
governmental entities certified under article twenty-eight of this chapter. Any capital related 
expense generated by a capital expenditure that requires or required approval under article 
twenty-eight of this chapter must have received that approval for the capital related expense 
to be paid for under the program.  
    (f) Payment methodologies and rates shall include a distinct component of reimbursement 
for direct and indirect graduate medical education as defined, calculated and implemented 
pursuant to section twenty-eight hundred seven-c of this chapter.  
    (g) The commissioner shall provide by regulation for payment methodologies and 
procedures for paying for out-of-state health care services.  
    5. Prior authorization. The program shall not require prior authorization for any health care 
service in any manner more restrictive of access to or payment for the service than would be 
required for the service under Medicare Part A or Part B. Prior authorization for prescription 
drugs provided by pharmacies under the program shall be under title one of article two-A of 
this chapter.  
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    § 5106. Health care organizations. 1. A member may choose to enroll with and receive 
health care services under the program from a health care organization.  
    2. A health care organization shall be a not-for-profit or governmental entity that is 
approved by the commissioner that is:  
    (a) an accountable care organization under article twenty-nine-E of this chapter; or  
    (b) a Taft-Hartley fund (i) with respect to its members and their family members, and (ii) 
if allowed by applicable law and approved by the commissioner, for other members of the 
program.  
    3. A health care organization may be responsible for providing all or part of the health care 
services to which its members are entitled under the program, consistent with the terms of its 
approval by the commissioner.  
    4. (a) The commissioner shall develop and implement procedures and standards for an 
entity to be approved to be a health care organization in the program, including but not 
limited to procedures and standards relating to the revocation, suspension, limitation, or 
annulment of approval on a determination that the entity is not competent to be a health care 
organization or has exhibited a course of conduct which is either inconsistent with program 
standards and regulations or which exhibits an unwillingness to meet such standards and 
regulations, or is a potential threat to the public health or safety. Such procedures and 
standards shall not limit approval to be a health care organization in the program for 
economic purposes and shall be consistent with good professional practice. In developing the 
procedures and standards, the commissioner shall: (i) consider existing standards developed 
by national accrediting and professional organizations; and (ii) consult with national and 
local organizations working in the field of health care organizations, including health care 
practitioners, hospitals, clinics, long-term supports and service providers, consumers and 
their representatives and labor organizations representing health care workers. When 
developing and implementing standards of approval of health care organizations, the 
commissioner shall consult with the commissioner of mental health, the commissioner of 
developmental disabilities, the director of the state office for the aging and the commissioner 
of the office of alcoholism and substance abuse services.  
    (b) To maintain approval under the program, a health care organization must: (i) renew its 
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status at a frequency determined by the commissioner; and (ii) provide data to the department 
as required by the commissioner to enable the commissioner to evaluate the health care 
organization in relation to quality of health care services, health care outcomes, and cost.  
    5. The commissioner shall make regulations relating to health care organizations 
consistent with and to ensure compliance with this article.  
    6. The provision of health care services directly or indirectly by a health care organization 
through health care providers shall not be considered the practice of a profession under title 
eight of the education law by the health care organization.  
    § 5107. Program standards. 1. The commissioner shall establish requirements and 
standards for the program and for health care organizations, care coordinators, and health 
care providers, consistent with this article, including requirements and standards for, as 
applicable:  
    (a) the scope, quality and accessibility of health care services;  
    (b) relations between health care organizations or health care providers and members; and  
    (c) relations between health care organizations and health care providers, including (i) 
credentialing and participation in the health care organization; and (ii) terms, methods and 
rates of payment.  
    2. Requirements and standards under the program shall include, but not be limited to, 
provisions to promote the following:  
    (a) simplification, transparency, uniformity, and fairness in health care provider 
credentialing and participation in health care organization networks, referrals, payment 
procedures and rates, claims processing, and approval of health care services, as applicable;  
    (b) primary and preventive care, care coordination, efficient and effective health care 
services, quality assurance, coordination and integration of health care services, including 
use of appropriate technology, and promotion of public, environmental and occupational 
health;  
    (c) elimination of health care disparities;  
    (d) non-discrimination with respect to members and health care providers on the basis of 
race, ethnicity, national origin, religion, disability, age, sex, sexual orientation, gender 
identity or expression, or economic circumstances; provided that health care services 
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provided under the program shall be appropriate to the patient's clinically-relevant 
circumstances;  
    (e) accessibility of care coordination, health care organization services and health care 
services, including accessibility for people with disabilities and people with limited ability to 
speak or understand English, and the providing of care coordination, health care organization 
services and health care services in a culturally competent manner; and  
    (f) especially in relation to long-term supports and services, the maximization and 
prioritization of the most integrated community-based supports and services.  
    3. Any participating provider or care coordinator that is organized as a for-profit entity 
(other than a professional practice of one or more health care professionals) shall be required 
to meet the same requirements and standards as entities organized as not-for-profit entities, 
and payments under the program paid to such entities shall not be calculated to accommodate 
the generation of profit or revenue for dividends or other return on investment or the 
payment of taxes that would not be paid by a not-for-profit entity.  
    4. Every participating provider shall furnish to the program such information to, and 
permit examination of its records by, the program, as may be reasonably required for 
purposes of reviewing accessibility and utilization of health care services, quality assurance, 
promoting improved patient outcomes and cost containment, the making of payments, and 
statistical or other studies of the operation of the program or for protection and promotion of 
public, environmental and occupational health.  
    5. In developing requirements and standards and making other policy determinations under 
this article, the commissioner shall consult with representatives of members, health care 
providers, care coordinators, health care organizations employers, organized labor including 
representatives of health care workers, and other interested parties.  
    6. The program shall maintain the security and confidentiality of all data and other 
information collected under the program when such data would be normally considered 
confidential patient data. Aggregate data of the program which is derived from confidential 
data but does not violate patient confidentiality shall be public information including for 
purposes of article six of the public officers law.  
    § 5108. Regulations. The commissioner may make regulations under this article by 
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approving regulations and amendments thereto, under subdivision one of section fifty-one 
hundred two of this article. The commissioner may make regulations or amendments thereto 
under this article on an emergency basis under section two hundred two of the state 
administrative procedure act, provided that such regulations or amendments shall not become 
permanent unless adopted under subdivision one of section fifty-one hundred two of this 
article.  
    § 5109. Provisions relating to federal health programs. 1. The commissioner shall seek all 
federal waivers and other federal approvals and arrangements and submit state plan 
amendments necessary to operate the program consistent with this article to the maximum 
extent possible.  
    2. (a) The commissioner shall apply to the secretary of health and human services or other 
appropriate federal official for all waivers of requirements, and make other arrangements, 
under Medicare, any federally-matched public health program, the affordable care act, and 
any other federal programs that provide federal funds for payment for health care services, 
that are necessary to enable all New York Health members to receive all benefits under the 
program through the program to enable the state to implement this article and to receive and 
deposit all federal payments under those programs (including funds that may be provided in 
lieu of premium tax credits, cost-sharing subsidies, and small business tax credits) in the state 
treasury to the credit of the New York Health trust fund and to use those funds for the New 
York Health program and other provisions under this article. To the extent possible, the 
commissioner shall negotiate arrangements with the federal government in which bulk or 
lump-sum federal payments are paid to New York Health in place of federal spending or tax 
benefits for federally-matched health programs or federal health programs. The 
commissioner shall take actions under paragraph (b) of subdivision eight of section fifty-one 
hundred one of this article as reasonably necessary.  
    (b) The commissioner may require members or applicants to be members to provide 
information necessary for the program to comply with any waiver or arrangement under this 
subdivision.  
    3. (a) The commissioner may take actions consistent with this article to enable New York 
Health to administer Medicare in New York state, to create a Medicare managed care plan 
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("Medicare Advantage") that would operate consistent with this article, and to be a provider 
of drug coverage under Medicare part D for eligible members of New York Health.  
    (b) The commissioner may waive or modify the applicability of provisions of this section 
relating to any federally-matched public health program or Medicare as necessary to 
implement any waiver or arrangement under this section or to maximize the benefit to the 
New York Health program under this section, provided that the commissioner, in 
consultation with the director of the budget, shall determine that such waiver or modification 
is in the best interests of the members affected by the action and the state.  
    (c) The commissioner may apply for coverage under any federally-matched public health 
program on behalf of any member and enroll the member in the federally-matched public 
health program or Medicare if the member is eligible for it. Enrollment in a federally-
matched public health program or Medicare shall not cause any member to lose any health 
care service provided by the program or diminish any right the member would otherwise 
have.  
    (d) The commissioner shall by regulation increase the income eligibility level, increase or 
eliminate the resource test for eligibility, simplify any procedural or documentation 
requirement for enrollment, and increase the benefits for any federally-matched public health 
program, and for any program to reduce or eliminate an individual's coinsurance, cost-
sharing or premium obligations or increase an individual's eligibility for any federal financial 
support related to Medicare or the affordable care act notwithstanding any law or regulation 
to the contrary. The commissioner may act under this paragraph upon a finding, approved by 
the director of the budget, that the action (i) will help to increase the number of members 
who are eligible for and enrolled in federally-matched public health programs, or for any 
program to reduce or eliminate an individual's coinsurance, cost-sharing or premium 
obligations or increase an individual's eligibility for any federal financial support related to 
Medicare or the affordable care act; (ii) will not diminish any individual's access to any 
health care service, benefit or right the individual would otherwise have; (iii) is in the interest 
of the program; and (iv) does not require or has received any necessary federal waivers or 
approvals to ensure federal financial participation.  
    (e) To enable the commissioner to apply for coverage or financial support under any 
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federally-matched public health program, the Affordable Care Act, or Medicare on behalf of 
any member and enroll the member in any such program, including an entity under 
paragraph (b) of subdivision eight of section fifty-one hundred one of this article if the 
member is eligible for it, the commissioner may require that every member or applicant to be 
a member shall provide information to enable the commissioner to determine whether the 
applicant is eligible for such program. The program shall make a reasonable effort to notify 
members of their obligations under this paragraph. After a reasonable effort has been made 
to contact the member, the member shall be notified in writing that he or she has sixty days 
to provide such required information. If such information is not provided within the sixty day 
period, the member's coverage under the program may be terminated.  
    (f) To the extent necessary for purposes of this section, as a condition of continued 
eligibility for health care services under the program, a member who is eligible for benefits 
under Medicare shall enroll in Medicare, including parts A, B and D.  
    (g) The program shall provide premium assistance for all members enrolling in a Medicare 
part D drug coverage under section 1860D of Title XVIII of the federal social security act 
limited to the low-income benchmark premium amount established by the federal centers for 
Medicare and Medicaid services and any other amount which such agency establishes under 
its de minimis premium policy, except that such payments made on behalf of members 
enrolled in a Medicare advantage plan may exceed the low-income benchmark premium 
amount if determined to be cost effective to the program.  
    (h) If the commissioner has reasonable grounds to believe that a member could be eligible 
for an income-related subsidy under section 1860D-14 of Title XVIII of the federal social 
security act, the member shall provide, and authorize the program to obtain, any information 
or documentation required to establish the member's eligibility for such subsidy, provided 
that the commissioner shall attempt to obtain as much of the information and documentation 
as possible from records that are available to him or her.  
    (i) The program shall make a reasonable effort to notify members of their obligations 
under this subdivision. After a reasonable effort has been made to contact the member, the 
member shall be notified in writing that he or she has sixty days to provide such required 
information. If such information is not provided within the sixty day period, the member's 
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coverage under the program may be terminated.  
    § 5110. Additional provisions. 1. The commissioner shall contract with not-for-profit 
organizations to provide:  
    (a) consumer assistance to individuals with respect to selection and changing selection of a 
care coordinator or health care organization, enrolling, obtaining health care services, and 
other matters relating to the program;  
    (b) health care provider assistance to health care providers providing and seeking or 
considering whether to provide, health care services under the program, with respect to 
participating in a health care organization and dealing with a health care organization; and  
    (c) care coordinator assistance to individuals and entities providing and seeking or 
considering whether to provide, care coordination to members.  
    2. The commissioner shall provide grants from funds in the New York Health trust fund or 
otherwise appropriated for this purpose, to health systems agencies under section twenty-nine 
hundred four-b of this chapter to support the operation of such health systems agencies.  
    3. Retraining and re-employment of impacted employees. (a) As used in this subdivision:  
    (i) "Third party payer" means an insurer authorized to provide health coverage under the 
insurance law, a health maintenance organization under article forty-four of this chapter, a 
self-insured plan providing health coverage, or any other third party payer for health care 
services.  
    (ii) "Health care provider administrative employee" means an employee of a health care 
provider primarily engaged in relations or dealings with third party payers or seeking 
payment or reimbursement for health care services from third party payers.  
    (iii) "Impacted employee" means an individual who, at any time from the date this section 
becomes a law until two years after the end of the implementation period, is employed by a 
third party payer or is a health care provider administrative employee, and whose 
employment ends as a result of the implementation of the New York Health program.  
    (b) Within ninety days after this section shall become a law, the commissioner of labor 
shall convene a retraining and re-employment task force including but not limited to: 
representatives of potential impacted employees, human resource departments of third party 
payers and health care providers, individuals with experience and expertise in retraining and 
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re-employment programs relevant to the circumstances of impacted employees, and 
representatives of the commissioner of labor. The commissioner of labor and the task force 
shall review and provide:  
    (i) analysis of potential impacted employees by job title and geography;  
    (ii) competency mapping and labor market analysis of impacted employee occupations 
with job openings; and  
    (iii) establishment of regional retraining and re-employment systems, including but not 
limited to job boards, outplacement services, job search services, career advisement services, 
and retraining advisement, to be coordinated with the regional advisory councils established 
under section fifty-one hundred eleven of this article.  
    (c) (i) Three or more impacted employees, a recognized union of workers including 
impacted employees, or an employer of impacted employees may file a petition with the 
commissioner of labor to certify such employees as being impacted employees.  
    (ii) Impacted employees shall be eligible for:  
    (A) up to two years of retraining at any training provider approved by the commissioner of 
labor; and  
    (B) up to two years of unemployment benefits, provided that the impacted employee is 
enrolled in a department of labor approved training program, is actively seeking 
employment, and is not currently employed full time; provided, however, that such impacted 
employee may maintain unemployment benefits for up to two years even if he or she does 
not meet the criteria set forth in this clause but is sixty-three years of age or older at the time 
of loss of employment as an impacted employee.  
    (d) The commissioner shall provide funds from the New York Health trust fund or 
otherwise appropriated for this purpose to the commissioner of labor for retraining and re-
employment programs for impacted employees under this subdivision.  
    (e) The commissioner of labor shall make regulations and take other actions reasonably 
necessary to implement this subdivision. This subdivision shall be implemented consistent 
with applicable law and regulations.  
    4. The commissioner shall, directly and through grants to not-for-profit entities, conduct 
programs using data collected through the New York Health program, to promote and protect 
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the quality of health care services, patient outcomes, and public, environmental and 
occupational health, including cooperation with other data collection and research programs 
of the department, consistent with this article, the protection of the security and 
confidentiality of individually identifiable patient information, and otherwise applicable law.  
    § 5111. Regional advisory councils. 1. The New York Health regional advisory councils 
(each referred to in this article as a "regional advisory council") are hereby created in the 
department.  
    2. There shall be a regional advisory council established in each of the following regions:  
    (a) Long Island, consisting of Nassau and Suffolk counties;  
    (b) New York City;  
    (c) Hudson Valley, consisting of Delaware, Dutchess, Orange, Putnam, Rockland, 
Sullivan, Ulster, Westchester counties;  
    (d) Northern, consisting of Albany, Clinton, Columbia, Essex, Franklin, Fulton, Greene, 
Hamilton, Herkimer, Jefferson, Lewis, Montgomery, Otsego, Rensselaer, Saratoga, 
Schenectady, Schoharie, St. Lawrence, Warren, Washington counties;  
    (e) Central, consisting of Broome, Cayuga, Chemung, Chenango, Cortland, Livingston, 
Madison, Monroe, Oneida, Onondaga, Ontario, Oswego, Schuyler, Seneca, Steuben, Tioga, 
Tompkins, Wayne, Yates counties; and  
    (f) Western, consisting of Allegany, Cattaraugus, Chautauqua, Erie, Genesee, Niagara, 
Orleans, Wyoming counties.  
    3. Each regional advisory council shall be composed of not fewer than twenty-seven 
members, as determined by the commissioner and the board, as necessary to appropriately 
represent the diverse needs and concerns of the region. Members of a regional advisory 
council shall be residents of or have their principal place of business in the region served by 
the regional advisory council.  
    4. Appointment of members of the regional advisory councils.  
    (a) The twenty-seven members shall be appointed as follows:  
    (i) nine members shall be appointed by the governor;  
    (ii) six members shall be appointed by the governor on the recommendation of the speaker 
of the assembly;  
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    (iii) six members shall be appointed by the governor on the recommendation of the 
temporary president of the senate;  
    (iv) three members shall be appointed by the governor on the recommendation of the 
minority leader of the assembly; and  
    (v) three members shall be appointed by the governor on the recommendation of the 
minority leader of the senate.  
    Where a regional advisory council has more than twenty-seven members, additional 
members shall be appointed and recommended by these officials in the same proportion as 
the twenty-seven members.  
    (b) Regional advisory council membership shall include but not be limited to:  
    (i) representatives of organizations with a regional constituency that advocate for health 
care consumers, older adults, and people with disabilities including organizations led by 
members of those groups, who shall constitute at least one third of the membership of each 
regional council;  
    (ii) representatives of professional organizations representing physicians;  
    (iii) representatives of professional organizations representing health care professionals 
other than physicians;  
    (iv) representatives of general hospitals, including public hospitals;  
    (v) representatives of community health centers;  
    (vi) representatives of mental health, behavioral health (including substance use), physical 
disability, developmental disability, rehabilitation, home care and other service providers;  
    (vii) representatives of women's health service providers;  
    (viii) representatives of health care organizations;  
    (ix) representatives of organized labor including representatives of health care workers;  
    (x) representatives of employers; and  
    (xi) representatives of municipal and county government.  
    5. Members of a regional advisory council shall be appointed for terms of three years 
provided, however, that of the members first appointed, one-third shall be appointed for one 
year terms and one-third shall be appointed for two year terms. Vacancies shall be filled in 
the same manner as original appointments for the remainder of any unexpired term. No 
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person shall be a member of a regional advisory council for more than six years in any period 
of twelve consecutive years.  
    6. Members of the regional advisory councils shall serve without compensation but shall 
be reimbursed for their necessary and actual expenses incurred while engaged in the business 
of the advisory councils. The program shall provide financial support for such expenses and 
other expenses of the regional advisory councils.  
    7. Each regional advisory council shall meet at least quarterly. Each regional advisory 
council may form committees to assist it in its work. Members of a committee need not be 
members of the regional advisory council. The New York City regional advisory council 
shall form a committee for each borough of New York City, to assist the regional advisory 
council in its work as it relates particularly to that borough.  
    8. Each regional advisory council shall advise the commissioner, the board, the governor 
and the legislature on all matters relating to the development and implementation of the New 
York Health program.  
    9. Each regional advisory council shall adopt, and from time to time revise, a community 
health improvement plan for its region for the purpose of:  
    (a) promoting the delivery of health care services in the region, improving the quality and 
accessibility of care, including cultural competency, clinical integration of care between 
service providers including but not limited to physical, mental, and behavioral health, 
physical and developmental disability services, and long-term supports and services;  
    (b) facility and health services planning in the region;  
    (c) identifying gaps in regional health care services;  
    (d) promoting increased public knowledge and responsibility regarding the availability and 
appropriate utilization of health care services. Each community health improvement plan 
shall be submitted to the commissioner and the board and shall be posted on the department's 
website;  
    (e) identifying needs in professional and service personnel required to deliver health care 
services; and  
    (f) coordinating regional implementation of retraining and re-employment programs for 
impacted employees under subdivision three of section fifty-one hundred ten of this article.  
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    10. Each regional advisory council shall hold at least four public hearings annually on 
matters relating to the New York Health program and the development and implementation 
of the community health improvement plan.  
    11. Each regional advisory council shall publish an annual report to the commissioner and 
the board on the progress of the community health improvement plan. These reports shall be 
posted on the department's website.  
    12. All meetings of the regional advisory councils and committees shall be subject to 
article six of the public officers law.  
    § 4. Financing of New York Health. 1. The governor shall submit to the legislature a 
revenue plan and legislative bills to implement the plan (referred to collectively in this 
section as the "revenue proposal") to provide the revenue necessary to finance the New York 
Health program, as created by article 51 of the public health law and all provisions of that 
article (referred to in this section as the "program"), taking into consideration anticipated 
federal revenue available for the program. The revenue proposal shall be submitted to the 
legislature as part of the executive budget under article VII of the state constitution, for the 
fiscal year commencing on the first day of April in the calendar year after this act shall 
become a law. In developing the revenue proposal, the governor shall consult with 
appropriate officials of the executive branch; the temporary president of the senate; the 
speaker of the assembly; the chairs of the fiscal and health committees of the senate and 
assembly; and representatives of business, labor, consumers and local government.  
    2. (a) Basic structure. The basic structure of the revenue proposal shall be as follows: 
Revenue for the program shall come from two taxes (referred to collectively in this section as 
the "taxes"). First, there shall be a progressively graduated tax on all payroll and self-
employed income (referred to in this section as the "payroll tax"), paid by employers, 
employees and self-employed individuals. Second, there shall be a progressively graduated 
tax on taxable income (such as interest, dividends, and capital gains) not subject to the 
payroll tax (referred to in this section as the "non-payroll tax"). Income in the bracket below 
twenty-five thousand dollars per year shall be exempt from the taxes. Higher brackets of 
income subject to the taxes shall be assessed at a higher marginal rate than lower brackets. 
The taxes shall be set at levels anticipated to produce sufficient revenue to finance the 
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program, to be scaled up as enrollment grows, taking into consideration anticipated federal 
revenue available for the program. Provision shall be made for state residents (who are 
eligible for the program) who are employed out-of-state, and non-residents (who are not 
eligible for the program) who are employed in the state.  
    (b) Payroll tax. The income to be subject to the payroll tax shall be all income subject to 
the Medicare Part A tax. The tax shall be set at a percentage of that income, which shall be 
progressively graduated, so the percentage is higher on higher brackets of income. For 
employed individuals, the employer shall pay eighty percent of the tax and the employee 
shall pay twenty percent of the tax, except that an employer may agree to pay all or part of 
the employee's share. A self-employed individual shall pay the full tax.  
    (c) Non-payroll income tax. There shall be a tax on income that is subject to the personal 
income tax under article 22 of the tax law and is not subject to the payroll tax. It shall be set 
at a percentage of that income, which shall be progressively graduated, so the percentage is 
higher on higher brackets of income.  
    (d) Phased-in rates. Early in the program, when enrollment is growing, the amount of the 
taxes shall be at an appropriate level, and shall be changed as anticipated enrollment grows, 
to cover the actual cost of the program. The revenue proposal shall include a mechanism for 
determining the rates of the taxes.  
    (e) Cross-border employees. (i) State residents employed out-of-state. If an individual is 
employed out-of-state by an employer that is subject to New York state law, the employer 
and employee shall be required to pay the payroll tax as to that employee as if the 
employment were in the state. If an individual is employed out-of-state by an employer that 
is not subject to New York state law, either (A) the employer and employee shall voluntarily 
comply with the tax or (B) the employee shall pay the tax as if he or she were self-employed.  
    (ii) Out-of-state residents employed in the state. (A) The payroll tax shall apply to any out-
of-state resident who is employed or self-employed in the state. (B) In the case of an out-of-
state resident who is employed or self-employed in the state, such individual and individual's 
employer shall be able to take a credit against the payroll taxes each would otherwise pay as 
to that individual for amounts they spend respectively on health benefits for the individual 
that would otherwise be covered by the program if the individual were a member of the 
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program. For the employer, the credit shall be available regardless of the form of the health 
benefit (e.g., health insurance, a self-insured plan, direct services, or reimbursement for 
services), to make sure that the revenue proposal does not relate to employment benefits in 
violation of the federal ERISA. For non-employment-based spending by the individual, the 
credit shall be available for and limited to spending for health coverage (not out-of-pocket 
health spending). The credit shall be available without regard to how little is spent or how 
sparse the benefit. The credit may only be taken against the payroll tax. Any excess amount 
may not be applied to other tax liability. The credit shall be distributed between the employer 
and employee in the same proportion as the spending by each for the benefit and may be 
applied to their respective portion of the tax. (C) If any provision of this subparagraph or any 
application of it shall be ruled to violate federal ERISA, the provision or the application of it 
shall be null and void and the ruling shall not affect any other provision or application of this 
section or the act that enacted it.  
    3. (a) The revenue proposal shall include a plan and legislative provisions for ending the 
requirement for local social services districts to pay part of the cost of Medicaid and 
replacing those payments with revenue from the taxes under the revenue proposal.  
    (b) The taxes under this section shall not supplant the spending of other state revenue to 
pay for the Medicaid program as it exists as of the enactment of the revenue proposal as 
amended, unless the revenue proposal as amended provides otherwise.  
    4. To the extent that the revenue proposal differs from the terms of subdivision two or 
paragraph (b) of subdivision three of this section, the revenue proposal shall state how it 
differs from those terms and reasons for and the effects of the differences.  
    5. All revenue from the taxes shall be deposited in the New York Health trust fund account 
under section 89-j of the state finance law.  
    § 5. Article 49 of the public health law is amended by adding a new title 3 to read as 
follows:  
TITLE III 
COLLECTIVE NEGOTIATIONS BY HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS WITH 
NEW YORK HEALTH 
Section 4920. Definitions.  
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    4921. Collective negotiation authorized.  
    4922. Collective negotiation requirements.  
    4923. Requirements for health care providers' representative.  
    4924. Mediation.  
    4925. Certain collective action prohibited.  
    4926. Fees.  
    4927. Confidentiality.  
    4928. Severability and construction.  
    § 4920. Definitions. For purposes of this title:  
    1. "New York Health" means the program under article fifty-one of this chapter.  
    2. "Person" means an individual, association, corporation, or any other legal entity.  
    3. "Health care providers' representative" means a third party that is authorized by health 
care providers to negotiate on their behalf with New York Health over terms and conditions 
affecting those health care providers.  
    4. "Strike" means a work stoppage in part or in whole, direct or indirect, by a body of 
workers to gain compliance with demands made on an employer.  
    5. "Health care provider" means a health care provider under article fifty-one of this 
chapter. A health care professional as defined in article fifty-one of this chapter who 
practices as an employee or independent contractor of another health care provider shall not 
be deemed a health care provider for purposes of this title.  
    § 4921. Collective negotiation authorized. 1. Health care providers may meet and 
communicate for the purpose of collectively negotiating with New York Health on any 
matter relating to New York Health, including but not limited to rates of payment and 
payment methodologies.  
    2. Nothing in this section shall be construed to allow or authorize an alteration of the terms 
of the internal and external review procedures set forth in law.  
    3. Nothing in this section shall be construed to allow a strike of New York Health by 
health care providers.  
    4. Nothing in this section shall be construed to allow or authorize terms or conditions 
which would impede the ability of New York Health to obtain or retain accreditation by the 
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national committee for quality assurance or a similar body or to comply with applicable state 
or federal law.  
    § 4922. Collective negotiation requirements. 1. Collective negotiation rights granted by 
this title must conform to the following requirements:  
    (a) health care providers may communicate with other health care providers regarding the 
terms and conditions to be negotiated with New York Health;  
    (b) health care providers may communicate with health care providers' representatives;  
    (c) a health care providers' representative is the only party authorized to negotiate with 
New York Health on behalf of the health care providers as a group;  
    (d) a health care provider can be bound by the terms and conditions negotiated by the 
health care providers' representatives; and  
    (e) in communicating or negotiating with the health care providers' representative, New 
York Health is entitled to offer and provide different terms and conditions to individual 
competing health care providers.  
    2. Nothing in this title shall affect or limit the right of a health care provider or group of 
health care providers to collectively petition a government entity for a change in a law, rule, 
or regulation.  
    3. Nothing in this title shall affect or limit collective action or collective bargaining on the 
part of any health care provider with his or her employer or any other lawful collective action 
or collective bargaining.  
    § 4923. Requirements for health care providers' representative. Before engaging in 
collective negotiations with New York Health on behalf of health care providers, a health 
care providers' representative shall file with the commissioner, in the manner prescribed by 
the commissioner, information identifying the representative, the representative's plan of 
operation, and the representative's procedures to ensure compliance with this title.  
    § 4924. Mediation. 1. In the event the commissioner determines that an impasse exists in 
the negotiations, the commissioner shall render assistance as follows:  
    (a) to assist the parties to effect a voluntary resolution of the negotiations, the 
commissioner shall appoint a mediator who is mutually acceptable to both the health care 
providers' representative and the representative of New York Health. If the mediator is 
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successful in resolving the impasse, then the health care providers' representative shall 
proceed as set forth in this article;  
    (b) if an impasse continues, the commissioner shall appoint a fact-finding board of not 
more than three members, who are mutually acceptable to both the health care providers' 
representative and the representative of New York Health. The fact-finding board shall have, 
in addition to the powers delegated to it by the board, the power to make recommendations 
for the resolution of the dispute;  
    (c) the fact-finding board, acting by a majority of its members, shall transmit its findings 
of fact and recommendations for resolution of the dispute to the commissioner, and may 
thereafter assist the parties to effect a voluntary resolution of the dispute. The fact-finding 
board shall also share its findings of fact and recommendations with the health care 
providers' representative and the representative of New York Health. If within twenty days 
after the submission of the findings of fact and recommendations, the impasse continues, the 
commissioner shall order a resolution to the negotiations based upon the findings of fact and 
recommendations submitted by the fact-finding board.  
    § 4925. Certain collective action prohibited. 1. This title is not intended to authorize 
competing health care providers to act in concert in response to a health care providers' 
representative's discussions or negotiations with New York Health except as authorized by 
other law.  
    2. No health care providers' representative shall negotiate any agreement that excludes, 
limits the participation or reimbursement of, or otherwise limits the scope of services to be 
provided by any health care provider or group of health care providers with respect to the 
performance of services that are within the health care provider's lawful scope or terms of 
practice, license, registration, or certificate.  
    § 4926. Fees. Each person who acts as the representative of negotiating parties under this 
title shall pay to the department a fee to act as a representative. The commissioner, by 
regulation, shall set fees in amounts deemed reasonable and necessary to cover the costs 
incurred by the department in administering this title.  
    § 4927. Confidentiality. All reports and other information required to be reported to the 
department under this title shall not be subject to disclosure under article six of the public 
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officers law.  
    § 4928. Severability and construction. If any provision or application of this title shall be 
held to be invalid, or to violate or be inconsistent with any applicable federal law or 
regulation, that shall not affect other provisions or applications of this title which can be 
given effect without that provision or application; and to that end, the provisions and 
applications of this title are severable. The provisions of this title shall be liberally construed 
to give effect to the purposes thereof.  
    § 6. Subdivision 11 of section 270 of the public health law, as amended by section 2-a of 
part C of chapter 58 of the laws of 2008, is amended to read as follows:  
    11. "State public health plan" means the medical assistance program established by title 
eleven of article five of the social services law (referred to in this article as "Medicaid"), the 
elderly pharmaceutical insurance coverage program established by title three of article two of 
the elder law (referred to in this article as "EPIC"), and the [family health plus program 
established by section three hundred sixty-nine-ee of the social services law to the extent that 
section provides that the program shall be subject to this article] New York Health program 
established by article fifty-one of this chapter.  
    § 7. The state finance law is amended by adding a new section 89-j to read as follows:  
    § 89-j. New York Health trust fund. 1. There is hereby established in the joint custody of 
the state comptroller and the commissioner of taxation and finance a special revenue fund to 
be known as the "New York Health trust fund", referred to in this section as "the fund". The 
definitions in section fifty-one hundred of the public health law shall apply to this section.  
    2. The fund shall consist of:  
    (a) all monies obtained from taxes pursuant to legislation enacted as proposed under 
section three of the New York Health act;  
    (b) federal payments received as a result of any waiver or other arrangements agreed to by 
the United States secretary of health and human services or other appropriate federal officials 
for health care programs established under Medicare, any federally-matched public health 
program, or the affordable care act;  
    (c) the amounts paid by the department of health that are equivalent to those amounts that 
are paid on behalf of residents of this state under Medicare, any federally-matched public 
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health program, or the affordable care act for health benefits which are equivalent to health 
benefits covered under New York Health;  
    (d) federal and state funds for purposes of the provision of services authorized under title 
XX of the federal social security act that would otherwise be covered under article fifty-one 
of the public health law; and  
    (e) state monies that would otherwise be appropriated to any governmental agency, office, 
program, instrumentality or institution which provides health services, for services and 
benefits covered under New York Health. Payments to the fund pursuant to this paragraph 
shall be in an amount equal to the money appropriated for such purposes in the fiscal year 
beginning immediately preceding the effective date of the New York Health act.  
    3. Monies in the fund shall only be used for purposes established under article fifty-one of 
the public health law.  
    § 8. Temporary commission on implementation. 1. There is hereby established a 
temporary commission on implementation of the New York Health program, referred to in 
this section as the commission, consisting of fifteen members: five members, including the 
chair, shall be appointed by the governor; four members shall be appointed by the temporary 
president of the senate, one member shall be appointed by the senate minority leader; four 
members shall be appointed by the speaker of the assembly, and one member shall be 
appointed by the assembly minority leader. The commissioner of health, the superintendent 
of financial services, and the commissioner of taxation and finance, or their designees shall 
serve as non-voting ex-officio members of the commission.  
    2. Members of the commission shall receive such assistance as may be necessary from 
other state agencies and entities, and shall receive reasonable and necessary expenses 
incurred in the performance of their duties. The commission may employ staff as needed, 
prescribe their duties, and fix their compensation within amounts appropriated for the 
commission.  
    3. The commission shall examine the laws and regulations of the state and make such 
recommendations as are necessary to conform the laws and regulations of the state and 
article 51 of the public health law establishing the New York Health program and other 
provisions of law relating to the New York Health program, and to improve and implement 
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the program. The commission shall report its recommendations to the governor and the 
legislature. The commission shall immediately begin development of proposals consistent 
with the principles of article 51 of the public health law for provision of health care services 
covered under the workers' compensation law; and incorporation of retiree health benefits, as 
described in paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) of subdivision 8 of section 5102 of the public health 
law. The commission shall provide its work product and assistance to the board established 
pursuant to section 5102 of the public health law upon completion of the appointment of the 
board.  
    § 9. Severability. If any provision or application of this act shall be held to be invalid, or to 
violate or be inconsistent with any applicable federal law or regulation, that shall not affect 
other provisions or applications of this act which can be given effect without that provision 
or application; and to that end, the provisions and applications of this act are severable.  












1.  End the burdens and obstacles to 
health care. 
 Every year, millions of New Yorkers with health 
insurance go without health care because they can’t afford it.  
Deductibles, copays, out-of-network charges and unfair 
denials of coverage get in the way.  People choose between 
health care and other basic necessities.  And most New 
Yorkers say they have fears about the affordability of health 
care. 
Insurance companies don’t care if you’re a multi-
millionaire CEO or a receptionist.  They impose the same 
financial obstacles regardless of your ability to pay. 
 If someone in a family needs home health care or nursing 
home care, the cost can wipe out a lifetime of savings or 
force family members to give up a career to care for a loved 
one.  Instead, the NY Health Act covers the 
long-term care people need, in the setting of 
their choice. 
 The NY Health Act has no premiums, 
deductibles, copays, restricted provider 
networks or out-of-network charges.  It 
lowers costs for seniors by picking up Medicare Part B 
premiums and eliminating Medicare “cost-sharing.”  It brings 
local tax relief by eliminating the “local share” of Medicaid. 
 NY Health would save billions that New Yorkers now 
spend for coverage and out-of-pocket costs – and is paid for 
by a broad-based progressively-graduated tax based on 
ability to pay. 
 The tax would apply to payroll income (i.e., subject to the 
Medicare Part A tax) paid at least 80% by the employer, and 
“unearned” income (e.g., capital gains, dividends, etc.) that is 
currently subject to the NY state personal income tax. 
 Income in lower brackets would be taxed at lower rates or 
exempt from the tax, and income in higher brackets would be 
taxed at a higher rate.  That’s just fair. 
 
2.  Stop wasting money. 
 Getting insurance companies off our backs will save 
billions of dollars to pay for health care and to put money 
back into New Yorkers’ pockets. Getting rid of insurance 
company bureaucracy and profits saves us over $20 billion.  
We save over $16 billion we now pay to doctors, hospitals 
and other providers for the administrative cost of fighting 
with insurance companies.  We’ll cut drug prices over $18 
billion with the bargaining power of 20 million consumers.  
That’s $55 billion a year. 
 These savings are what frees up the money to pay for 
ending deductibles, co-pays, restricted provider networks, 
and out-of-network charges, and covering long-term care.  
The fragmentation of the current system is the enemy of 
affordability, quality and real reform. 
 
3.  All in the same boat. 
 Covering all of us in the same plan isn’t just a matter of 
fairness.  Making the plan universal and publicly accountable 
also guarantees that NY Health will be top quality. 
 How?  Legislators, governors and other officials, their 
families, friends will be covered by the same plan as all their 
constituents.  They’ll have a personal stake in making sure 
the plan treats them and their doctors, hospitals and other 
providers as best as can be.  All 20 million New Yorkers will 
benefit by being in the same plan with 
them. 
 We all want to hold down costs and the 
taxes that pay for the plan.  But we’ll also 
have a stake in keeping NY Health top 
quality.  That balance of pressures is key. 
Insurance companies have to deliver as 
much of our money to their stockholders as possible.  That 
means cutting what they spend on our health care any way 
they can. 
 The NY Health Act explicitly requires that payments to 
health care providers must be “reasonably related to the cost 
of efficiently providing the health care service and assuring 
an adequate and accessible supply of the health care service.”  
No insurance company promises or delivers that. 
 
From  
Assembly Member Richard N. Gottfried 
Senator Gustavo Rivera 
What makes the NY Health Act work. 
And why no other plan does. 
No other plan can do the job. 
Some argue that we should just try to get health 
insurance for the 5% of New Yorkers who are still 
uninsured. 
But plans that keep our fractured insurance company 
system can’t remove the burdens and financial obstacles to 
health care and don’t give us the savings that will pay for 
health care and put money back in New Yorkers’ pockets.  
They won’t relieve the administrative burdens on doctors, 
hospitals and other providers. 
Millions of New Yorkers go without needed health care 
or face financial obstacles and burdens to get it.  No one 
says that’s acceptable.  And the NY Health Act is the only 
plan that meets that need. 
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NEW YORK STATE ASSEMBLY 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF LEGISLATION 
submitted in accordance with Assembly Rule III, Sec 1(f) 
  
BILL NUMBER: A5248 
  
SPONSOR: Gottfried (MS) 
 
  
TITLE OF BILL: 
  
An act to amend the public health law and the state finance law, in 




PURPOSE OR GENERAL IDEA OF BILL: 
  
This bill would create a universal single payer health plan - New York 
Health - to provide comprehensive health coverage for all New Yorkers. 
  
  
SUMMARY OF SPECIFIC PROVISIONS: 
  
Every New York resident would be eligible to enroll, regardless of age, 
income, wealth, employment, or other status. 
  
There would be no network restrictions, deductibles, or co-pays.  Cover- 
age would be publicly funded. The benefits will include comprehensive 
outpatient and inpatient medical care, long-term care, primary and 
preventive care, prescription drugs, laboratory tests, rehabilitative, 
dental, vision, hearing, etc. - all benefits required by current state 
insurance law or provided by the state public employee package, Family 
Health Plus, Child Health Plus, Medicare, or Medicaid, and others added 
by the plan. 
  
Everyone would choose a primary care practitioner or other provider to 
provide care coordination - helping to get the care and follow-up the 
patient needs, referrals, and navigating the system. But there would be 
no "gatekeeper" obstacles to care. 
  
As with most health coverage, New York Health covers health care 
services when a member is out of state, either because health care is 
needed while the member is traveling or because there is a clinical 
reason for going to a particular out-of-state provider. 
  
A broadly representative Board of Trustees will advise the Commissioner 
of Health. The Board shall develop proposals relating to retiree health 
benefits and coverage of health care services covered under the workers' 
compensation law. 
  
In addition to the Board, there will be six regional advisory councils 
to represent the diverse needs and concerns of the region. The councils 
shall include but not be limited to representatives of health care 
consumers, providers, municipal and county government, and organized 
labor. The councils shall advise the Board, Commissioner, Governor, and 
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Legislature on matters relating to the NY Health program and shall adopt 
community health improvement plans to promote health care access and 
quality in their regions. 
  
Health care providers, including those providing care coordination, 
would be paid in full by New York Health, with no co-pays or other 
charges to patients. The plan would develop alternative payment methods 
to replace old-style fee-for-service (which rewards volume but not qual- 
ity), and would negotiate rates with health care provider organizations. 
(Fee-for-service would continue until new methods are phased in.) The 
bill would authorize health care providers to form organizations to 
collectively negotiate with New York Health. Health care would no longer 
be paid for by insurance companies charging a regressive "tax" insurance 
premiums, deductibles and co-pays imposed regardless of ability to pay. 
Instead, New York Health would be paid for based on ability to pay, 
through a progressively-graduated payroll-based tax (paid at least 80% 
by employers and not more than 20% by employees, and 100% by self-em- 
ployed) and a progressively-graduated tax based on other taxable income, 
such as capital gains, interest and dividends. A specific revenue plan, 
following guidelines in the bill, would be submitted to the Legislature 
by the Governor. 
  
Federal funds now received for Medicare, Medicaid, Family Health and 
Child Health Plus would be combined with the state revenue in a New York 
Health Trust Fund. New York would seek federal waivers that will allow 
New York to completely fold those programs into New York Health. The 
"local share" of Medicaid funding - a major burden on local property 
taxes - would be ended. 
  
Private insurance that duplicates benefits offered under New York Health 
could not be offered to New York residents. (Existing retiree coverage 





The state constitution states: "The protection and promotion of the 
health of the inhabitants of the state are matters of public concern and 
provision therefor shall be made by the state and by such of its subdi- 
visions and in such manner, and by such means as the legislature shall 
from time to time determine." (Article XVII, § 3.) All residents of the 
state have the right to health care. 
  
New Yorkers - as individuals, employers, and taxpayers - have experi- 
enced a rapid rise in the cost of health care and coverage in recent 
years. This increase has resulted in a large number of people without 
health coverage. Businesses have also experienced extraordinary 
increases in the costs of health care benefits for their employees. An 
unacceptable number of New Yorkers have no health coverage, and many 
more are severely underinsured. 
  
Health care providers are also affected by inadequate health coverage in 
New York State. A large portion of voluntary and public hospitals, 
health centers and other providers now experience substantial losses due 
to the provision of care that is uncompensated. Individuals often find 
that they are deprived of affordable care and choice because of deci- 
sions by health plans guided by the plan's economic needs rather than 
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their health care needs. 
  
To address the fiscal crisis facing the health care system and the state 
and to assure New Yorkers can exercise their right to health care, this 
legislation would establish a comprehensive universal single-payer 
health care coverage program, funded by broad-based revenue based on 
ability to pay, for the benefit of all residents of the state of New 
York. 
  
The state will work to obtain waivers relating to Medicaid, Family 
Health Plus, Child Health Plus, Medicare, the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act, and any other appropriate federal programs, under 
which federal funds and other subsidies that would otherwise be paid to 
New York State will be paid by the federal government to New York State 
and deposited in the New York Health trust fund. Under such a waiver, 
health coverage under those programs will be replaced and merged into 
New York Health, which will operate as a true single-payer program. If 
such a waiver is not obtained, the state shall use state plan amendments 
and seek waivers to maximize, and make as seamless as possible, the use 
of federally-matched health programs and federal health programs in New 
York Health, The goal of this legislation is that coverage be delivered 
by New York Health and, as much as possible, the multiple sources of 
funding will be pooled with other New York Health funds and not be 
apparent to New York Health members or participating providers. This 
program will promote movement away from fee-for-service payment, which 
tends to reward quantity and requires excessive administrative expense, 
and towards alternate payment methodologies, such a s global or capitat- 
ed payments to providers or health care organizations, that promote 
quality, efficiency, investment in primary and preventive care, and 
innovation and integration in the organizing of health care. 
  
This act does not create any employment benefit, nor does it require, 
prohibit, or limit the providing of any employment benefit. In order to 
promote improved quality of, and access to, health care services and 
promote improved clinical outcomes, it is the policy of the state to 
encourage cooperative, collaborative and integrative arrangements among 
health care providers who might otherwise be competitors, under the 
active supervision of the commissioner. It is the intent of the state to 
supplant competition with such arrangements and regulation only to the 
extent necessary to accomplish the purposes of this act, and to provide 
state action immunity under the state and federal antitrust laws to 
health care providers, particularly with respect to their relations with 
the single-payer New York Health plan created by this act. 
  
  
PRIOR LEGISLATIVE HISTORY: 
  
1992: A.8912-A passed Assembly 
1993: A.5900 reported to Ways and Means 
1994: A.5900 referred to Health Committee 
1995-96: A.6801 reported to Ways and Means 
1997-98: A.6172 reported to Ways and Means 
1999-00: A.3571 reported to Ways and Means 
2001-02: A.6779 reported to Ways and Means 
2003-04: A.6952 reported to Ways and Means 
2005: A.6576 reported to Ways and Means 
2006: A.6576 referred to Health Committee 
47
2007-08: A.7354 - reported to Ways and Means 
2009-10: A.2356 - referred to Health Committee 
2011-12: A.7860-A - referred to Ways and Means 
2013: A5389 referred to Health Committee 
2014: A5389 - reported to Ways and Means 
2015: A5062 - Passed Assembly 
2016: A5062 - passed Assembly 
2017: A4738 - passed Assembly 





Full funding for New York Health would come from the revenue measures to 
be proposed by the Governor under guidelines in the bill, plus available 
federal funds. The revenue package would also replace:  local share of 
Medicaid, the state share of Medicaid, state and local payments for 
public employee health coverage, and various other health care spending. 
Numerous analyses document that a single-payer system would be most 





Immediately. The program will actually begin functioning when the 




States as Policy Laboratories: The Politics of
State-Based Single-Payer Proposals
Although the focus for most
single-payer advocates is in
Washington, DC, and on pro-
posals for Medicare for all, there
are also efforts in a handful of
states to enact a state-based
single-payer program.Moreover,
the odds of legislative passage
are better in a state like New
York than at the federal level.
Even if enacted, however,
state-based single-payer pro-
posals face a distinct set of ob-
stacles, including (1) the need
to obtain federal permission
(via waivers) to repurpose fed-
eral dollars, (2) the federal Em-
ployee Retirement Income and
Security Act, and (3) the burden
of state-only action in an inter-
connected 50-state economy.
The most likely result of the
energized single-payer move-
mentwill be incremental public
insurance expansions at the
federal and state levels, inclu-
ding state programs to permit
the uninsured to buy into the
Medicaid program. Such an out-
come is consistentwith themost
plausible path (incrementalism)
to a US version of universal
coverage. (Am J Public Health.
2019;109:1511–1514. doi:10.
2105/AJPH.2019.305294)
Michael S. Sparer, JD, PhD
See also Donnelly et al., p. 1482.
Despite the gains generatedby the Affordable Care Act
(ACA), more than 30 million
Americans remain uninsured,
and millions more delay or defer
needed medical care because of
high deductibles and other out-
of-pocket costs. This ongoing
policy challenge prompts an
increasing cadre of progressive
Democrats to call for a compre-
hensive overhaul of the nation’s
health care system, dramatically
reducing (or perhaps completely
eliminating) themultipayer private
insurance health insurance industry
and replacing it with comprehen-
sive publicly funded coverage
for all, referred to generally as a
“single-payer” insurance model.1
Although the focus for most
single-payer advocates is Wash-
ington, DC, where the rhetorical
movement for Medicare for all
animates the presidential cam-
paigns of numerous Democratic
candidates, there are also efforts in a
handful of states to enact a state-
based single-payer program that
could become a model for federal
policymakers.2
The political obstacles to the
single-payer movement are ob-
vious.3 First, the interest group
opposition is fierce, wealthy, and
influential. Opponents include
private insurers worried about
being forced into bankruptcy,
providers worried about lower
reimbursement, employers wor-
ried about higher taxes and lost
control over employee benefits,
unions worried about losing
dollars generated by their health
benefit programs, and of course a
variety of conservative and Re-
publican advocacy groups. In-
terest group support for single
payer is far weaker, more frag-
mented, and less wealthy.
Single-payer proposals also
raise concerns about the appro-
priate role of government and the
division of labor between the
public and private sectors. These
concerns are especially powerful
here in the United States, where
an antigovernment ethos resonates
strongly with much of the pop-
ulation and where the view that
government is less competent
than the private sector is deeply
engrained. This context makes any
effort to dramatically raise taxes to
fund a single-payer system even
more difficult, even when econ-
omists point to administrative
efficiencies, long-term system
savings, and the elimination of
insurance premiums.
The odds of overcoming these
obstacles are better at the state
level than in Washington, DC.
Although single-payer pro-
posals at the national level have
only recently received their first
congressional committee hearing,
there are several states in which
single-payer proposals have re-
ceived serious consideration.
Vermont, for example, enacted
legislation in 2011 that put them
on the path to single payer (al-
though that effort was eventually
dropped in 2014). Colorado voters
considered (but defeated) a single-
payer referendum in 2016, as did
voters in Oregon in 2002. More
recently, the California state senate
passed a single-payer bill in 2017
that garnered the support (at least
during the campaign) of that state’s
newly elected governor, Gavin
Newsom. And in New York,
single-payer supporters saw a win-
dow of opportunity after the No-
vember 2018 election results in
which the Democrats took control
of the state senate, following several
years in which a Republican senate
had blocked an assembly passed
single-payer bill.
There may indeed be a small
window of opportunity for pol-
icymakers in a couple of states to
enact legislation that would put
their state on a path to a single-
payer system—it is not likely, but
it is possible. Even if enacted,
however, state-based single-
payer proposals face a distinct
set of obstacles on the path to
implementation. These barriers
include (1) the need to obtain
federal permission (via waivers)
to repurpose the vast amounts of
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federal dollars that now underpin
the nation’s health system; (2) the
federal Employee Retirement
Income and Security Act
(ERISA), which significantly
limits state jurisdiction over the
employers’ role in health in-
surance; and (3) the burden of
state-only action in an inter-
connected 50-state economy.
Perhaps ironically, the most
likely result of an energized
single-payer movement is a series
of incremental public insurance
expansions at both the federal and
state levels. Instead of Medicare
for all, Congress may enact
Medicare for more. Instead of the
New York Health Act, New
York may permit the uninsured
to buy into the state’s Medicaid
program. Suchanoutcomewould
be consistent with the most
plausible path to an American
version of universal coverage, one
that emerges step by step through
incremental expansions that build
on the current system, as opposed
to proposals to fundamentally
change the way the systemworks.
More on this later. First, however,
I review the limits on state efforts




The federal government is the
largest single funder of health care
services, and state-based single-
payer proposals seek to use federal
dollars as a core fiscal component
of the new state program. To do
so, however, requires federal
permission to redirect funds from
Medicare, Medicaid, the ACA,
the Federal Employees Health
Benefit Program, the Veteran’s
Health Administration, and per-
haps other federal programs as
well. Federal officials in the
Trump administration have
already made clear that they will
oppose any such waiver requests.4
Even assuming an eventual
friendly Democratic administra-
tion, the details of such waiver
requests would be complicated
and controversial.
For more than 50 years, for
example,Medicare has served as a
single national program, with
federal rules governing eligibility,
benefits, and provider re-
imbursement. There are, of
course, some exceptions to the
uniformity requirements, in-
cluding the all-payer hospital
reimbursement program, which
allows Maryland (and previously
a few other states) to set the al-
lowable hospital charges for all
payers, including Medicare.
Similarly, Medicare Advantage
plans have some flexibility to add
benefits and set reimbursement
rates. These exceptions pale,
however, in comparison with a
proposal that the program (and all
its dollars) be turned over to state
officials, an idea that will raise
concerns not only among federal
policymakers but among politi-
cally influential Medicare bene-
ficiaries and advocates on their
behalf as well. (The effort to re-
direct Veteran’s Health Admin-
istration funds to a state will likely
also generate fierce resistance
from an even more potent po-
litical group, the nation’s military
veterans!)
State officials have a some-
what easier path to redirecting
Medicaid and ACA funds.
Medicaid, for example, already
delegates broad authority to de-
termine eligibility, benefits, and
reimbursement rates to the states,
and there is a long history of
granting waivers from the federal
rules designed to limit such state
discretion. Moreover, conserva-
tives have long proposed that
federal officials give states a fixed
amount of federal Medicaid
funding, and the block grant
concept is very close to what
state-based single-payer advo-
cates seek. The ACA also con-
tains explicit authority (in section
1332 of the law) for state-based
experimentation along the lines
proposed by single-payer advo-
cates. Here again, however, de-
spite its rhetorical support for
state experimentation, the
Trump administration is unlikely
to be receptive to comprehensive
Medicaid or ACA waivers
designed to create a path to a
single-payer system. Nor would
the waiver process be simple and
straightforward even in a Dem-
ocratic administration.
The single-payer proposal
now under consideration inNew
York (theNewYorkHealth Act)
contains a backup plan in case the
state is unable to obtain the de-
sired federal waivers, under
which the state would provide
supplemental wraparound cov-
erage for Medicaid and Medicare
beneficiaries. In other words,
those programs would continue
as is, but the state would ensure
that those beneficiaries also re-
ceive the additional benefits
covered by the new single-payer
program. Such a systemwould be
quite administratively complex,
undermining one of the guiding
principles of the reform. At the
same time, the cost of such sup-
plemental coverage would be
significant, thereby making it
even more difficult to generate




ERISA, enacted by Congress
in 1974, is concerned primarily
with employer pension programs
(requiring that such programs be
adequately capitalized, avoid in-
equitable vesting requirements,
and provide clear disclosure
about terms and conditions). But
ERISA also has two provisions
likely to generate court chal-
lenges to state-based single-payer
programs. First, the law prohibits
states from regulating, taxing or
otherwise interfering with com-
panies that have self-insured
health plans in which the firm
itself holds the financial risk of
employee medical costs.5 More
than 60% of the 173 million
Americans with group coverage
receive coverage through one of
these self-insured ERISA plans.
State legislation that imposed a
significant payroll tax to fund a
single-payer plan would almost
certainly be challenged in court as
unlawful under ERISA. Second,
ERISA also prevents states from
enacting a so-called employer
mandate, or a requirement that
firms provide health coverage (or
pay for such coverage) for their
employees. Here again, any state
legislation that imposed a signif-
icant payroll tax to fund a
single-payer plan would likely be
challenged as an unlawful em-
ployer mandate, a claim that
could have special resonance
with small businesses that cur-
rently are exempt from the fed-
eral employermandate contained
in the ACA.
Richard Gottfried, the legis-
lative sponsor of the single-payer
proposal in New York, dismisses
the ERISA challenge as unlikely
to succeed, noting that (1) the
state has clear authority to impose
payroll taxes; (2) the proposed
law does not require any firm to
provide coverage but, in fact,
does just the opposite, relieving
firms of any such obligation; and
(3) firms could still maintain their
employer-based coverage, al-
though it would be irrational for
them to do so because they also
would be contributing to the cost
of the single-payer program.6
There is no clear precedent
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suggesting how the courts would
rule in the inevitable ERISA
challenge to a state-based single-
payer initiative. It is quite likely,
however, that the litigation
would drag on for years, com-
plicating at a minimum any effort
to implement such a program.
AN INTERCONNECTED
50-STATE ECONOMY
The implementation of a
state-based single-payer program
is complicated by the nation’s
interconnected 50-state econ-
omy. States need to decide, for
example, whether the new pro-
gram will cover nonresidents
(and, if not, how businesses can
provide coverage to that pop-
ulation). Former Vermont gov-
ernor Peter Shumlin, the guiding
force behind that state’s single-
payer proposal, decided to in-
clude the out-of-state com-
muters, but that decision both
raised the overall cost and added
to the potential implementation
challenge.7 There also are a host
of potential unintended conse-
quences that are hard to predict
or plan for. Will businesses and
high-income individuals exit the
state to avoid paying the new
taxes needed to finance the sys-
tem? Will physicians and other
health care providers exit the state
to maintain income generated
from commercial insurers? Will
severely ill individuals move to
the state to receive comprehen-
sive coverage, and, if so, what
would be the fiscal result of such a
“health care magnet” effect?
What will be the impact on large
companies that operate in mul-
tiple states?
It is plausible that these con-
cerns are overstated. For exam-
ple, despite the longstanding
differences in state-based health
and welfare programs, there is
little evidence of a significant
health care magnet effect. Nor is
there evidence of a major exodus
of high-income individuals fol-
lowing the imposition of new
state income taxes or of a large-
scale physician exit because of
cuts in reimbursement. This is
especially true in New York City
and other destinations of choice
among the nation’s most wealthy
individuals. Nevertheless, in its
analysis of the proposed New
York Health Act, the RAND
Corporation projected that if
roughly 50 000 high-income
taxpayers changed their domicile,
the state would lose more than
$30 billion in revenue, or more
than 20% of the estimated $139
billion needed to fund the first
year of the new single-payer
program.8
The fiscal (and political) ca-
pacity of a single state to generate
sufficient tax revenue to finance a
single-payer system is also ques-
tionable. For example, when
Vermont’s Governor Shumlin
pulled the plug on that state’s
single-payer initiative, he cited
the “economic shock” of having
to impose dramatic tax increases
(11.5% on employers and 9.5%
on individuals) that would in-
crease the state’s budget by almost
50%.7 New York assemblyman
Richard Gottfried argues that the
progressive tax scheme contained
in the New York Health Act
enables the state to more easily
withstand the economic shock of
the massive tax, but the potential
exit of at least some of the state’s
wealthiest citizens would un-
dermine that assumption.
Finally, single-payer advocates
can also face unexpected re-
sistance from presumed political
allies based on the idiosyncratic
provisions in state constitutions.
For example, both Planned Par-
enthood and NARAL Pro-
Choice America opposed the
2016 single-payer referendum in
Colorado because the state’s
constitution banned public
funding for abortions, and re-
productive rights advocates
feared the initiative would
eliminate access to abortions for
women now covered by private
health plans. The referendum’s
supporters challenged that as-
sumption, arguing that the new
law would lead to the repeal of
the constitutional ban. But the
uncertainty about this issue un-
doubtedly contributed to the




Those who propose Medicare
for all and who tout the eco-
nomic and moral virtues of a
single payer argue persuasively
that such an approach would
dramatically reduce the inequities
and disparities deeply rooted in
the nation’s complicated, frag-
mented, and decentralized sys-
tem. Medicare is a national
program with uniform rules; it is
viewed by most Americans as an
“earned right,” and although it
now has a relatively limited
benefit package, Senator Bernie
Sanders and other advocates
promise vastly expanded cover-
age. But the notion that the
United States (or any of its
political subdivisions) is going
to replace (nearly overnight)
the longstanding system of
employer-sponsored coverage
runs contrary to both US history
and US politics. The interest
group opposition is too strong,
the cultural concerns about
government are too deep, and
the opportunities for opponents
to stymie the policy process are
too plentiful. Moreover, state
officials who hope to create the
policy laboratory that enacts and
implements a single-payer pro-
gram must overcome additional
obstacles, including ERISA, the
need for federal waivers, and the
complications generated by an
interconnected 50-state
economy.
In this context, the most likely
reform scenarios are incremental
rather than comprehensive. One
idea generating significant mo-
mentum is to expand Medicare
enrollment (either by lowering
the eligibility age or by permit-
ting additional populations to
buy into the program). But
Medicare for more is politically
plausible only if the Democrats
control both the White House
and Congress, a scenario that
cannot happen before 2021.
States, however, can act more
quickly, aiding their remaining
uninsured (and underinsured)
and providing a model for na-
tional reform (much as the 2006
coverage expansions in Massa-
chusetts provided a model for the
ACA). Washington state, for
example, recently passed the
nation’s first so-called public
option, Cascade Care, under
which buyers on the state’s in-
surance exchange will soon be
able to purchase a lower-cost plan
in which premiums (and de-
ductibles) are kept low because of
state-mandated caps on provider
reimbursement. The private
carrier that operates this plan will
need to meet a host of additional
requirements not imposed on the
other plans in the insurance
market.10
Similarly, several states are
currently considering different
versions of a Medicaid buy-in,
which could lead to a policy
menu for future reformers. Such
buy-in programs could differ on
1. whether to offer the buy-in
product on or off the ACA
insurance exchange,
2. the benefit package,
AJPH FINANCING HEALTH CARE
November 2019, Vol 109, No. 11 AJPH Sparer Peer Reviewed Analytic Essay 151351
3. out-of-pocket costs,
4. provider reimbursement, and
5. how tofinance the initiative.11
Under the proposal now under
consideration in New Mexico,
for example, the state would es-
tablish a buy-in plan available to
all those not otherwise eligible for
public or private coverage, with
out-of-pocket costs based on
household income and benefits
delivered by plans currently op-
erating in the state’s Medicaid
managed care market.12
The argument for relying on
Medicaid as a path to universal
coverage is strengthened as well
by the program’s 30-year history
of incremental expansion, under
both Democratic and Republican
administrations. Medicaid now
has more than 70 million enroll-
ees, its cost is shared by the federal
government and the states, and its
political resilience was an impor-
tant factor in the failure of the
Republicans to repeal and replace
the ACA. The program has sur-
prisingly strong interest group
support, it is administered by the
states (thus shielding it from claims
that it is a big government
monolith), and it provides an in-
surance safety net for public health
crises (fromAIDS to the Flint,MI,
water crisis). Finally, Medicaid
buy-in strategies arenot precluded
by ERISA, can proceed without
federal waivers (although such
waivers could help), and can
proceed without raising concerns
about nonresidents or neighbor-
ing states.
At the same time, Medicaid
politics also shows the potential
risk of relying on states to provide
a path to universal coverage.
After all, there are still more than
a dozen “red” states that have not
adopted the ACA Medicaid ex-
pansion. There is increased
pressure in many red states to
expand coverage, as illustrated by
the recent voter referendums in
Idaho, Nebraska, and Utah re-
quiring state officials to expand
Medicaid.13 But the political
pressure in these states to expand
coverage competes with equally
strong (if not stronger) pressure to
cut back, suggesting that uni-
versal coverage in the United
States will not happen without
federal legislation. The question,
however, is whether the best path
to universal coverage is through a
single-payer path or through
incremental expansions of cur-
rent programs.
There is no doubt that many
progressive Democrats will con-
tinue to advocate the more am-
bitious single-payer approach,
and in some states there clearly
are going to be windows of op-
portunity for legislative success.
But single payer even in the most
liberal of states is still a political
long shot. In New York, for
example, Richard Gottfried and
his colleagues could not round up
the votes to pass the New York
Health Act in the most recent
legislative session, even with the
current Democratic control of
both the state legislative and
executive branches. And legisla-
tive enactment even if achieved
would lead to further battles
over waivers, ERISA, and
nonresidents.
The argument here is that the
single-payer debate at both the
national and state levels will ul-
timately generate consensus on a
more incremental proposal, one
that looks much more like a
Medicare or Medicaid expansion
or buy-in. Such an outcome
would be consistent with long-
standing trends in US health
policy. It also would be a wel-
come step on the path toward a
USversion of affordable universal
coverage.
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FEDERALISM, ERISA, AND STATE SINGLE-PAYER HEALTH CARE 
 
Erin C. Fuse Brown & Elizabeth Y. McCuskey* 
 
ABSTRACT 
While federal health reform sputters, states have begun to pursue their 
own transformative strategies for achieving universal coverage, the most 
ambitious of which are state-based single-payer plans.  Since the passage of 
the Affordable Care Act in 2010, legislators in twenty-one states have 
proposed sixty-six unique bills to establish single-payer health care systems.  
This paper systematically surveys those state legislative efforts and exposes 
the federalism trap that threatens to derail them:  ERISA’s preemption of 
state regulation relating to employer-sponsored health insurance.  ERISA’s 
expansive preemption provision creates a narrow, risky path for state 
regulation to capture the employer health care expenditures crucial for 
financing a single-payer system.  While this paper illustrates how some state 
proposals may survive ERISA, the threat of preemption drives states to 
structure their plans in convoluted ways that may undermine other systemic 
goals such as universality, solidarity, and streamlined administration.  
This analysis demonstrates how ERISA’s uniquely broad preemption, 
coupled with its lack of waiver authority, elevates the interests of private 
employers above those of sovereign states and diminishes states’ abilities to 
serve as laboratories of health reform.  We argue that this moment in health 
reform demands ERISA preemption reform.  To restore balance to health 
care federalism and pave the way for state reforms of all kinds, this paper 
proposes federal legislative and jurisprudential solutions:  amendments to 
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ERISA’s preemption provisions, the addition of a statutory waiver, and/or a 
reinterpretation of ERISA preemption consistent with Congressional intent 
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INTRODUCTION  
The Affordable Care Act (ACA) marked a seismic shift in the U.S. health 
care system. It dramatically increased coverage, enlarged the federal role in 
the regulation of private health insurance, and altered the public’s 
expectations and belief that everyone should have access to affordable 
coverage that does not discriminate on health status.1 Yet the ACA did not 
produce universal coverage, and as a federal settlement of health system 
regulation and design, it has proven unstable due to political and legal attacks 
undermining its effectiveness at health care coverage and cost-control.2 Still, 
a feasible federal replacement for the ACA has proven elusive.   
 Rather than wait idly by for federal progress, states have picked up the 
momentum on health reform, spurred both by necessity and an appetite for 
policy innovation.  Of necessity, states have turned to their own reforms in 
response to federal governmental attempts to undermine the ACA’s coverage 
and cost-containment policies since the Trump Administration took power in 
2017.3  States also are testing different models and serving as laboratories for 
1 See, e.g., Lawrence O. Gostin, David Hyman, Peter D. Jacobson, The Affordable Care 
Act: Moving Forward in the Coming Years, 317 JAMA 19 (2017); Timothy Jost, “Taking 
Stock of Health Reform: Where We’ve Been, Where We’re Going,” HEALTH AFF. BLOG 
(Dec. 6, 2016), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20161206.057800/full/ 
[https://perma.cc/688V-HRVC].  
2 See, e.g., John A. Graves, Sayeh S. Nikpay, The Changing Dynamics of US Health 
Insurance And Implications for The Future of The Affordable Care Act, 36 HEALTH AFF.  
297 (2017); Jonathan Oberlander, The End of Obamacare, 376 N. ENGL. J. MED. 1 (2017); 
Sara Rosenbaum, The (Almost) Great Unraveling, 43 J. HEALTH POLITICS POL’Y & L. 
679580 (2018); Elizabeth Y. McCuskey, Big Waiver under Statutory Sabotage, 45 OH. N. L. 
REV. 213_ (forthcoming 2019). 
3 See Andrew M. Bindman et al., Beyond the ACA: Paths to Universal Coverage in 
California, 37 HEALTH AFF. 1367, 1367 (2018) (“The passage of the ACA temporarily 
relieved states of the need to take the lead in expanding health care coverage. However, many 
states have returned to the issue in the wake of the threat by the administration of President 
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alternative ways to pay for health care, including some ambitious proposed 
experiments in single-payer plans.  While federal single-payer reform under 
“Medicare-for-All”4 gains support and attention,5 state legislators quietly 
have drafted and introduced dozens of single-payer bills. 
This project surveys state efforts from 2010 through 2019 to establish 
single-payer health care, which we define as legislative attempts to achieve 
universal health care coverage for all residents in a state by combining 
financing for all health care services into a single, state-administered payer.6  
State legislative proposals to establish single-payer plans have been 
surprisingly robust both in volume and variation, with sixty-six unique 
single-payer bills introduced across twenty-one states since 2010.7 Though 
state single-payer proposals also face steep political, practical, legal, and 
financial challenges,8 the volume and detail of state bills suggest many of 
Donald Trump to repeal the ACA.”).  
4 See Bernie Sanders, Healthcare for All, https://berniesanders.com/topics/health-care-
for-all/ [https://perma.cc/Q396-VD66]. See also Nicole Gaudiano & Maureen Groppe, 
“Democrats back Medicare for all in about half of House races they're contesting,” USA 
TODAY (Oct. 23, 2018), 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/elections/2018/10/23/democrats-back-
medicare-all-half-contested-house-races/1732966002/ [https://perma.cc/K6EM-FRAB].  
5 Cf. Kaiser Family Foundation, Public Opinion on Single Payer, National Health Plans, 
and Expanding Access to Medicare Coverage, (2018),   
https://www.kff.org/slideshow/public-opinion-on-single-payer-national-health-plans-and-
expanding-access-to-medicare-coverage/ [https://perma.cc/M4PT-ZDQX]; Liz Hamel, 
Bryan Wu, Mollyann Brodie, Data Note: Modestly Strong but Malleable Support for Single-
Payer Health Care (Jul 5, 2017), https://www.kff.org/health-reform/poll-finding/data-note-
modestly-strong-but-malleable-support-for-single-payer-health-care/ 
[https://perma.cc/3AT8-WYHP].  
6 Our methodology for identifying state single-payer bills is set forth in Part I.A. and 
Appendix B, infra.  
7 See Part I.A., infra.  
8 A full discussion of these other challenges is beyond the scope of this Article. The most 
significant of these include: (a) the difficulty and necessity of securing waivers from the 
federal government to include Medicare, Medicaid, and Affordable Care Act marketplaces 
in the single payer plan; (b) the need for states to raise taxes significantly to make up for the 
massive federal subsidy of employer-based health plans through the preferred tax treatment 
of these plans, which would be lost if these plans are shifted to the state single-payer plan; 
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these are serious, non-symbolic efforts.  Our research particularly focuses on 
how these states seek to capture the employer-sponsored health insurance that 
currently covers 49% of Americans—a critical market for the solvency and 
viability of any single-payer plan.9 
Even if individual states can muster the political will and popular support 
to pass single-payer bills, a federalism trap threatens to thwart their 
transformative experiments:  The Employee Retirement Income Security Act 
of 1974 (ERISA),10 a federal statute governing employer-based benefit plans.  
When state laws conflict with federal ones, preemption doctrine generally 
displaces the state law in favor of the federal.11  But the express statement of 
preemption in ERISA sweeps even further, purporting to invalidate “any and 
all” state laws that “relate to” an employee benefit plan, not merely those 
which unavoidably conflict.12  
This indeterminately broad preemption language in ERISA, combined 
with an obscure “savings” clause for state regulation of insurers and an 
equally obscure “deemer” clause interpreted to prohibit states from regulating 
employer benefit arrangements that mimic insurance has spawned 
voluminous litigation and derailed state health reforms for decades.13   States, 
for example, may not impose their own “employer mandate” to provide 
health benefits due to ERISA preemption and therefore mostly had to wait 
for federal legislation (the ACA) to impose one.  As another example, state 
and (c) the fact that states, unlike the federal government, cannot deficit-spend and thus 
would struggle to finance single-payer programs in a recession when revenues decline. See, 
e.g., Lindsay Wiley, Medicaid for All? State-Level Single-Payer Health Care, 79 OHIO ST. 
L. J. 843 (2018); Nicholas Bagley, Federalism and the End of Obamacare, 127 YALE L. J. F. 
1 (2017).  




10 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq. 
11 See generally Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225, 225 n.3 (2000). 
12 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2012) (included as § 514 in the Act). 
13 See, e.g., Peter D. Jacobson, The Role of ERISA Preemption in Health Reform: 
Opportunities and Limits, 37 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 86, 89-90 (2009). 
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laws establishing mandatory minimum health benefits “relate to” employer-
provided health benefits; the “savings” clause avoids preemption when states 
enforce these minimum benefits laws against insurance companies selling 
insuance to employers, yet the “deemer” clause preempts their application to 
employers who self-insure their own health benefits.14 ERISA preemption 
thus raises a daunting legal challenge and uncertainty for states trying to 
capture critical employer-based health spending and draw those with 
employer-based coverage into the single-payer system.  
States are tying themselves in knots to avoid ERISA preemption in their 
health reforms. The state single-payer bills we studied feature several 
innovations to accomplish indirectly what ERISA prohibits them from doing 
directly, namely to mandate employers participate in and cover all their 
employees through the state’s single-payer plan.15 State single-payer bills 
contain at least three types of provisions to capture employer health 
expenditures and move enrollees into the system: (A) funding plans that use 
payroll and/or income taxes to raise revenue to pay for the single-payer plan 
and to encourage employers and employees to shift from employer-based 
coverage to the state single-payer plan;16 (B) provider regulations that restrict 
participating providers from billing any third party other than the single-payer 
plan at single-payer rates;17 and (C) assignment/subrogation/secondary payer 
provisions that allow the single-payer plan to pay for services for enrollees 
with dual coverage, and then seek reimbursement from the collateral source 
of coverage.18  
 This article comprehensively catalogues state single-payer proposals and 
analyzes whether ERISA would preempt state efforts to capture the employer 
expenditures.  There are strong arguments why each of these three types of 
14 E.g., id. at 90. 
15 A state mandate that employers must provide health benefits to employees or, if the 
employer opts to provide benefits, it has to cover employees under the state’s single-payer 
plan would be preempted by ERISA because such a mandate would “relate to” an employee 
benefit plan, altering the structure of the employer’s plan. See note 114, infra.   
16 See Part I.B.1., infra. 
17 See Part I.B.2., infra.  
18 See Part I.B.3., infra.  
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provisions (A–Funding Plan; B–Provider Restriction; or C–
Assignment/Subrogation/Secondary Payer) should survive ERISA 
preemption.  But courts’ unpredictable, tortured, and at times, contradictory 
application of ERISA casts a pall of uncertainty over their durability and 
invites litigation.19  Legal uncertainty amplifies the political challenges of 
establishing a state single-payer system because policymakers may struggle 
to pass such a sweeping legislative reform if key parts may be preempted.20 
ERISA preemption targets the primary funding provisions in these bills, 
further threatening the economic modeling and revenue stream upon which 
single-payer plans depend.  Legal uncertainty over ERISA preemption thus 
narrows the eye of the political and economic needle a state must thread to 
establish single-payer health care. 
ERISA is also an interloper in federal health insurance regulation – an 
employee-benefits statute not originally intended to govern health care, but 
which now exerts a powerful influence over it. Unlike most major federal 
health care statutes including Medicare, Medicaid, and the ACA, ERISA does 
not provide for waiver, state experimentation, or federal funding.21  The 
Department of Labor, which administers ERISA, lacks the statutory authority 
to waive its preemption, even if the Department finds it would be beneficial.22  
19 See Part II.A.2., infra.  
20 Brendan S. Maher, The Benefits of Opt-In Federalism, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1733, 1783 
(2011) (“A state has a greater incentive to confirm the preferences of its own citizens or serve 
as a ‘“laboratory of benefits’” if its regulatory decisions will not be reduced into nothingness 
by ERISA preemption”). 
21 See Elizabeth Y. McCuskey, Agency Imprimatur & Health Reform Preemption, 78 
OHIO ST. L. J. 1099, 1102-03 (2017); see also text accompanying notes 338-342, infra. Cf. 
Karl Polzer & Patricia A. Butler, Employee Health Plan Protections Under ERISA, 16 
HEALTH AFF. 93, 93-94 (1997) (explaning that “ERISA was designed to establish uniform 
federal standards,” while “substantially deregulat[ing] employee health plans” due in part to 
its “lack of substantive requirements”).Other federal programs like the Veterans 
Administration, TRICARE, and federal employee health benefits, as well as statutes that 
exert profound but indirect influence on health insurance, like the Internal Revenue Code, 
do not have waivers, either.   
22 See Part III.B.2. and text accompanying notes 338-342, infra.  See also Manatt 
Health, “Understanding the Rules: Federal Legal Considerations for State-Based Approaches 
to Expand Coverage in California,”  5, 10 (Feb. 2018) (noting that ERISA’s “provisions are 
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Nor will the agency’s enforcement discretion save a state’s single-payer 
provision from preemption because employers or third-party administrators 
can raise ERISA preemption through litigation, enforced by courts.  
The combined effect of ERISA’s extremely broad preemption provision 
and its lack of a waiver thwarts all manner of state autonomy and flexibility 
in health reform. ERISA’s obstruction stands at odds with other federal 
statutes that distribute authority and control between the national and state 
governments to allow state flexibility against a backdrop of federal standards 
and agency expertise in health care regulation.  
ERISA’s broad preemption springs from a concern in 1974 that multi-
state employers would refuse to provide health benefits to their employees if 
subjected to state regulatory variations.23 The conditions underlying this 
assumption, however, have shifted since the ACA significantly supplanted 
state health insurance regulation with federal standards and imposed a federal 
mandate for larger employers to offer health coverage.24 While multi-state 
employers’ need for regulatory uniformity to continue offering coverage 
arguably has receded,25 ERISA’s continued insistence on national uniformity 
prevents states from effectuating major health system reforms that their 
citizens desire and still leaves self-funded employer plans largely 
unregulated.  The breadth of ERISA preemption thus elevates the interests of 
private businesses above the interests and police powers of sovereign states.  
In this article, we do not argue that any state ought to establish single-
payer health care or that state-based single payer is preferable to a national 
effort or to other more incremental reforms toward universal coverage and 
not waivable by administrative action” and that suspension of the statutory preemption 
“would likely need federal legislation to receive an exemption”. 
23   See Phyllis C. Borzi, There’s “Private” and Then There’s “Private”: ERISA, Its 
Impact, and Options for Reform, 36 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 660, 663 (2008). 
24 29 U.S.C. § 1185d; 26 U.S.C. § 9815 (applying many of the ACA’s health insurance 
requirements, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg et seq., to group health plans governed by 
ERISA); 26 U.S.C. § 45R (containing the employer mandate). 
25 Mallory Jensen, Is ERISA Preemption Superfluous in the New Age of Health Care 
Reform?, 2011 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 464, 516 (2011). 
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cost-control.26 Instead, our research reveals that even if a state’s citizens want 
single payer, the state faces a nearly insurmountable structural challenge from 
ERISA.  Because ERISA thwarts state experimentation with single-payer 
models, it also denies an opportunity to gather evidence on whether single-
payer systems have advantages or disadvantages over other reforms.  State 
single-payer legislation provides a stark illustration of the federalism trap 
created by ERISA that has stymied states’ health reform efforts—big and 
small—for decades.  
We propose four solutions to clear the way for state health reforms and 
reduce ERISA’s obstruction – three legislative and one jurisprudential. First, 
Congress could amend ERISA’s preemption provisions with respect to health 
benefit plans, replacing its broad “any and all” preemption with “floor 
preemption,” used in other federal health care statutes. Floor preemption, 
which displaces only those state laws that are less stringent than the federal 
standard (the “floor”),  preserves uniformity in federal baseline regulations, 
balanced with state flexibility to enact laws consistent with and no less 
protective than the federal floor.  Second, Congress could eliminate ERISA’s 
“deemer clause”27 for health benefits to correct Supreme Court interpretation 
that has built an impenetrable barrier of preemption around self-funded 
employer-based plans. Third, Congress could instead add a statutory waiver 
provision to ERISA, which would allow states to ask the federal government 
to suspend ERISA preemption for their proposed health reforms. As seen in 
other federal health care statutes, an ERISA waiver would allow the federal 
government to manage the degrees of uniformity and variation, while still 
permitting state experimentation in health policy.  Floor preemption and 
26 See, e.g., Katie Gudiksen, Single-Payer vs. Public Option: Can Either System Address 
Rising Health Care Prices? THE SOURCE BLOG (Mar. 29, 2018), 
http://sourceonhealthcare.org/single-payer-vs-public-option-can-either-system-address-
rising-health-care-prices/ [https://perma.cc/N8RZ-EATX]. 
27 ERISA’s broad preemption provision contains an exception, the “savings clause” that 
saves from preemption state insurance regulation. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A). But the savings 
clause contains a further exception, the “deemer clause” that has been interpreted by courts 
to deem self-funded group health plans as not in the business of insurance, and therefore not 
subject to state insurance regulation. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(B); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. 
v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 747 (1985). 
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deemer clause revisions to ERISA would produce the most direct and 
enduring reforms, but a waiver provision might offer the most politically 
expedient option, though far more limited in its effect. 
Fourth, because the scope of ERISA preemption depends largely on 
jurisprudential interpretation of the statute, courts could curtail the scope of 
ERISA preemption and reinvigorate the “presumption against preemption” 
for health care regulation in a way that more accurately reflects Congress’s 
original legislative intent for ERISA.28  While we recognize this as a potential 
avenue for ERISA reform, we have little faith in its efficacy because of its 
fragmentary implementation and because the courts who broke ERISA 
interpretation are unlikely to effectuate its repair.  If neither Congress nor the 
courts will address ERISA’s obstruction, we recommend ways state 
legislators may build an ERISA-resistant single-payer plan using overlapping 
provisions to protect the system’s viability in the event a court finds any 
single provision preempted.29  
  This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I presents the findings of a 
survey of state-single payer bills introduced from 2010 through 2019 and 
their key features, identifying three types of provisions that state single-payer 
proposals use to capture employer health expenditures and the 49% of 
Americans covered by employer plans: Type A (Funding Plan), Type B 
(Provider Restrictions), and Type C (Assignment / Subrogation / Secondary 
Payer) provisions. Part II details the application of ERISA preemption 
analysis to each of these provisions and the degree to which each should 
survive ERISA preemption.  Part III then situates ERISA in the broader 
context of federal health insurance statutes.  Although Congress did not 
intend ERISA to be a health care statute, ERISA’s extraordinarily broad 
preemption, scant federal regulation, and lack of waiver flexibility create a 
federalism trap, obstructing state experimentation and autonomy in ways that 
undermine the health care federalism infrastructure of the ACA, Medicaid, 
and Medicare statutes. We offer four proposals to remove ERISA’s 
obstructions to state health reform, infusing the federal regulatory scheme 
with greater flexibility and recalibrating its role in health care federalism.   
Ultimately, we urge that the time has come to amend ERISA preemption 
28 See Part III.B., infra.  
29 See Part II.C., infra.  
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in order to unshackle meaningful state health reforms from its outdated 
prohibitions.   
 
I.  STATE SINGLE-PAYER PLANS  
State health reform momentum has only picked up steam after the ACA.  
State reform efforts range from patches for the individual market,30 laws 
targeting surprise medical bills31 and prescription drug prices,32 proposals to 
allow any state resident to buy a public plan, such as Medicaid,33 all the way 
to full transformation of the health care finance system in state single-payer 
proposals.  This Part takes a deep dive into the ambitious end of state health 
reforms: state single-payer plans. 
 
A.  The Recent Proliferation of State Single-Payer Proposals 
The volume of state interest and activity in single-payer health care, as 
measured by proposed legislation, has been substantial. Since the ACA was 
passed in 2010 through 2019, legislators in twenty-one states have proposed 
sixty-six unique single-payer bills.34 Although our research turned up over 
100 bills that can be characterized as proposing a state-based single-payer 
plan, removal of duplicates (i.e., substantially similar bills introduced in 
different chambers in the same legislative session or bills assigned different 
30 See Kaiser Family Found., “Tracking Section 1332 State Innovation Waivers,” (Aug 
23, 2018) https://www.kff.org/health-reform/fact-sheet/tracking-section-1332-state-
innovation-waivers/ [https://perma.cc/EQ99-FHWZ]. 
 31 See Christina Cousart, “State Legislators Take Action to Protect Consumers from 
Surprise Billing,” NASHP.org (Sept. 18, 2018), https://nashp.org/state-legislators-take-
action-to-protect-consumers-from-surprise-billing/ [https://perma.cc/8MWM-UJL5]. 
 32 See Robert Pear, “States Rush to Rein In Prescription Costs, and Drug Companies 
Fight Back,” NY Times (Aug. 18, 2018), https://nyti.ms/2OMyV0T 
[https://perma.cc/8E2W-4WXY]. 
33 See Elisabeth Rosenthal, “Can States Fix the Disaster of American Health Care?,” NY 
TIMES (Jan. 16, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/16/opinion/california-states-
health-care.html [https://perma.cc/N8PD-8YR6].  
34 See Appendix A for a table listing all the bills by state and year and Appendix B for 
search terms and methodology for identifying state single-payer proposals. 
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numbers as they move through the legislative process) resulted in sixty- six 
bills. Although many bills explicitly stated that their purpose was to establish 
a single-payer health system, not all did.35 We characterized bills as state 
single-payer proposals if they sought to establish universal health care 
coverage for all residents in a state by combining financing for all health care 
services into a single, state-administered payer. We excluded bills that did 
not meet this definition and thus did not purport to establish a single-payer 
plan, such as those that called for a study of single-payer, expressed support 
for a national single-payer plan, or attempted less-than comprehensive health 
reforms (e.g., universal primary care).36   None except Vermont’s ill-fated 
single-payer plan37 was passed, and no state has implemented a single-payer 
system.  
The defining characteristics of state single-payer proposals are the 
combination of universal eligibility for state residents38 and reliance on 
statutory waivers from Medicare, Medicaid, and the ACA to consolidate 
these sources of federal funding and their covered populations into the state 
single-payer plan.39 Other common elements include: expansive provider 
35 Compare H.B. 1516, 438th Sess. Gen. Assemb., (Md. 2018) (“It is the intent of the 
General Assembly that: (1) There be a comprehensive universal single-payer health care 
coverage program and a health care cost control system for the benefit of all residents of the 
state.”) with H.B. 2436, 100th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2017) (providing, in 
synopsis, “that all individuals residing in the State are covered under the Illinois Health 
Services Program for health insurance.”). 
36 See Appendix B for search terms and exclusion criteria.  
37 Act of May 26, 2011, 2011 Vt. Acts & Resolves 48 (enacting H.B. 202, providing for 
universal coverage in Vermont); see also, John E. McDonough, The Demise of Vermont’s 
Single-Payer Plan, 372 N. ENGL. J. MED. 1584, 1584 (2015).  
38  See, e.g., S.B. 562, 2017-2018 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2017), § 100620(a) (“Every resident 
of the state shall be eligible and entitled to enroll as a member under the program”); H.B. 
440, 132nd Gen. Assemb., 2017-2018 Sess. (Ohio 2017) § 3920.07(A), “All Ohio residents 
and individuals employed in Ohio, including the homeless and migrant workers, are eligible 
for coverage under the Ohio health care plan.”).  Cf. id. at §§ 3920.07(F), (G) (extending 
eligibility to nonresidents who work in the state or college students who attend university in 
the state). 
39 Waiver reliance to include federal payers is nearly universal among the single-payer 
plans.  See, e.g., S.B. 2237, 2018 Leg. Session (R.I. 2018),§ 23-95-12(d) (providing, “The 
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eligibility;40 administratively set or negotiated rates for providers and health 
care goods, such as prescription drugs;41 low or no cost-sharing for patients;42 
comprehensive coverage of services;43 and mechanisms for care-
coordination.44  
The volume, variation, and detail of these state single-payer proposals is 
surprising. Although many of the states with single-payer proposals are 
controlled by Democrats, the single-payer bills are not exclusively from 
“blue” states. Most of the states with single payer proposals expanded 
Medicaid under the ACA, reducing the percentage so only a small fraction of 
the population that remains uninsured.  So, there seems to be something else 
beyond universal coverage driving many of these single-payer bills. That 
something else appears to be an effort to control health care costs through 
expansive rate-setting authority for health care services and prescription 
director shall seek and obtain waivers and other approvals relating to Medicaid, the 
Children's Health Insurance Program, Medicare, the ACA, and any other relevant federal 
programs” to preserve and maximize federal funds available, while moving them into the 
state single-payer fund). Further, most state single-payer proposals would require a waiver 
from the U.S. Department of Health & Human Services of the Affordable Care Act’s 
employer mandate, pursuant to the ACA’s Section 1332 waiver provision.  See Wiley, supra 
note 8. 
40 See, e.g., S.B. 1872, 120th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2018) (“Any health care provider 
who is licensed to practice in this state and is otherwise in good standing is qualified to 
participate in the program as long as the health care provider's services are performed within 
this state.”). 
41 See, e.g., A. 4738-A, 2017 Leg., 240th Sess. (N.Y. 2018), § 4. Provider rates are 
commonly set through negotiation representatives of providers and the single-payer plan, 
along with formularies and negotiated prices for prescription drugs.  
42 See, e.g., S.B. 1014, 202nd Gen. Assemb., 2017-2018 Sess. (Pa. 2018), § 503(c) 
(“Participants are not subject to copayments, deductibles, point-of-service charges or any 
other fee or charge for a service within the package and shall not be directly billed nor 
balance billed by participating providers for covered benefits provided to the participant.”)  
43 See, e.g., S.B. 5957, 65th Leg., 2017 2d Spec. Sess. (Wash. 2017), § 16. The bills 
include, and go beyond, the ACA’s essential health benefits, and typically include services 
covered by Medicare and Medicaid.  
44 See, e.g., H.F. 2352, 87th Gen. Assemb., 2017-2019 Sess. § 16 (Iowa 2018).  Some 
require eligible beneficiaries to enroll in a care coordinator, which can be their primary care 
physician, a “medical home,” or an organization, such as an ACO or HMO.  
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drugs,45 a reduction of administrative costs for the state and the health care 
industry by streamlining the multi-payer system into one,46 and relieving 
citizens of their growing cost-sharing burdens from high deductibles, out-of-
network bills, and co-insurance rates.47 Figure 1 depicts the twenty-one states 
with at least one single-payer bill proposed between 2010 and 2019. 
45 See, e.g., A. 5248, 2019 Leg., 2019-2020 Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2019) § 2, (“To address 
the fiscal crisis facing the health care system and the state and to assure New Yorkers can 
exercise their right to health care, affordable and comprehensive health coverage must be 
provided. . . [T]his legislation is an enactment of state concern for the purpose of establishing 
a comprehensive universal guaranteed health care coverage program and a health care cost 
control system for the benefit of all residents of the state of New York.”); S.B. 786, 2015 
Leg., 121st Sess. (S.C. 2015), §§ 44-18-910 to -930 (providing for the authority to establish 
rates for both health care providers that participate in the state program and those that do 
not). 
46 See, e.g., H.B. 2987, 190th Gen. Ct., 2017-2018 Sess. (Mass. 2017), § 1(b) (“Today’s 
numerous private and public health insurance plans, with differing benefits and patient 
payment requirements, impose massive administrative burdens on doctors, hospitals, other 
health care organizations, as well as on patients, employers and other payers. Purchasing 
power is fragmented.”).  
47 See, e.g., S.B. 2237, 2018 Leg. Sess. (R.I. 2018), § 23-95-1(e) (stating in its 
Legislative Findings, “Rhode Island must act because there are currently no effective state 
or federal laws that can adequately control rising premiums, co-pays, deductibles and 
medical costs, or prevent private insurance companies from continuing to limit available 
providers and coverage.”).  
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Figure 1. States with Single Payer Bills, by Medicaid Expansion Status 
 
Although many, if not most, of these bills are political long-shots in their state 
legislatures, collectively they do not appear to be purely symbolic or 
precatory.48 Many of the single-payer proposals are highly detailed, 
seemingly the products of a great deal of thought, analysis, political tradeoffs, 
and resources.49 The impression of viewing these state single-payer bills in 
48 Of course, some bills may be totally symbolic or just manifest one legislator’s policy 
position, while others have more support from multiple co-sponsors or coalitions and have 
advanced further along the legislative process. We did not assess the bills for their 
“seriousness” in terms of breadth of political support. 
49 For example, some states have held hearings or commissioned in-depth economic 
assessments of their single-payer plans, demonstrating both the specificity of proposals and 
a commitment of significant resources to understand their economic impact. See, e.g., 
ANDREW BINDMAN, MARIAN MULKEY, RICHARD KRONICK, A PATH TO UNIVERSAL 
COVERAGE AND UNIVERSAL HEALTH CARE FINANCING IN CALIFORNIA (Mar. 12, 2018), 
https://healthcare.assembly.ca.gov/sites/healthcare.assembly.ca.gov/files/Report%20Final
%203_13_18.pdf; JODI LIU ET AL., RAND CORPORATION, AN ASSESSMENT OF THE NEW 
YORK HEALTH ACT: A SINGLE-PAYER OPTION FOR NEW YORK STATE 14 (2018), 
https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2424.html; CHAPIN WHITE ET AL., RAND 
CORPORATION, A COMPREHENSIVE ASSESSMENT OF FOUR OPTIONS FOR FINANCING HEALTH 
CARE DELIVERY IN OREGON (2018), 
https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1662.html; JOHN SHEILS & MEGAN COLE, 
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totality is that there is a nontrivial possibility that some state or states could 
thread the political, administrative, financial, and legal needles necessary to 
pass a single-payer plan in the coming years.  
 
B.  How State Single-Payer Plans Capture Employer Health Expenditures 
The billion-dollar question, both in terms of dollars-at-stake and legal 
hurdles from ERISA, is how the state single-payer plan addresses employer-
sponsored health coverage.50 In the U.S., 49% of the population is covered 
by employer-sponsored coverage, which amounts to 20% of our total national 
health care expenditures.51 Once the single-payer system starts covering this 
population, it must capture the vast employer and employee expenditures that 
pays for such coverage.52 State legislation faces a big obstacle in achieving 
this critical task:  ERISA preempts state law that “relates to” employer-
THE LEWIN GROUP, COST AND ECONOMIC IMPACT ANALYSIS OF A SINGLE-PAYER PLAN IN 
MINNESOTA (2012), 
https://growthandjustice.org/images/uploads/LEWIN.Final_Report_FINAL_DRAFT.pdf.  
50 The other critical question is whether HHS will grant states waivers to capture federal 
Medicaid (1115 waiver), Medicare (demonstration waivers), and ACA (1332 waiver) funds 
for the state’s single-payer plan. These statutory waivers lie beyond the scope of this Article, 
but other scholars have provided analysis. See Wiley, supra note 8.  
51 Kaiser Family Foundation, “Health Insurance Coverage of the Total Population,” 
(timeframe: 2017), https://www.kff.org/other/state-indicator/total-
population/?currentTimeframe=0&sortModel=%7B%22colId%22:%22Location%22,%22s
ort%22:%22asc%22%7D GARY CLAXTON ET AL., KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION, 2018 
EMPLOYER HEALTH BENEFITS SURVEY, Section 10: Plan Funding, 
https://www.kff.org/health-costs/report/2018-employer-health-benefits-survey/; Centers for 
Medicare and Medicaid Services, National Health Expenditures 2016 Highlights 2, 
https://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Statistics-Trends-and-
Reports/NationalHealthExpendData/downloads/highlights.pdf.  
52 In addition to these direct expenditures, the federal government further subsidizes 
employer spending on health benefits by not taxing such expenditure as wages. See 
generally, U.S. Internal Revenue Service, Employee Benefits (updated Nov. 2, 2018), 
https://www.irs.gov/businesses/small-businesses-self-employed/employee-benefits.  
Although policy debates on the tax-treatment of employee health benefits is beyond the scope 
of this article, the larger point is that capturing what the system currently spends on employer 
health expenditures is critical for the financial viability of any single-payer plan.  
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sponsored benefits, as detailed in Part II below.  Additionally, the population 
covered by employer-sponsored health benefits tends to be healthier than 
those covered by public programs, which is critical to balancing the risk pool 
for the single-payer plan.53 Of those with employer-based coverage, more 
than 60% are covered by self-funded plans (also called self-insured plans), 
where the employer pays for the health benefits with its own funds, retaining 
financial or insurance risk.54 As discussed in Part II, ERISA’s “deemer” 
clause has placed self-funded plans entirely beyond the reach of state 
regulation.55 
To assess the distorting effect of ERISA preemption on states’ health 
reform efforts, this project focuses on the analyzing how states can capture 
employers’ expenditures and transition the 49% of the population covered by 
employer-sponsored health plans into the state single-payer program.56 We 
reviewed the sixty-six single-payer bills to identify their methods of capturing 
employer expenditures, as discussed below.57 Eight of the sixty-six proposals 
purported to establish a single-payer program for the state, but did not contain 
an explicit mechanism to capture employer expenditures or move those with 
employer coverage into the single payer, for example by creating a state-
based “Medicare-for-All” program, enrolling everyone in the state in an 
53 See Victor R. Fuchs, How to Make US Health Care More Equitable and Less Costly: 
Begin By Replacing Employment-Based Insurance, 320 JAMA 2071, 2071 (2018); Brief for 
the Harvard Law School Center for Health Law & Policy et al., as Amici Curiae in support 
of Petitioner, Gobeille v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 577 U.S. ___; 136 S. Ct. 936 (2016) (No. 
14-181), at 19-20.   
54 GARY CLAXTON ET AL., Kaiser Family Foundation, 2018 Employer Health Benefits 
Survey, Section 10: Plan Funding, at 167, https://www.kff.org/health-costs/report/2018-
employer-health-benefits-survey/supra note , at Section 10 167. See, e.g., Advantages and 
Myths of Self-Funding for Employers with Fewer than 250 Employees, Cigna Health & Life 
Ins. Co. (Feb. 2014), http://www.cigna.com/assets/docs/business/small-
employers/841956_b_self_funding_whitepaper_v8.pdf (“Traditional self-funding is defined 
as when an employer pays for their own medical claims directly, while a third-party 
administrator administers the health plan by processing the claims, issuing ID cards, handling 
customer questions and performing other tasks.”). 
55 See Part II.A., infra. 
56 GARY CLAXTON ET ALKaiser Family Foundation, supra note 51, at Section 10. 
57 See Part I.B., infra.  
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expanded version of Medicare.58 Thus, we focused our analysis on the 
remaining fifty-eight state single-payer proposals for their methods of 
capturing employer expenditures and moving those covered by employee 
health plans into the single-payer program.  
Due to ERISA preemption, discussed in Part II, states cannot simply 
mandate that employers adopt the single-payer plan as their employee health 
plan. However, states must capture employers’ expenditures and shift those 
covered by employer-based health plans into the single-payer system, or else 
its single-payer plan is not truly a single-payer, and the economics will not 
work.  
Unable to mandate that self-funded employers drop their benefit plans 
and participate in the single-payer plan under ERISA, state single-payer 
proposals mix and match the following tools to capture employer 
expenditures: (A) imposing a payroll tax on employers and/or an income tax 
on individuals to fund the single-payer plan; (B) requiring or creating 
incentives for all provider payments to be made through the single payer 
entity at single-payer rates; and/or (C) subrogation, assignment, or secondary 
payer provisions allowing the single-payer entity to pay for services and seek 
reimbursement from employer plans or other collateral sources.  
In addition, most proposals contain nonduplication provisions prohibiting 
insurers from offering health benefits that duplicate those covered by the 
single-payer plan.59 The idea behind nonduplication is that if insurers cannot 
sell plans that cover any of the services or benefits covered by the single-
payer plan, then there are no competing private plans to choose from. Insurers 
may only sell so-called wraparound services that supplement the single-payer 
coverage. On its face, a nonduplication provision appears to do much of the 
work of shifting those with employer-based coverage to the single-payer 
plan, because employers would not have any health plan options to offer their 
employees in the single-payer state. However, as discussed in Part II, ERISA 
58 See, e.g., S.B. 2598, 218th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.J. 2018). 
59 See, e.g., H.F. 2352, 87th Gen. Assemb., 2018 Sess. (Iowa 2017), § 7(3) (“An insurer, 
carrier, or health maintenance organization that is issued a certificate of authority by the 
commissioner of insurance may offer only the following: . . . Benefits that do not duplicate 
the health care services covered by the healthy Iowa program.”).  
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preemption likely would make the nonduplication provisions unenforceable 
against self-funded employer-based health plans.60 Thus, state single-payer 
proposals must use other provisions to draw the self-funded employers’ 
expenditures and their enrollees into the single-payer plan. 
Appendix A contains a list of the single-payer bills proposed bewtween 
2010 - 2019 and their mechanisms to capture employer-sponsored health 
spending.  Appendix B details our methodology for collecting and analyzing 
these state single-payer bills. 
1. Type A—Funding Plan 
The Type A—Funding Plan model captures employer expenditures and 
participation through a payroll tax and/or an individual income tax. Payroll 
taxes are levied on employers  and are calculated as a percentage of the wages 
that the employer pays its employees.61 The fact that the payroll tax is based 
on wages and not the employer’s spending on employee health benefits is 
significant for the ERISA preemption analysis below.62 As tallied in Figure 
3, forty- five bills across sixteen states contain a Type-A funding plan.63 State 
proposals may impose a flat64 or graduated payroll tax rate,65 which also may 
apply to self-employed income.66 Some states divide the payroll tax among 
employers and employees, with the employer paying a larger proportion of 
the tax, similar to the current division of premiums for employer-based 
60 See Part II.B.4, infra.  
61 See, e.g., John A. Brittain, The Incidence of Social Security Payroll Taxes, 61 AM. 
ECON. REV. 110, 110 (1971) (noting that while payroll taxes may be imposed on the 
employer, they are typically paid by the employee in the form of reduced wages).  
62 See Part II.B.1, infra.  
63 See Fig. 2, infra.  
64 See, e.g., Pa. S.B. 1014, § 904 ( “[A] tax of 10% is imposed on payroll amounts 
generated as a result of an employer conducting business activity within this 
Commonwealth.”). Vermont’s plan would have imposed a flat 11.5% payroll tax as well as 
a graduated income tax. See PETER SHUMLIN, GOVERNOR OF THE STATE OF VERMONT, 
GREEN MOUNTAIN CARE: A COMPREHENSIVE MODEL FOR BUILDING VERMONT’S 
UNIVERSAL HEALTH CARE SYSTEM 5 (2014), 
http://hcr.vermont.gov/sites/hcr/files/pdfs/GMC%20FINAL%20REPORT%20123014.pdf.  
65 See NY A. 4738-A, § 4-2a; LIU ET AL., supra note 49, at 2.   
66 See R.I. S.B. 2237, § 23-95-12(i). 
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coverage.67 Other states would impose an income tax on employees to 
capture the employee-share of spending on health coverage.68 Income taxes 
may apply to unearned income to capture non-wage earnings, such as interest, 
capital gains, or dividends,69 and can be progressively scaled to income 
levels.  Sales and excise taxes are possible, but potentially more regressive 
than taxes scaled to individual income. 
A payroll tax would lead many employers to drop their own coverage if 
they must pay the tax regardless of whether they offer their own employer-
based plan.70 The individual share of a payroll tax or an income tax is a way 
to replicate the employee’s contribution to health care premiums and capture 
unearned income or income of state residents are employed by out-of-state 
employers. If employees are required to pay a tax to fund the state single-
payer program, many will elect to drop their employer-based plans so as to 
avoid double-paying for redundant coverage.71  
67 See Id.; LIU ET AL., supra note 49, at 14. The New York Health Act would divide the 
payroll tax, such that employers pay 80 percent, and employees pays 20 percent.  
68 See SHUMLIN, supra note 64, at 5 (“[T]he highest-income Vermonters would pay 9.5 
percent of income through a public premium, up to a maximum of $27,500, while lower-
income Vermonters would pay based on a sliding scale tied to a lower percentage of income 
ranging from 0 up to 9.5 percent”).  
69 See R.I. S.B. 2237, § 23-95-12(ji) (“There shall be a progressive contribution based 
on unearned income, i.e., capital gains, dividends, interest, profits, and rents. Initially, the 
unearned income RICHIP contributions shall be equal to ten percent (10%) of such unearned 
income. The ten percent (10%) initial rate may be adjusted by the director to allow for a 
graduated progressive exemption or credit for individuals with lower unearned income 
levels.”) See also, LIU ET AL., supra note 49, at 2 (“Individuals would not pay premiums for 
NYHA. Instead, the program would be financed by new graduated state taxes on payroll and 
nonpayroll income (such as interest, dividends, and capital gains) and redirected federal 
funding through waivers and state funding for current health care programs.”).  
70 See LIU ET AL., supra note 49, at 2, 50 (explaining that, “[w]hile the NYHA does not 
prohibit employers from offering health insurance, it does include a mandatory employer 
payroll tax contribution to help fund NYH,” and noting the assumption that the payroll tax 
will replace employer spending on employer-sponsored insurance, with overall employer-
spending unchanged). 
71 As discussed in Part II, a funding plan based on a payroll tax should avoid preemption 
by ERISA, but it is far from certain whether courts will agree.  Income taxes generally would 
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The simplest form of Type A plan would rely solely on a payroll tax 
and/or income tax to capture employer expenditures and move enrollees to 
drop their employer coverage. These “Funding Only” proposals capture 
employers’ health care expenditures directly via a payroll tax and assume that 
few employers would continue to offer their own coverage for employees 
subject to the payroll tax assessment, and even if they do, few employees will 
continue to take up employer coverage once they are covered by the state 
single-payer plan. An example of a Funding Only model is Washington’s 
2017 single-payer bill, which would fund its single-payer plan using a payroll 
tax for employers, with no exceptions.72 Most of the state single-payer bills 
that contain a funding plan combine the financing mechanism with other 
tools, discussed below, to entice individuals into the single-payer plan and 
capture employer health expenditures.  
The Type A—Funding Plan can be analogized to public school financing.  
All households must pay property taxes to fund public schools that all 
children are eligible to attend.73  If certain households wish to pay for private 
school, they are free to do so, but it does not excuse them from their property 
tax. The public school analogy also reveals a nuance of the Funding Plan 
approach: unless the quality or choice of providers were the same or superior 
in the single-payer plan, there may be employers and employees who 
continue to maintain their employer-based plans, even when subject to the 
taxes to fund the single-payer plan.  
2. Type B—Provider Restriction 
A second variation, the Type B—the Provider Restriction model, uses a 
form of provider regulation to draw individuals away from employer-based 
plans into the single-payer plan. Thirty-four of the single-payer bills across 
fourteen states contain a Type-B provider restriction.74 Because provider 
regulation tends to fall beyond the reach of ERISA preemption,75 state single-
payer proposals use provider regulation to move individuals to drop their 
not implicate ERISA.  See Part II.A.2, infra.  
72 S.B. 5747, 65th Leg., 2017 Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2017).  
73 See SHUMLIN, supra note 64, at 11 (explaining the analogous relationship between 
public school financing and Green Mountain Care). 
74 See Figure 3, infra.  
75 See Part II.A, infra.  
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employer coverage. These provisions restrict the ability of participating 
providers from billing anyone other than the single-payer plan, whether the 
patient or any third-party payer, for services rendered to a patient with single-
payer coverage. In addition, the provisions limit providers’ payment rates to 
the single-payer rates. For example, California’s S.B. 562 says that 
participating providers may not “charge any rate in excess of the payment 
established under this title for any health care service provided to a member 
under the program and shall not solicit or accept payment from any member 
or third party for any health care service, except as provided under a federal 
program.”76 The proposals may automatically enroll all residents in the state 
single-payer plan, or they may deem all residents presumptively eligible, but 
require an affirmative step to enroll.77 Under either model, most plans assume 
all residents would be covered by the single-payer plan.  
The Provider Restriction model creates incentives for patients to drop 
their employer-based coverage because if providers want to participate in the 
single-payer plan, they are barred from billing employer-based plans and 
would thus cease participating in those plans. If providers are unable to be 
paid from any other source, they will no longer see patients who have other 
coverage. The limitation on providers’ charges to the single-payer rate also 
reduces incentives to continue to participate in other plan networks, such as 
employer-based plans, because they will not be able to earn more from those 
payers than from the single-payer. Thus, the provider networks for the 
employer plans would shrink considerably, perhaps to the point where 
76 Cal. S.B. 562, § 100639(e) (emphasis added).  The proposed statute further states that 
“[t]his section does not preclude the program from acting as a primary or secondary payer in 
conjunction with another third-party payer when permitted by a federal program.” Id. In other 
words, for programs like TRICARE and the federal employee health benefits programs, 
which do not provide waivers, presumably the provider would be permitted to bill these 
federal programs directly, and the state single payer could be the secondary payer.   
77 Compare R.I. S.B. 2237, § 23-95-5(a)(1) (requiring the plan director to “identify [and] 
automatically enroll [...] qualified Rhode Island residents”) and H.B. 74, 147th Gen. 
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Del. 2013), § 1611 (declaring “[a]ll Delaware citizens” entitled to 
benefits but establishing no enrollment procedure) with H.B. 1793, Gen. Ct., 2018 Sess. 
(N.H. 2018), § 404-J:4 (extending presumptive eligibility to “[a]ll individuals legally 
residing in New Hampshire” but requiring completion of an application for payment of 
benefits). 
74
employer-based coverage is all but worthless to employees. Employees will 
drop employer coverage if it lacks a functioning provider network. 
In some instances, we characterized single-payer proposals as a Type B 
model even when they lacked an explicit limit on providers’ ability to be paid 
from non-single payer sources. For example, Provider Restrictions could 
exist where the plan contained strong incentives for providers to participate 
exclusively in the program short of a mandate to do so, such as requirements 
that providers participate on an all-or-nothing basis78 or onerous notification 
requirements.79 Another example is South Carolina’s bill, which would pay 
providers a higher rate if they participate in the single-payer plan’s network 
than if they do not.80  
Standing alone, the Provider Restriction model may move individuals 
into the single payer plan and out of employer-based plans, but it does not 
capture the employers’ expenditures on health coverage. Thus, a Provider 
Restriction would almost certainly need to be paired with a payroll tax or 
other funding mechanism to capture employers’ financial contribution. In 
effect, the provider restrictions in this model are designed to simulate the 
effects of a nonduplication provision through provider regulation: they limit 
the market for employer-based coverage by shrinking the provider networks 
for that coverage, but without triggering ERISA preemption. 
3. Type C—Assignment, Subrogation, Secondary Payer 
A third variation, the Type C model, includes an explicit subrogation, 
assignment, or secondary payer provision to facilitate the single-payer plan’s 
ability to recover paid claims from collateral sources of coverage, including 
78 See, e.g., H.B. 2436, 100th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2017), § 40(g) 
(“Providers who accept payment from the Program for services rendered may not bill any 
patient for covered services. Providers may elect either to participate fully, or not at all, in 
the Program.”). See also, R.I. S.B. 2237, § 23-95-9(d), § 23-95-7(a)(2) (using nearly identical 
languagesame).  
79 See, e.g., Pa. S.B. 1014, § 507 (requiring nonparticipating providers to notify patients 
of their provider’s nonparticipation and to have the patient sign a form acknowledging he or 
she is solely responsible for amounts charged in excess of the approved single-payer rates, 
or else face penalties for noncompliance up to 200% of the amount they billed the patient). 
80 S.B. 786, 121st Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (S.C. 2015), §§ 44-18-920; 44-18-940. 
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employer-based plans.81 Twenty-five bills across nine states employed a 
Type-C subrogation, assignment or secondary payer provision.82 
Subrogation is the action, typically by an insurance carrier, to assert the 
rights of the insured to reimbursement or payment against a third party.83  In 
the single-payer context, the single-payer plan could pay for the health care 
services of a member, and then assert a subrogation claim to recover those 
costs against a third party that is responsible for paying for the member’s 
care, including collateral sources of health coverage. Oregon’s most recent 
single payer bill provides an example of a subrogation provision:  
(2) The Oregon Health Authority is subrogated to the rights 
of any participant that has a claim against an insurer, 
tortfeasor, employer, third party administrator, pension 
manager, public or private corporation, government entity or 
any other person that may be liable for the cost of health 
services provided to the participant and paid for by the Health 
Care for All Oregon Plan. (3) The authority may enter into an 
agreement with any person for the prepayment of claims 
anticipated to arise under subsection (2) of this section during 
a biennium. At the end of each biennium, the authority shall 
appropriately charge or refund to the payer the difference 
between the amount prepaid and the amount due.84 
An assignment of benefits is a legal agreement where the individual 
agrees to transfer the right to reimbursement for his or her health care services 
81 Other collateral sources may include out-of-state coverage, government payers where 
a waiver is not secured, TRICARE, federal employee health benefit plans, tortfeasors, 
workers compensation plans, accident or auto insurance policies, or other plans that are not 
included in the single-payer plan.  
82 See Figure 3, infra.  
83 Subrogation, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“The principle under which 
an insurer that has paid a loss under an insurance policy is entitled to all the rights and 
remedies belonging to the insured against a third party with respect to any loss covered by 
the policy.”). 
84 S.B. 631, 78th Leg. Assemb., 2015 Reg. Sess. (Or. 2015), § 15(2), (3) (emphasis 
added).  
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to another party, typically to a provider.85 In the single-payer context, an 
assignment provision would transfer to the single-payer plan the individual’s 
right to reimbursement from another third-party payer, such as a health 
plan.86 
Similarly, secondary payer provisions make the single-payer plan the 
secondary payer to any other coverage the patient may have, including 
employer-based coverage.87 This means that the collateral source of coverage 
has the first obligation to pay for the patient’s services, and the single-payer 
plan will only pay for services not otherwise covered by the primary payer. 
The secondary payer provision may be paired with a subrogation provision 
that authorizes the state single-payer plan to recover amounts that it paid that 
were the responsibility of the primary payer.88  
To illustrate the mechanics of these provisions, assume an an employee 
gets an MRI and a bill for $800 for the service.  Her employer’s plan agrees 
to pay up to $1,000 for an MRI.  Under a subrogation provision, the state 
single-payer plan would pay the provider’s bill of $800, then charge the 
employer $800.89  Under an assignment provision, similarly, the state single-
85 46A C.J.S. Insurance § 2001 (“A form authorizing a [health care provider] to receive 
payment of a patient’s insurance benefits is sufficient to effect an assignment of the patient’s 
claim against the insurance company to the [health care provider].”  
86 See, e.g., R.I. S.B. 2237, § 23-95-12(g), providing: 
Receipt of health care services under the plan shall be deemed an assignment by the 
[Rhode Island Single Payer Plan] participant of any right to payment for services 
from a policy of insurance, a health benefit plan or other source. The other source 
of health care benefits shall pay to the fund all amounts it is obligated to pay to, or 
on behalf of, the [Rhode Island Single Payer Plan] participant for covered health 
care services. The director may commence any action necessary to recover the 
amounts due. 
87 See, e.g., H.P. 887, 128th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Me. 2017), § 7506 (providing that 
“Healthy Maine serves as a secondary payor” and the total of primary and secondary 
payments “may not exceed the amount that Healthy Maine would pay if it were the only 
payor”). 
88 Id. (“Healthy Maine may recover health care payments from any other collateral 
source, such as a health insurance plan, health benefit plan or other payor that is primary to 
Healthy Maine.”). 
89 E.g. S.B. 631, 78th Leg. Assemb., 2015 Reg. Sess (Or. 2015), § 15(3) (providing that  
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payer play would assume the employee’s right to receive $800 from the 
employer plan and would pay the provider on the employee’s behalf, then 
assess an $800 charge on the employer to pay back the state fund.90  Under a 
secondary payer provision, the employer plan must pay the $800 bill and the 
state single-payer plan is relieved of its obligation to pay.91   
In proposals using a Type C—Assignment/Subrogation/Secondary Payer 
model, if a patient has dual coverage in both the single-payer plan and another 
plan, such as employer-sponsored coverage, the single payer plan is able to 
seek reimbursement from the other plan (the collateral source of coverage) 
for any services provided. In states where the providers are permitted to bill 
collateral sources , the single-payer plan would just be responsible for patient 
cost-sharing and services not covered by the collateral source. Using the MRI 
example from above, the MRI provider could bill the patient’s employer plan 
$800 for the MRI. If the patient had a $500 deductible under her employer 
plan, the patient would ordinarily owe $500 to the MRI provider. However, 
the state single-payer plan, which does not permit patient cost-sharing, would 
then function as supplemental coverage and pay the patient’s $500 cost-
sharing, and the employer would pay $300.92  Thus, the assignment, 
subrogation, or secondary payer provision saves the single-payer plan money 
by turning first to collateral sources of coverage,93 which may reduce the 
amount of payroll or other taxes required to fund the single-payer program. 
these charges shall be amassed each “biennium”).   
90 E.g., R.I. S.B. 2237 § 23-95-12(g) (authorizing the state single-payer plan’s director 
to take “any action necessary” to recover these funds).   
91 E.g., H.P. 887, 128th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Me. 2017), § 7506 (providing that if the 
employer plan should have paid and did not, the state single-payer plan can pay and recoup 
the bill from the employer plan).   
92 E.g., P.A. S.B. 1014, §§ 503(c) (prohibiting patient cost sharing), 505 (subrogation), 
507 (provider participation) (providing that the state plan is subrogated to and deemed an 
assignee of a participant’s duplicate coverage, prohibiting the provider from charging 
participants cost-sharing, and not prohibiting the provider from billing a participant’s 
duplicate coverage).   
93 E.g., S.F. 1125, 2019 Leg., 91st Sess., § 3, subd. 3(a) (Minn. 2019) (providing, “The 
Minnesota Health Plan shall seek reimbursement from the collateral source for services 
provided to the individual  . . . Upon demand, the collateral source shall pay to the Minnesota 
Health Fund the sums it would have paid or expended on behalf of the individual for the 
health care services provided by the Minnesota Health Plan.”) 
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It also contains an implied acknowledgement that employers may continue to 
offer coverage if they so choose. The circuitous inefficiency of these Type C 
pay-and-recoup provisions illustrate the contortions that ERISA forces states 
into. These provisions would be unnecessary if the state could simply 
mandate that employers offer coverage to employees through the state single-
payer plan or cease providing employer-based coverage altogether because 
the possibility of dual coverage would be eliminated. 
For administrative ease, however, providers may simply want to bill the 
single-payer plan for all services provided to dually covered patients, and the 
Assignment/Subrogation/Secondary Payer provisions allow the single-payer 
to pay the provider and then recover payment from the collateral source. This 
would allow the single-payer plan to recapture some of the employer 
expenditures, not what it spends on premiums, but the amount it pays in 
claims. The Assignment/Subrogation/Secondary Payer model may be 
particularly useful to capture expenditures of out-of-state employers, who 
may not be subject to the state’s payroll tax requirements.  
A few  states—Ohio, Rhode Island, and Maine—combine Types B and 
C.94  Ohio’s single payer bills contain provisions that require providers to 
seek payment only from the state single-payer plan, a provision subrogating 
the rights of the single-payer plan to all rights of a participant against a 
collateral source of payment, and a provision assigning from the participant 
to the single payer plan any rights to receive payment for services from any 
other source.95 Combining Types B and C creates an mechanism to pull both 
employees and the employer expenditures into the single-payer plan: (1) 
require participating providers to seek payment only from the single payer; 
(2) all services provided to state residents will be paid by the single payer at 
the established rates; and (3) if the patient is dually covered by an employer 
plan or other coverage, then the single-payer entity will seek reimbursement 
from the collateral source. In this way, the single-payer system can capture 
some of the employer expenditures on claims paid. For patients with dual 
coverage, it effectively transforms the single-payer plan into the billing agent 
of the provider. The employer can still pay claims to the single-payer plan if 
94 See, e.g., Ohio H.B. 440; H. 5611, 2019 Gen. Assemb., Jan. Sess. (R.I. 2019); H.P. 
962, 126th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Me. 2013).  
95 Ohio H.B. 440  § 3920.09(C)-(D), § 3920.13, § 3920.04(B)(15)(g). 
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it elects to keep its private plan, but it may be easier and cheaper to simply 
stop covering the employees in that state and pay a payroll tax per employee 
instead. This model still relies upon a payroll tax or other way to capture the 
employer funds saved if it stops providing coverage to its employees, but it 
allows the single-payer to capture health expenditures from third-party payers 
that continue to exist outside the single-payer system.96  
A handful of bills only contained a Type C subrogation/ assignment/ or 
secondary payer provision and no Funding Plan or Provider Restriction.97 A 
standalone Type C will do little to capture employer expenditures or move 
individuals into the single-payer plan and suggests that the state may 
anticipate the persistence of a multi-payer system. Most of these plans 
provide for future development of the funding provisions, and such payroll 
or income taxes would do most of the work of moving people and funds into 
the state’s plan. A standalone Type-C provision, particularly secondary 
payer, may even keep people in dual-coverage longer than if they were paying 
for employer coverage that they rarely used (because the state plan would pay 
their claims). In some cases, other features suggest a standalone secondary 
payer bill may not actually establish a single-payer, but rather establish a 
public option to compete with private plans without displacing private 
coverage altogether.98  
A summary of the different types of mechanisms that state single-payer 
bills use to capture employer expenditures is listed in Figure 2. The number 
of state proposals that contain each of the features, A, B, and C, are listed in 
Figure 3. Note that proposals that feature more than one type of provision are 
96 As noted below in Part II.A.3, however, application of these provisions to self-insured 
employer plans would be preempted. 
97 H.P. 887, 127th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Me. 2017); H.P. 316, 129th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. 
(Me. 2019); H.B. 6285, (Mich. 2018); Or. S.B. 631; S.B. 5222, 66th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wa. 
2019).  
98 For example Wash. S.B. 5222 (2019) would allow employers that provide minimum 
essential coverage to employees to apply for an exemption from the payroll taxes to pay for 
the state plan. See § 114(3). Moreover, the bill does not contain a nonduplication provision 
and allows providers to continue to bill other payers. Mich. H.B. 6285 (2018) creates a state 
plan that would be secondary to other coverage. Providers remain free to contract with and 
bill third-party payers, but only at rates less than the state plan’s rates. Employers may 
participate voluntarily. 
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counted more than once.  
Figure 2. Types of State Single-Payer Provisions 
 




4. Summarizing the Models to Capture Employer Spending  
The necessity of a payroll tax or other funding mechanism to capture 
employer expenditures means that most proposals combine a Funding Plan 
with either a Provider Restriction or Assignment/Subrogation/Secondary 
Payer provision.99 Other states have single payer bills that lack a specific 
Funding Plan but contain a Provider Restriction or an 
Assignment/Subrogation/Secondary Payer provision.100 All Type B and C 
plans will eventually require a funding mechanism, even if the bills leave the 
details to be determined later. A proposal’s lack of a specific revenue plan 
may reflect the political or technical difficulty of determining the precise 
levels of each type of tax needed to pay for the system. Thus, while it may be 
possible to design a single-payer plan without either a Provider Restriction or 
a Subrogation/Assignment/Secondary Payer provision, it is not possible to 
imagine a viable single payer plan that lacks a financing mechanism. The 
taxes in Type A proposals draw employees and employer expenditures into 
the single-payer plan, while the Type B and C proposals use provider 
regulation or assignment/subrogation/secondary payer provisions to bolster 
the movement of people and funds into the single-payer plan.  
All these models, particularly Types B and C, implicitly contemplate that 
some employers may continue to offer employer-based coverage, at least 
during a transition period before the system settles into equilibrium. As such, 
these models may also improve the ERISA-resistance of the single-payer 
proposal as a whole.  
In response to ERISA, the emerging models for state single-payer plans 
use a combination of nudges and incentives operating on all the various actors 
in the health care transaction. Employers are encouraged, but not required, by 
the payroll tax to drop their employee coverage in the single-payer state. 
Providers are given incentives to participate in the single-payer plan and thus 
relinquish the ability to charge any other party for their services, including 
99 See e.g., N.Y. A. 4738-A (combining a payroll tax, unearned income tax, and a 
provider restriction); Penn. S.B. 1014 § 904, § 905, § 505 (combining a payroll tax, income 
tax, and subrogation and assignment provisions). See also, Appendix A. 
100 See, e.g., H.B. 1516, 438th Sess. Gen. Assemb., (Md. 2018) (providing for the 
revenue plan to be developed and a provider restriction); Or. S.B. 631 (providing for a 
revenue plan to be developed and a subrogation provision).  
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the individual patient or employer plans. Employees likely will choose the 
state-single payer plan and drop their employer plan, because the single-payer 
plan’s broad provider network, lower cost-sharing, and comprehensive 
coverage will make it more attractive.  Even if employees keep their 
employer-sponsored plan, the state single-payer plan may pay the providers 
and seek reimbursement from this collateral source. The legal question we 
turn to in the next Part is whether ERISA preempts these nudges and 
incentives designed to pull employees and employer health spending through 
the state’s single-payer plan.  
 
II.  ERISA’S OBSTACLES TO STATE SINGLE-PAYER PLANS  
States’ powers to regulate their health care systems are historic and 
expansive, but bounded by federal laws that limit state regulatory power 
through preemption.  One federal law has erected a notorious obstacle to state 
regulation of health insurance:  ERISA.101  Congress enacted ERISA in 1974 
to regulate pensions (hence the “Retirement Income Security” in its title),102 
but the statute’s broad preemption language has wrought unintended 
consequences, blocking numerous state health reform laws over the past 40 
years as impermissibly “relat[ing] to” employer-sponsored health insurance.  
ERISA’s formidable preemption barrier is not, however, impassible.  The 
ERISA preemption scheme allows states to regulate some aspects of the 
insurance industry, provider payments, and general revenues.  State laws that 
manage to wriggle through the narrow space between permitted targets of 
regulation and impermissible burdens on employer-sponsored plans may 
survive preemption.   
Whether state-based single-payer plans survive ERISA preemption is the 
billion-dollar question posed in Part I.  The logical answer is that ERISA 
preemption poses a substantial obstacle to these state efforts, but the plans 
should survive if carefully drafted.  The practical answer is that ERISA 
101 Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (1974) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001–
1461 (2012)) 
102 See, e.g., James A. Wooten, A Legislative and Political History of ERISA Preemption, 
Part 1, 14 J. PENSION BENEFITS 31, 31-35 (2006). 
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preemption doctrine and precedent have become so harsh and unstable that 
they cast a pall of uncertainty, jurisdiction by jurisdiction, and invite litigation 
challenging these state efforts no matter where they arise.   
 
A.  The ERISA Preemption Labyrinth 
Preemption generally describes the displacement of one legal authority 
by another legal authority in an established hierarchy.103  The U.S. 
Constitution’s Supremacy Clause makes duly enacted federal law the 
“supreme law of the land,” and subordinates state laws “to the contrary.”104  
Preemption doctrine thus plays a crucial role in maintaining order in a federal 
system and policing the boundaries of authority.105   
These boundaries, however, are porous, poorly defined, and disorderly at 
many important junctures.106  Preemption doctrine has evolved a taxonomy 
of forms to determine which conflicts of authority have preemptive effect.107  
The taxonomy relies on divination of Congressional intent behind the federal 
law,108 identification of its points of friction with state laws, and selection of 
103 See generally Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225, 225 n.3 (2000) 
(defining “preemption” as “the displacement of state law by federal statutes (or by courts 
seeking to fill gaps in federal statutes”); Preemption, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1368–69 
(10th ed. 2014) (“The principle (derived from the Supremacy Clause) that a federal law can 
supersede or supplant any inconsistent state law or regulation.”). 
104 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.  See also, e.g., Lauren E. Phillips, Note, Impeding 
Innovation:  State Preemption of Progressive Local Regulations, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 2225 
(2018). 
105 See generally WILLIAM W. BUZBEE ED., PREEMPTION CHOICE (2009); RICHARD A. 
EPSTEIN & MICHAEL S. GREVE, EDS., FEDERAL PREEMPTION: STATES’ POWERS, NATIONAL 
INTERESTS 309 (2007). 
106 See Elizabeth Y. McCuskey, Body of Preemption:  Health Law Traditions and the 
Presumption against Preemption, 89 TEMPLE L. REV. 89, 95-97 (2016). 
107 See generally David S. Rubenstein, Delegating Supremacy?, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1125, 
1136-37 (2012) (explaining the Supreme Court’s preemption taxonomy).   
108 Gade v. Nat'l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88, 96 (1992) (“The question 
whether a certain state action is pre-empted by federal law is one of congressional intent. 
The purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone.”) (internal quotation marks and brackets 
omitted). 
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the degree to which they may coexist.109  Congress may explicitly express its 
intention to preempt state law, or that intent may be implied.110  Even when 
Congress expresses its wishes for preemption, those provisions invite plenty 
of ambiguity and room for interpretation.111   
ERISA exemplifies the phenomenon of expressed but ambiguous 
preemption provisions because the statute’s preemption is both forcefully-
worded and inscrutable.  Although passed primarily with pension benefits in 
mind,112 ERISA applies to all employer-sponsored benefits, and expressly 
extends to plans that provide “medical, surgical, or hospital care or benefits . 
. . through the purchase of insurance or otherwise.”113 ERISA’s original 
purposes were to safeguard employees’ pensions and to encourage 
employers’ provision of pension benefits by establishing a uniform system of 
federal regulation and limiting employees’ remedies.114  ERISA, however, 
109 See McCuskey, Body of Preemption, supra note 106, at 95-97.   
110 E.g., Max Helveston, Preemption Without Borders, 48 GA. L. REV. 1085, 1088 
(2014) (“Federal preemption occurs either when federal law explicitly states that it was 
intended to override state law (express preemption) or when continued enforcement of state 
law would conflict with federal law (implied, obstacle, or impossibility preemption).”); 
Daniel J. Meltzer, Preemption and Textualism, 112 MICH. L. REV. 1, 8 (2013) (describing 
implied preemption as resulting from an interpretation of the statute rather than its direct 
text).   
111 See, e.g., Geier v. Am. Honda, 529 U.S. 861, 866, 873 (2000) (holding that implied 
preemption may apply even when the statute has express preemption provisions); Jamelle C. 
Sharpe, Legislating Preemption, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 163, 179, 216 (2011) (“Although 
an express preemption or saving clause can be clear evidence of Congress’s preemptive 
intent, it may not be definitive evidence.”); Meltzer, supra note 110, at 30-31 (noting the 
variety of interpretive methods applied to express preemption provisions).  See also Brendan 
S. Maher, The Affordable Care Act, Remedy, and Litigation Reform, 63 AM. U. L. REV. 649, 
702 (2014) (observing that, “[t]he doctrine of preemption—and obstacle preemption in 
particular—is quite muddled”)   
112 See generally ERIC M. PATASHNIK, REFORMS AT RISK:  WHAT HAPPENS AFTER 
MAJOR POLICY CHANGES ARE ENACTED 74-77 (2008); Wooten, supra note 102. 
113 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (originally § 3(1)).  See, e.g., Travelers, 514 U.S. at 650-51.  But 
cf. PATASHNIK, supra note 112, at 83 (noting scholarly disagreement about how far Congress 
intended ERISA to intrude on health insurance regulation, but agreement on “the importance 
of the preemption provision for health politics and policy”).    
114 See, e.g., 29 § 1001  (2012) (declaring ERISA’s policy as, “to protect interstate 
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“does not go about protecting plan participants . . . by requiring employers to 
provide any given set of minimum benefits, but instead controls the 
administration of benefit plans”115 if employers choose to provide them. 
To promote uniformity116 and encourage multi-state employers to provide 
benefits, Congress wrote into ERISA a “terse but comprehensive”117 
provision expressly preempting “any and all” state laws118 that “relate to” any 
“benefit plan[s]”119 covered by the Act.120  Even state laws friendly to 
ERISA’s goals have run afoul of its preemption.121   
The “relates to” provision “may be the most expansive express pre-
emption provision in any federal statute.”122  But ERISA contains a “savings 
commerce and the interests of participants in employee benefit plans and their beneficiaries, 
by requiring the disclosure and reporting to participants and beneficiaries of financial and 
other information with respect thereto, by establishing standards of conduct, responsibility, 
and obligation for fiduciaries of employee benefit plans, and by providing for appropriate 
remedies, sanctions, and ready access to the Federal courts.”); 29 § 1001a (declaring 
“multiemployer pension” plans to be targets of ERISA’s policies); 29 § 1001b (declaring 
“single-employer defined benefit pension plans” to be targets of ERISA’s policies).   
115 Travelers, 514 U.S. at 651. 
116 See Aetna Health, Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 208 (2004) (“The purpose of ERISA 
is to provide a uniform regulatory regime over employee benefit plans.”). 
117 Gobeille v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 136 S. Ct. 936, 943 (2016).  See generally Wooten, 
supra note 102.   
118 ERISA defines state “laws” as “all laws, decisions, rules, regulations, or other state 
actions having the effect of law,” §514(c)(1), and includes both states and “any political 
subdivision thereof, or any agency or instrumentality of either which purports to regulate, 
directly or indirectly, the terms and conditions of employee benefit plans covered by 
ERISA,” § 514(c)(2).   
119 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2012) (included as § 514 in the Act). 
120 The preemption provision took effect on January 1, 1975.  29 U.S.C. § 1144(a).  Cf. 
§ 1144(b)(1) (stating that ERISA does not apply retroactively from that date). 
121 E.g., Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Serv., Inc., 486 U.S. 825, 830 (1988) 
(“Legislative ‘good intentions’ do not save a state law within the broad pre-emptive scope 
of § 514(a).”).   
122 Gobeille, 136 S. Ct. at 947 (Thomas, J., concurring).  See Meltzer, supra note 110, at 
20 (noting that other statutes like the Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act of 
1995 use “related to” preemption language, but that ERISA’s is the “most frequently 
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clause,” which exempts state regulation of “insurance” from preemption 
under the statute.123  States may not, however, “deem” an employee benefit 
plan or trust “to be an insurance company . . . or to be engaged in the business 
of insurance” in order to regulate it under the savings clause.124  In the health 
benefits context, courts have interpreted this to exempt employers’ self-
funded health plans from state “insurance” laws.125 The preemption clause, 
savings clause, and “deemer” clause structure illustrate the whipsaw of 
ERISA preemption:  the broadest preemption statement, followed by a broad 
exception to that preemption, finished with an exception to the exception, 
restoring preemption.126   
The Court’s ERISA preemption jurisprudence has, over the past four 
decades, attempted to navigate a workable course between the “broad scope 
Congress intended” and the “susceptibility to limitless application” its chosen 
words engender.127  The quest for workable standards in light of the clause’s 
“indeterminacy” has resulted in an ERISA preemption doctrine that rejects 
litigated”). 
123 Noting in ERISA “shall be construed to exempt or relieve any person from any law 
of any state which regulates insurance, banking, or securities.”  § 514(b)(2)(A)  This clause 
preserves states’ ability to directly regulate the “business of insurance.”  See, e.g., Ky. Ass’n 
of Health Plans v. Miller, 538 U.S. 329, 339, 341-42 (2003) (holding that “any willing 
provider” laws were not preempted); Pharm. Care Mgm’t. Ass’n v. Rowe, 429 F.3d 294, 301 
(1st Cir. 2005) (holding that pharmacy benefit manager legislation was saved from 
preemption).  But see PCMA v. Gerhart, 852 F.3d 722, 732 (8th Cir. 2018) (holding that 
ERISA preempted Iowa’s regulation of PBMs that provided services to ERISA plans).  
ERISA also contains a provision that expressly preserves other federal laws, stating that they 
are not preempted if ERISA’s application would “alter, amend, modify, invalidate, impair, 
or supersede” them.  29 U.S.C. § 1144(d); see Shaw v. Delta Airlines, 463 U.S. 85, 96-97 
(1983).   
124 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(B). 
125 See Part II.A.2.b., infra.  
126 See also Mary Ann Chirba-Martin & Troyen A. Brennan, The critical role of ERISA 
in state health reform, 13 HEALTH AFF. 142, 142-156 (1994) (explaining the “intricate three-
step dance of the ‘relate to,’ ‘savings,’ and ‘deemer’ clauses”). 
127 Gobeille, 136 S.Ct. at 943.  See also id. at 948 (Thomas, J., concurring) (noting how 
“uncomfortable” the Court became with the volume of state law preempted by a literal 
reading).   
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“uncritical literalism,”128 but replaces it with a complex analytical framework 
whose outcomes can be difficult to predict.  It is a mess. 
The Supreme Court has interpreted “relates to” broadly, while crafting 
limiting principles to deal with the “unhelpful” phrasing,129 so that not every 
relationship to employee benefit plans invalidates a state law.  Per the Court’s 
interpretation, state laws impermissibly “relate to” employee benefit plans by 
making “reference to” those plans,130 by “act[ing] immediately and 
exclusively upon ERISA plans” or by making “the existence of ERISA plans 
. . . essential to the law’s operation.”131   
State laws also may “relate to” ERISA plans by having too strong a 
“connection with” them, such as when a state law “governs the payment of 
benefits, a central matter of plan administration,” or “interferes with 
nationally uniform plan administration,”132 or indirectly produces “economic 
effects” which would “force an ERISA plan to adopt a certain scheme of 
substantive coverage or effectively restrict its choice of insurers.”133  Thus, 
ERISA would preempt state laws that require employers to offer health 
benefits or impose requirements on the benefits offered as impermissibly 
relating to an employee benefit plan.134 The concept of a forced choice or 
128 NY State Conf. of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 
645, 656.  See also California Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr., 
519 U.S. 316, 336 (Scalia, J., concurring) (opining that the preemption clause’s furthest 
literal interpretations produce infinite preemption that “no sensible person could have 
intended”).   
129 Travelers, 514 U.S. at 655-56 (calling the preemption language “unhelpful” and 
rejecting a literal reading of the phrase).  Accord Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. 
Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 739 (1985) (“not a model of legislative drafting”). 
130 Travelers, 514 U.S. at 656. 
131 Dillingham, 519 U.S. at 325. 
132 Egelhoff, 532 U.S. at 148. 
133 Travelers, 514 U.S. at 668.  See Gobeille, 136 S.Ct. at 943 (collecting cases).  See 
also Egelhoff, 532 U.S. at 146-47; Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, 463 U.S. 85, 97–100 (1983) 
(finding that laws effectively requiring employers to “pay employees specific benefits” are 
preempted). 
134 E.g., Travelers, 514 U.S. at 664 (noting that a “substantive mandate” on health 
benefits would be preempted); Mary Anne Bobinski, Unhealthy Federalism:  Barriers to 
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“Hobson’s choice” plays an important role in distinguishing preempted state 
laws from permitted ones.135  State laws that nudge too hard may leave 
employers with only the illusion of choice in whether to offer benefits and 
what to cover.136  Those laws are preempted as impermissibly relating to 
ERISA plans.137   But state laws that merely make certain choices more 
attractive than others may survive;138 their connection is “too tenuous, 
remote, or peripheral” for preemption.139 
Additionally, beyond ERISA’s capacious express preemption provisions, 
the regular doctrine of conflict preemption would invalidate those state 
efforts that impermissibly conflict with or create obstacles to ERISA rules.140  
Even good arguments for why novel state efforts should slip through are 
doubtful, due to the breadth of the preemption, courts’ singular focus on 
uniformity, and the statute’s unfortunate wording.  In the realm of ERISA, 
courts usually resolve indeterminacy to favor preemption. 
In a health reform landscape already fraught with uncertainty and 
Increasing Health Care Access for the Uninsured, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 255, 292 (1990) 
(stating that “state level employer mandates” are preempted). 
135 See, e.g., Travelers, 514 U.S. at 664 (noting that a Hobson's choice “would be treated 
as imposing a substantive mandate”).  Retail Indus. Leaders Ass'n v. Fielder, 435 F. Supp. 
2d 481, 497 (D. Md. 2006),  (“The ‘choice’ here is a Hobson's choice” and therefore 
preempted); Retail Indus. Leaders Ass' v. Fielder, 475 F.3d 180, 202 (4th Cir. 2007) 
(Michael, J., dissenting) (“Paying the assessment would [] not be a financial burden that 
leaves Wal–Mart with a Hobson's choice, that is, no real choice but to increase health 
insurance benefits.”).   
136 See Travelers, 514 U.S. at 664.   
137 See Retail Indus. Leaders Ass' v. Fielder, 475 F.3d 180, 192-93 (4th Cir. 2007). 
138 E.g., Travelers, 514 U.S. at 664 (“[N]o showing has been made here that the 
surcharges are so prohibitive as to force all health insurance consumers to contract with the 
Blues. As they currently stand, the surcharges do not require plans to deal with only one 
insurer, or to insure against an entire category of illnesses they might otherwise choose to 
leave without coverage.”).  
139 Shaw v. Delta Airlines, 463 U.S. 85, 100 (1983). 
140 See John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Harris Trust & Savings Bank, 510 U.S. 
86, 99 (1993) (finding that Congress did not intend to “fundamentally . . . alter traditional 
preemption analysis” when it wrote ERISA’s express preemption language).  See also Boggs 
v. Boggs, 520 U.S. 833, 833 (1997) (applying conflict preemption to ERISA).   
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indeterminacy,141 ERISA has wreaked havoc on state health regulation and 
reform efforts.142  The expansive “relates to” provision has preempted 
everything from direct mandates for employer benefits to statutory rules of 
general applicability that indirectly burden employers’ decisions about their 
plans and how much those plans will cost.  In its most recent ERISA opinion 
in Gobeille, for example, the Supreme Court held that ERISA preempted state 
all-payer claims data reporting requirements, even where the plans already 
collected the data at issue and self-funded plans contracted with an insurance 
company affiliate to do so.143    
Yet explicit references to employer plans are not always fatal to state 
laws,144 nor are the dividing lines for coercive versus permitted economic 
effects clearly drawn.145  State and local health insurance reforms prior to the 
ACA met a multitude of fates when challenged in court.  These reforms 
include regulations targeting providers (hospitals and doctors), employer 
contribution provisions (a/k/a pay-or-play laws), and regulation of insurance 
141 See generally, McCuskey, Body of Preemption, supra note 106, at 103-105; Scott L. 
Greer & Peter D. Jacobson, Health Care Reform and Federalism, 35 J. HEALTH POL., POL’Y 
& L. 203, 220 (2010) (noting that political opportunism in health policy can be 
counterproductive).  
142 See, e.g., Brendan S. Maher & Peter K. Stris, ERISA & Uncertainty, 88 WASH. U. L. 
REV. 433, 464–65 (2010) (noting that ERISA’s provisions regularly capture the Supreme 
Court’s attention); Gregory Acs, et al., Self-Insured Employer Health Plans:  Prevalence, 
Profile, Provisions, and Premiums, 15 HEALTH AFF. 266, 267 (1996) (“ERISA preemption 
is very controversial.”). 
143 Gobeille v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 577 U.S. ___, 136 S. Ct. 936, 947 (2016). 
144 Compare Board of Trade, 506 U.S. 125, 130 (1992) (holding state law specifically 
referring to employee benefit plans preempted “on that basis alone”) with Dillingham, 519 
U.S. at 328 (holding that state law which can function irrespective of ERISA plans does not 
impermissibly “reference” ERISA plans).  
145 State legislative purpose is “relevant only as it may relate to the ‘scope of the state 
law the Congress understood would survive,’” preemption or ‘the nature of the effect of the 
state law on ERISA plans.’”  Gobeille, 136 S.Ct. at 946 (quoting Travelers, 514 U.S. at 658-
59 and Dillingham, 519 U.S. at 325).  See also Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Serv., 
Inc., 486 U.S. 825, 830, (1988) (“Legislative ‘“good intentions’” do not save a state law 
within the broad pre-emptive scope of” ERISA preemption).   
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coverage and administration.146 
1. Provider regulation 
  State regulation of health care providers typically falls outside ERISA’s 
reach, despite substantial indirect economic effects on employee-benefit 
plans.  Regulation of provider rates, taxation of health care facilities, medical 
quality-control regulations, and general health care delivery regulations are 
not preempted.147  As with most other applications of ERISA, however, the 
analysis is not always so straightforward when insurance reimbursement gets 
involved.  
In New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. 
Travelers Insurance Co., the Supreme Court established both the modern 
understanding of the “connection with” preemption standard, and the modern 
analysis of how provider regulation may indirectly impact employer-
sponsored health benefits.148  The New York law challenged in Travelers 
imposed a 24% surcharge on hospital bills for patients covered by 
commercial insurance other than Blue Cross or Blue Shield (“Blue plans”) to 
146 See generally, Peter D. Jacobson, The Role of ERISA Preemption in Health Reform: 
Opportunities and Limits, 37 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 86 (2009).  States have endeavored to 
reform other aspects of their health care systems, especially cost structures, which are not as 
obviously related to the single-payer insurance reforms discussed here.  E.g., Pharm. Care 
Mgm’t. Ass’n v. District of Columbia, 613 F.3d 179, 190 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (district law 
regulating pharmaceutical benefits managers partially preempted); Pharm. Care Mgm’t. 
Ass’n v. Rowe, 429 F.3d 294, 301 (1st Cir. 2005) (similar legislation not preempted); Erin 
C. Fuse Brown & Jaime S. King, ERISA as a Barrier for State Health Care Transparency 
Efforts,  in TRANSPARENCY IN HEALTH & HEALTH CARE (eds. I. Glenn Cohen, Holly 
Fernandez Lynch, and Barbara Evans, Cambridge U. Press 2019). 
147 See, e.g., Travelers, 514 U.S. at 659-65 (arguing that surcharges are non-preempted 
economic influences because they do not require plans to deal with only one insurer); 
Dillingham, 117 S.Ct. at 840 (noting that traditional areas of state action such as medical 
care quality standards and hospital workplace regulations are too remote to affect choices 
made by ERISA plans); De Buono, 117 S.Ct. at 1747 (holding that state tax on gross receipts 
of health care facilities is not preempted by ERISA).  
148 See, e.g., Amy B. Monahan, Pay or Play Laws, ERISA Preemption, and Potential 
Lessons from Massachusetts, 55. U. KAN. L. REV. 1203, 1208 (2007).  This decision came 
after multiple states attempted to include employers in health care reform without triggering 
ERISA preemption. 
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cover the externalized costs – borne by Medicaid, Blue plans, and community 
hospitals – that enabled commercial insurers and HMOs to charge lower rates 
and enroll healthier populations.149  Although the surcharge was based on 
providers’ bills and was collected by the providers, it was designed to impact 
the cost-structure for third-party payers of those bills and in particular to 
make Blue plans more attractive.150  Thus, the surcharge had an “indirect 
economic effect on choices made by insurance buyers, including ERISA 
plans.”151  Travelers held that this indirect economic incentive to buy Blue 
plans did not trigger ERISA preemption because it did not “bind plan 
administrators to any particular choice” of plan and did not “force” employers 
to contract with Blue plans.152   
Travelers established that general health care regulations’ indirect 
economic influence over employer health insurance choices may survive 
preemption, but only to a degree.  While the 24% surcharge on hospital 
services was not “so prohibitive as to force all health insurance consumers to 
contract with” Blue plans, the Court posed that “there might be a point at 
which an exorbitant tax leaving consumers with a Hobson’s choice would be 
treated as imposing a substantive mandate” on employers’ insurance choices 
and therefore preempted.153   
149 Travelers, 514 U.S. at 650.  The law included an additional assessment on HMOs 
directly, varying with the number of Medicaid enrollees in the HMO, which was paid by the 
HMO to the state’s general fund.  Id.  At the time, New Jersey enacted a similar rate-setting 
statute that had survived preemption analysis in the Third Circuit.  See Travelers, 514 U.S. 
at 654 (arguing that purposefully interfering with ERISA plan choices constitutes a 
“connection” that triggers preemption).  
150 Id.  The law included an additional assessment on HMOs directly, varying with the 
number of Medicaid enrollees in the HMO, which was paid by the HMO to the state’s general 
fund.  Id. at 650. See Monahan, supra note 148, at 1208 (finding that state laws with 
connections to ERISA plans may relate to such plans even if ERISA is not explicitely 
referenced). 
151 Travelers, 514 U.S. at 659. 
152 Id. at 661, 664 (“[T]he surcharges do not require plans to deal with only one insurer, 
or to insure against an entire category of illnesses they might otherwise choose to leave 
without coverage.”). 
153 Id. at 664.   
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After Travelers, analysis of connection between state laws and ERISA 
plans has focused on the practical degree of choice left to the employer.  A 
state tax on hospital gross receipts, for example, was among the “‘myriad 
state laws’ of general applicability that impose some burdens on the 
administration of ERISA plans but nevertheless do not ‘relate to’ them within 
the meaning of the governing statute.”154   
2. Employer contributions   
State and local governments’ efforts to nudge employers to contribute to 
their employees’ health care costs have not fared as well as provider 
regulation under ERISA preemption.155  Prior to the ACA’s federal employer 
mandate, several state and local governments enacted “fair share”156 or “pay-
or-play” requiring that employers offer a certain level of health benefits 
(play) or pay an assessment to the state for the difference (pay).157  These 
laws’ fates under ERISA preemption thus far have turned on the nature and 
strength of the pay incentives, and on employers’ political support.158 
  Massachusetts’s 2006 comprehensive health reform statute,159 for 
example, included a requirement that employers with more than ten 
154 De Buono v. NYSA-ILA Med. & Clinical Servs. Fund, 520 U.S. 806, 815 (1997) 
(citing Travelers, 514 U.S., at 668) (concluding that, while the tax would have some 
influence on the ERISA fund’s decision to provide benefits by operating clinics, its influence 
would not be so strong as to force a particular decision). 
155 See generally Mary Ann Chirba-Martin, ERISA Preemption of State “Pay of Play” 
Mandates:  How PPACA Clouds an Already Confusing Picture, J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y. 
393, 404-17 (finding that most state legislative attempts to bypass ERISA by encouraging 
employers to offer employee health coverage were either voted down immediately or faced 
continuous §514 challenges). 
156 See generally Julia Contreras & Orly Lobel, Wal-Martization and the Fair Share 
Health Care Acts, 19 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 105 (2006) (evaluating Maryland’s Fair Share 
Health Care Act which was turned down in court for being incompatible with federal uniform 
treatment laws under ERISA). 
157 See Monahan, supra note 148, at 1205-06 (arguing that state laws with relatively 
weak “pay” provisions are more likely to surivie ERISA preemption challenges when not 
viewed as disgused mandates). 
158 See id. at 1211-20.   
159 “Massachusetts Health Care Reform Act” 
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employees make “fair and reasonable contributions” to employees’ health 
insurance coverage, or else pay an assessment of $295 per employee into a 
state fund.160  A few years after Massachusetts enacted its reforms, the 
Affordable Care Act enacted a federal “pay-or-play” provision modeled on 
the Massachusetts statute,161 now colloquially referred to as the “employer 
mandate.”162  The Massachusetts employer mandate, “somewhat 
surprisingly,” went unchallenged under ERISA,163 perhaps because the 
health reform bill enjoyed widespread political support from employers.164   
Elsewhere, employer trade groups have readily challenged pay-or-play 
legislation in court, leading to divergent approaches in the Circuit Courts 
starting in 2007.  Maryland’s Fair Share Health Care Act,165 aimed at 
160 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 149, § 188(a) (2006).  Employers who do not arrange pre-
tax payroll deductions for their employees’ health benefits face an additional assessment if 
their employees use the state-funded Health Safety Net program.  Id. ch. 149 § 44.  
161 See, e.g., KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION, MASSACHUSETTS HEALTH CARE REFORM:  
SIX YEARS LATER, at 1 (May 2012), https://www.kff.org/health-costs/issue-
brief/massachusetts-health-care-reform-six-years-later/ [https://perma.cc/HTX2-MZHL] 
(evaluating former Governor Mitt Romney’s health reform effort to provide near-universial 
health coverage to state residents and the standard it set for similar national efforts). 
162 See, e.g., Internal Revenue Service, Employer Shared Responsibility Provisions, 
https://www.irs.gov/affordable-care-act/employers/employer-shared-responsibility-
provisions [https://perma.cc/KCA6-XD3E] (“The employer shared responsibility provisions 
are sometimes referred to as ‘the employer mandate’ or ‘the pay or play provisions.’”).    
163 Jacobson, supra note 146, at 93-94.  There exists ample speculation, however, about 
how such a challenge would be resolved, if litigated.  See, e.g., Chirba-Martin, supra note 
155, at 410-11 (arguing that the law is vulnerable to ERISA preemption because it explicitly 
targets almost all employers and requires some level of health benefit payment); Edward A. 
Zelinsky, The New Massachusetts Health Law: Preemption and Experimentation, 49 WM. 
& MARY L. REV. 229, 232 (2007) (reaching a “regrettable conclusion” that ERISA preempts 
the Massachusetts law).  
164 See Chirba-Martin, supra note 155, at 410.  Vermont enacted a provision similar to 
the Massachusetts employer mandate in 2006 and similarly met no litigation challenges to 
it.  See id. at 412. 
165 MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 15-142 (2007) (“Fair Share Health Care Fund 
Act”).  See Retail Industry Leaders Association v. Fielder, 475 F.3d 180, 198 (4th Cir. 2007)  
(Michael, J., dissenting) (“Maryland enacted the Fair Share Health Care Fund Act [] in 2006 
to require very large employers, such as Wal–Mart Stores, Inc., to assume greater 
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Walmart, required employers with more than 10,000 employees to spend a 
minimum of 8% of their payroll on health care, or else pay the difference 
between the employer’s actual health care expenditures and the 8% threshold 
into a state Medicaid fund.166  Walmart’s trade association sued. 
The Fourth Circuit in Retail Industry Leaders Association v. Fielder held 
that ERISA preempted Maryland’s pay-or-play law.167  The Fielder majority 
concentrated on the extent to which Maryland’s law impacted Walmart’s 
ability to uniformly administer its benefits nationwide.168  Fielder framed the 
inquiry in terms of choice:  A state law that “directly regulates or effectively 
mandates some element” of employer plans is preempted, while a law that 
“creates only indirect economic incentives that affect but do not bind the 
choices of employers” is not.169  Maryland’s law gave Walmart the choice of 
offering 8% payroll in health benefits to its employees, or paying that amount 
into the state Medicaid fund.170   
The Fourth Circuit found that “playing” by increasing benefits was, “[i]n 
effect, the only rational choice.”171 Offering the required level of health 
benefits would make Walmart a more attractive employer and help it recruit 
and retain employees.172  But “paying” that money to the state instead would 
not produce any benefit for Walmart, and might actually harm its employee 
morale and public opinion.173  Because the “pay” option was so undesirable 
for the employer, the Fourth Circuit held that the Act “effectively mandates 
that employers structure their employee healthcare plans to provide a certain 
responsibility for employee health insurance costs that are now shunted to Medicaid.”). 
Suffolk County, NY enacted a similar “Wal-Mart” law.  See Jacobson, supra note 146, at 94 
(Suffolk County’s provision applied only to non-unionized retailers). 
166 MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH–GEN. § 15–142(d), (f), (g).  See Contreras & Lobel, supra 
note 156, at 105-06.   
167 475 F.3d 180, 183 (4th Cir. 2007). 
168 Id. at 193. 
169 Id. 
170 Id.  
171 Id.  
172 Id. 
173 Id.  
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level of benefits,” and therefore formed an impermissible connection with 
ERISA plans.174   
The Maryland Act “directly” targeted an employer, and nudged too hard 
on Walmart’s benefits decisions by failing to offer “meaningful alternatives” 
for compliance.175  Further, the majority in Fielder expressed concern that 
permitting Maryland to enforce its law would invite other states to regulate 
similarly and “force Wal-Mart … to monitor these varying laws and 
manipulate its healthcare spending to comply with them.”176  
 State pay-or-play laws now must navigate around Fielder to survive 
preemption challenge.  Shortly after Fielder in 2007, a New York district 
court held that “[a]lthough … not bound by the decision of the Fourth Circuit 
in Fielder,” a county-level play-or-pay regulation targeting Walmart was 
“substantially similar to the Maryland Act” and therefore preempted.177 But 
in 2008, San Francisco’s Health Care Security Ordinance successfully 
avoided preemption before the Ninth Circuit in Golden Gate Restaurant 
Association v. San Francisco.178  San Francisco’s 2006 version of pay-or-
play survived largely due to its inclusion of the “meaningful alternatives” 
missing in Fielder.179  If Fielder represents the preempted Hobson’s choice 
174 Id. at 193-94 (“The Act thus falls squarely under Shaw’s prohibition of state mandates 
on how employers structure their ERISA plans.”) (citing Shaw, 463 U.S. at 96–97).  But see 
id. at 201-03 (Michael, J., dissenting) (“The Act expresses no preference for one method of 
…. . . or the other. . . . ... The Act does not compel an employer to establish or maintain an 
ERISA plan . . .… [or] impede an employer’s ability to administer its ERISA plans under 
nationally uniform provisions,” or “mandate a certain level of ERISA benefits.”).   
175 Id. at 196-97.  See Retail Indus. Leaders Ass’nRILA v. Suffolk Cty., 497 F. Supp. 2d 
403, 417 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) (“Although the Act provides employers with various alternative 
options to comply…, ‘the only rational choice employers have under [the Act] is to structure 
their ERISA healthcare benefit plans so as to meet the minimum spending threshold.’).  But 
see Fielder, 475 F.3d. at 202-203 (Michael, J., dissenting) (“The choice is real” because the 
“pay” amount is not “exorbitant.”). 
176 Id. at 197.   
177 See, e.g., Suffolk Cty., 497 F. Supp. 2d at 416. 
178 546 F.3d 639, 639 (9th Cir. 2008). 
179 See Golden Gate Restaurant Ass’n v. City and County of San Francisco, 546 F.3d 
639, 660 (9th Cir. 2008) (“In stark contrast to the Maryland law in Fielder, the City-payment 
option under the San Francisco Ordinance offers employers a meaningful alternative that 
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or forced choice for employer contributions, Golden Gate represents the non-
preempted “meaningful” or true choice.   
The San Francisco Health Care Security Ordinance established a city-run 
health care program for low-to-moderate income residents.180 To help capture 
and maintain employer health care contributions in funding the program, the 
ordinance requires that employers make “required health care expenditures 
to or on behalf of” employees at regular intervals.181 The ordinance set the 
“health care expenditure rate”182 based on the number of hours worked, but 
left up to the employers what type of expenditures to make.183  Employers 
had “discretion” in choosing among all possible commercial and private 
options.184  Employers also could choose a mix of different expenditures, as 
long as they met the required rate in total spend.185   
The Ninth Circuit observed that the ordinance did not force “creation” of 
ERISA plan, require employers to start offering health plans or change any 
existing health plans, or demand they provide specific benefits in any 
particular way.186  Rather, the ordinance prescribed only the dollar amount 
employers must spend and did not scrutinize much about how they spend the 
money or the “benefits derived from those dollars.”187  Combining a required 
expenditure rate with such broad discretion in how to spend it constituted an 
“even less direct … influence” on employer benefit decision than the one the 
Supreme Court upheld in Travelers.188   
The nature of the choices facing San Francisco employers distinguished 
the ordinance from Maryland’s preempted law.  The two laws differed litte 
allows them to preserve the existing structure of their ERISA plans.”). 
180 S.F. ADMIN. CODE §§ 14.1-14.8 (2007) 
181 S.F. ADMIN. CODE § 14.3(a). Golden Gate, 546 F.3d at 642.   
182 S.F. ADMIN. CODE § 14.1(b)(68). 
183 Golden Gate, 546 F.3d at 644. 
184 Id.. at 644-45 (citing S.F. ADMIN. CODE § 14.1(b)(7) and ESR Reg. 4.2(A)). 
185 Id. at 645-646. 
186 Id. at 646, 649-52. 
187 Id. at 647.   
188 Id. at 656 (citing Travelers, 514 U.S. at 658-59).   
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in the ultimate expenditure required from employers, with Maryland’s 
calculated as a percentage of payroll and San Francisco’s calculated as a flat 
dollar amount per hour worked.  The Maryland law, however, offered nothing 
new for the employer who chose the “pay” option, effectively rendering it a 
penalty for not offering suitable health insurance benefits.189  By contrast, the 
ordinance establishing San Francisco’s city-run benefits program “offers 
employers a meaningful alternative” to an ERISA plan, and “provides 
tangible benefits to employees when their employers choose to pay” the 
city.190 Employers who already offered health care benefits could keep their 
ERISA plan, and employers who did not could simply pay the tax and their 
employees could rely on the City program.191  Employers who rely on the 
City program would have a way to keep their employees healthy without the 
burden and complexity of selecting and administering their own ERISA 
plans. 
Pay-or-play laws thus survive or fail ERISA preemption based on the 
nature of the employer choices they establish and courts’ characterizations of 
them.192  Two years after the Golden Gate opinion, Congress enacted a 
federal-level employer mandate in the Affordable Care Act, likely obviating 
the urgency for many more states to pursue pay-or-play regulations.193 
Massachusetts repealed its state employer mandate during the initial years of 
Affordable Care Act implementation.194 Some cities and counties, 
meanwhile, have continued to pursue expanded health care programs with 
some pay-or-play features likely designed with the Fielder-Golden Gate split 
189 Id. at 659-60 (quoting Fielder, 475 F.3d at 193, 196).   
190 Id. at 660. 
191 See id. at 6061.Id. 
192 See Monahan, supra note 148 at 1205. 
193 See Wiley, supra note 8, at 859 (stating that, “[t]he [pay-or-play preemption] issue 
became moot when the ACA federalized the employer mandate, so the question remains 
unresolved”). 
194 See Benjamin D. Sommers, Mark Shepard, & Katherine Hempstead, Why Did 
Employer Coverage Fall in Massachusetts After the ACA? Potential Consequences of a 
Changing Employer Mandate, 37 HEALTH AFF. (2018) (examining employer-sponsored 
coverage rates before and after Massachusetts repealed its state-level mandate in 2014). 
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in mind.  For example in 2016, the City of Seattle enacted a Golden Gate-
style ordinance aimed at employer health care contributions for hotel 
workers.195  The ERISA Industry Committee has sued the City, relying on 
Fielder to argue that ERISA preempts the ordinance; the litigation remains 
ongoing.196  Massachusetts revived its pay-or-play mandate in 2018, 
suggesting that the preemption of pay-or-play provisions remains a relevant 
concern despite the ACA’s federal employer mandate.197 
The Supreme Court has not considered ERISA preemption in the pay-or-
play context, and litigation outcomes remain unpredictable when navigating 
the distinctions between diverging circuit court opinions in Fielder and 
Golden Gate.198  The pair of cases has reverberated beyond the Fourth and 
Ninth Circuits.  Other courts rely on Fielder and Golden Gate in a variety of 
ERISA contexts as exemplars of preempted and permitted employer 
incentive impacts, respectively.199 
195 See Carmen Castro-Pagan, “Seattle Faces Legal Test Over Hotel Worker Insurance 
Mandate,” BLOOMBERGLAW.COM (Aug. 14, 2018).   
196 Id.; ERISA Indus. Cmte. v. City of Seattle, 2:18-CV-01188 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 2018).  
197 See Katie Lannan, “Mass. Employers Face New Health Care Assessments in 2018,” 
WBUR.ORG (Dec. 29, 2017), https://www.wbur.org/commonhealth/2017/12/29/mass-
employers-face-new-health-care-assessments-in-2018. 
198 See, e.g., Fielder, 475 F.3d at 201 (Michael, J., dissenting) (lamenting the 
inconsistency of ERISA preemption holdings); Golden Gate Restaurant Ass’n v. City and 
County of San Francisco, 558 F.3d 1000, 1004 (2009) (Smith, J., dissenting from denial of 
rehearing en banc); id. at 1001 (Fletcher, J., concurring in panel opinion); The ERISA Indus. 
Cmte. v. City of Seattle, 2:18-CV-01188 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 2018) (pending litigation 
challenging Seattle pay-or-play ordinance for hotels).  See generally, Catherine L. Fisk & 
Michael M. Oswalt, Preemption and Civic Democracy in the Battle over Wal–Mart, 92 
MINN. L. REV. 1502, 1514–20 (2008) (arguing that the Fourth Circuit’s majority analysis in 
Fielder is inconsistent with recent Supreme Court holdings in other ERISA preemption 
cases); Chirba-Martin, supra note 155, at 411 (observing “the unfortunate reality that when 
it comes to ERISA preemption litigation, anything can happen”).   
199 See, e.g., Self-Ins. Inst. of Am., Inc. v. Snyder, 761 F.3d 631, 637 (6th Cir. 2014) 
(distinguishing Fielder in a hospital receipts tax context), cert. granted, judgment 
vacated, 136 S. Ct. 1355 (2016), aff’d, 827 F.3d 549 (6th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S.Ct. 
660 (2017); Merit Const. All. v. City of Quincy, 759 F.3d 122, 130 (1st Cir. 2014) (citing the 
pair of cases in assessing whether compliance with a city public-bidding ordinance “by 
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3. Insurance regulation versus self-funded plans 
ERISA’s express preemption provision contains an exception: a 
“savings” clause that saves from preemption state laws that regulate 
insurance.200 However, the savings clause contains an exception-to-the-
exception, the “deemer” clause, which has been interpreted to exempt self-
funded employer plans from the state insurance regulations saved by the 
savings clause.201  The upshot of the convoluted interplay between ERISA’s 
savings and deemer clauses is that states may regulate so-called “fully 
insured” employee health plans, but self-funded plans are completely beyond 
the reach of state law. 
ERISA’s savings clause preserves significant spheres of state regulatory 
authority over health insurance. The statute does not define “insurance,”202 
but under current ERISA precedent, it saves state laws that are “specifically 
directed toward entities engaged in insurance” and “substantially affect the 
risk pooling arrangement between the insurer and the insured.”203   
Thus, employers who provide health benefits by buying insurance 
policies for their employees must abide by state health insurance regulations 
that govern those policies. This method of providing employee health 
benefits is known as a “fully-insured” plan because the employer purchases 
insurance policies for its employees from an insurance company, who takes 
on the contracted risks in exchange for premiums.204 For these fully-insured 
plans, states retain broad authority to regulate. For example, state insurance 
rules prohibiting subrogation by health insurance plans affect employer 
means of a non-ERISA plan” avoids preemption). 
200 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A).  
201 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(B); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 
724, 747 (1985). 
202 Compare 29 § 1144(b)(2)(A) (“nothing in this subchapter shall be construed to 
exempt or relieve any person from any law of any State which regulates insurance”) with 29 
§ 1002 (definitions section, no entry for insurance). 
203 Kentucky Ass'n of Health Plans, Inc. v. Miller, 538 U.S. 329, 341–42 (2003) (making 
“a clean break from the [three] McCarran-Ferguson factors” in favor of two factors).  
204 See, e.g., Kaiser Family Foundation, Employer Health Benefits: 2018 Annual Survey, 
175 (2018). 
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plans’ calculation of benefits but nonetheless avoid preemption under the 
savings clause.205  States also can regulate the insurance policies available for 
purchase by employers.  States may require that insurers cover certain 
services,206 set rules for underwriting and administration207 (such as 
mandatory open enrollment, community rating, and risk-pooling),208 and 
require that insurers accept all providers willing to meet the plan’s terms 
(“any willing provider” laws).209   
Many employers, particularly larger employers, now offer health benefits 
a different way:  they agree to pay for some portion of their employees’ health 
care needs directly from an employer fund, instead of purchasing insurance 
policies for them.210  This form of employer-sponsored health benefit is 
known as “self-funded”211 or “self-insured,”212 with the “self” referring to the 
205 See FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 59-61 (1990). 
206 See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 731, 746-47 
(1985)(holding that states may require specified mental-health-care benefits be provided to 
residents in certain employee health-care plans).  
207 See, e.g., Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355, 370-87 (2002) (holding 
state law requiring external appeals process was enforceable against HMO providing 
employer-sponsored coverage).   
208 See, e.g., NYS Health Maintenance Org. Conference v. Curiale, 64 F.3d 794, 803 (2d 
Cir. 1995) (holding that NY community rating and open enrollment laws were not preempted 
because their only connection to employer plans was an "indirect effect on rate 
diversification among insurers"); Safeco Life Ins. Co. v. Musser, 65 F.3d 647, 648 (7th Cir. 
1995) (holding Wisconsin high-risk pool regulations were not preempted by ERISA).  
209 See Kentucky Ass'n of Health Plans, Inc. v. Miller, 538 U.S. 329, 335-37 (2003) 
(upholding state “any willing provider” law as within the “business of insurance” under 
ERISA).  Cf. Pharm. Care Mgmt. Ass'n v. Tufte, 297 F. Supp. 3d 964, 982 (D.N.D. 2017) 
(holding that ERISA does not preempt state regulation of pharmacy benefit managers – 
insurance intermediaries).  But cf. PCMA v. Gerhart, 852 F.3d 722 (8th Cir. 2018). 
210 See SELF-INSURANCE INSTITUTE OF AMERICA, SELF-INSURED GROUP HEALTH 
PLANS, (2018), available at https://www.siia.org/i4a/pages/index.cfm?pageID=4546 
[https://perma.cc/96RL-XQCY].  
211 GARY CLAXTON ET AL., supra note 51, at Section 10. Employers often safeguard their 
funds by purchasing “stop loss” insurance, to protect them if their employees’ health care 
claims exceed the fund amount. 
212 See Timothy Stoltzfus Jost & Mark A. Hall, Self-Insurance for Small Employers 
Under the Affordable Care Act: Federal and State Regulatory Options, 68 N.Y.U. ANN. 
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employer.  In 2018, 61% of Americans with employer-sponsored health care 
coverage were covered by self-funded plans.213 By contrast, in the 1970s 
when ERISA was passed, only 7% of those with employer-sponsored health 
coverage were in self-funded plans.214  Although the deemer clause does not 
mention self-funded plans, the Supreme Court has held that the self-funding 
mechanism does not sufficiently replicate the “business of insurance” for the 
purpose of regulation, and thus states may not “deem” self-funded plans to 
be providing insurance for the purpose of regulating them.215    
This interpretation of ERISA’s savings and deemer clauses means states 
may enforce their insurance regulations against fully-insured but not self-
funded employer-sponsored health plans.216  In essence, ERISA preemption 
catalyzed the growth of self-funded plans by opening a loophole through 
which employers could provide their employees with health benefits and 
avoid state insurance regulation.217  Further, courts have allowed employer 
plans to be “self-insured in name only, with the [employer] bearing minimal 
risk and most of the risk borne by the insurer” providing stop-loss coverage 
SURV. AM. L. 539, 554-56 (2013) (noting no definition of “self-insured” in ERISA, but 
tracing definitions through the Internal Revenue Code and Affordable Care Act).   
213GARY CLAXTON ET AL., supra note 51, at Section 10.   
214 Phyllis C. Borzi, There's "Private" and Then There's "Private": ERISA, Its Impact, 
and Options for Reform, 36 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 660, 661 (2008).  
215 See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 747 (1985) (holding 
that self-insured plans are exempt from state insurance regulation under the “deemer” 
clause).   
216 See FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 61 (“We read the deemer clause to exempt 
self-funded ERISA plans from state laws that ‘regulat[e] insurance’ within the meaning of 
the saving clause,” thus preemption state anti-subrogation law applied to self-funded plans).   
217 See Timothy Stoltzfus Jost & Mark A. Hall, Self-Insurance for Small Employers 
Under the Affordable Care Act: Federal and State Regulatory Options, 68 N.Y.U. ANN. 
SURV. AM. L. 539, 552-54 (2013); Chirba-Martin & Brennan supra note 126, at 146; Russell 
Korobkin, The Battle over Self-Insured Health Plans, or “One Good Loophole Deserves 
Another”, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y, L., & ETHICS 90 (2005).  But see FMC Corp., 498 U.S. 
at 68 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that, “The number of self-insured employee benefit 
plans grew dramatically in the 1960's and early 1970's.”).   
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to the employer.218  
ERISA’s savings clause thus allows states to regulate 40% of the 
employer-sponsored insurance market that is fully insured, but the deemer 
clause preempts the same state regulation as applied to the remaining 60% of 
employer self-funded plans.219 The diminishing practical distinction between 
fully insured and self-insured plans strains credulity.220  Yet this technical 
distinction triggers ERISA preemption for self-funded plans and thereby 
frustrates state efforts to enact uniform health care reforms,221 as self-funded 
plans have swallowed the savings clause. 
ERISA thus painfully illustrates how indeterminate an express 
preemption provision can be, spawning a dense, shifting body of precedent 
with relatively little predictive value.   
 
B.  State Single-Payer Plans under ERISA 
The intricate threat of ERISA preemption appears to have informed state 
legislative drafting in the most recent waves of single-payer legislation.222  
218 Jost & Hall, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 554. 
219 See Korobkin, supra note 217, at 136.   
220 See FMC Corp., 498 U.S. at 65 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“The Court's construction 
of the statute draws a broad and illogical distinction between benefit plans that are funded 
by the employer (self-insured plans) and those that are insured by regulated insurance 
companies (insured plans).”) 
221 See, e.g., Bobinski, supra note 134, at 294. See also Gregory Acs, et al., Self-Insured 
Employer Health Plans:  Prevalence, Profile, Provisions, and Premiums, 15 HEALTH AFF. 
266, 267 (1996) (ERISA “limits many of the health care financing and cost containment 
initiatives that states have considered” and “[b]ecause self-insured plans do not have to 
comply with state mandated benefits, ERISA prevents states from legislating a minimum 
benefit package for all of their residents.”).   
222 As detailed in part I, supra, state single-payer plans establish broad eligibility and 
coverage rules, then employ one or more types of provisions to fund the plans and draw 
enrollees from private coverage into the plan.  These provisions typically involve payroll and 
income taxes (Type A – Funding Plans), restrictions on provider reimbursement outside the 
state plan (Type B – Provider Restrictions), and some means of recouping state-plan 
payments for those who continue to maintain employer coverage (Type C – Assignment, 
Subrogation, Secondary-Payer). See Figure 2, supra.  
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Many provisions in the single-payer plans outlined in Part I fall well beyond 
ERISA’s preemptive reach because they address the state’s operation of its 
own plan and do not “relate to” employer-sponsored health plans, including 
the resident eligibility, cost-sharing, comprehensive coverage, and care 
coordination provisions.223 Similarly, the provider eligibility and rate-setting 
provisions, as well as rate setting for medical goods like prescription drugs, 
target core features of the health care market without regard to employer 
plans, and with permissibly tangential effects on them.224  They have a strong 
foundation in Supreme Court precedent225 and should easily survive litigation 
challenge. 
The crucial provisions for capturing employer health care spending and 
moving employees onto the state single-payer plan, however, face a difficult 
path through the ERISA preemption labyrinth.  As the analysis below 
concludes, the Type A, B, and C provisions should survive preemption under 
current ERISA doctrine and precedent. Yet the opaque nature of ERISA 
doctrine, courts’ unpredictable application of it, and employer trade 
associations’ propensity to sue also mean that litigation is virtually 
guaranteed, while the result in any particular litigation is not.   
1. Type A—Funding Plans 
State individual income taxes, meant to capture employees’ contributions 
to premiums and cost-sharing, do not trigger ERISA preemption because they 
do not target or impact employers.  Employer payroll taxes also should easily 
survive preemption under Travelers.  Payroll taxes keyed to employers’ 
health care expenditures, however, may need to navigate through the 
223 See Part I.A, infra (listing examples of these common provisions).  Cf. Rush 
Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355, 370-87 (2002) (holding state law dictating 
plan administration was enforceable against HMO providing employer-sponsored coverage); 
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 747 (1985) (state-mandated 
coverage of particular services, as applied to employer plans, not preempted as regulating 
insurance).  
224 See Part I.A, infra (providing examples). 
225 E.g., Kentucky Ass'n of Health Plans, Inc. v. Miller, 538 U.S. 329, 336 (2003) 
(upholding state “any willing provider” law as within the “business of insurance” under 
ERISA); Travelers, 514 U.S. at 659-65; Dillingham, 117 S.Ct. at 840; De Buono, 117 S.Ct. 
at 1747. 
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impenetrable hash of appellate precedent on pay-or-play laws, which 
obscures prediction. 
Although states enjoy fairly wide latitude on how they raise revenues, 
Type A’s payroll taxes ultimately could influence employers’ benefit 
decisions and therefore may run afoul of ERISA preemption. Assessments 
targeting particular employers and offering the employer nothing in return, 
as in Fielder,226 and/or setting the tax rate exorbitantly high227 may exert a 
preempted level of influence on the employer’s benefit plan decisions.  On 
the other hand, laws that preserve discretion for employers on how to meet a 
required health care expenditure rate and that offer tangible options for 
employers that choose pay instead of play, as in Golden Gate, create the kind 
of “legitimate alternatives that survive preemption.228 
The payroll taxes in Funding Plans have several structural advantages 
over the pay-or-play assessments in Fielder and Golden Gate.  First, payroll 
tax provisions do not depend on the existence or amount of employers’ health 
benefits and need not make any mention of them. Payroll taxes are calculated 
as a percentage of the wages paid to employees.229  The lack of an explicit 
reference to employer plans, and the fact that the tax is assessed without 
regard to existing ERISA plans or plan choices helps legislation of Type A 
pass through ERISA preemption’s first “relates to” hurdle.230 
Second, a payroll tax is far less likely than pay-or-play assessments to 
have an impermissible “connection” to ERISA plans via its indirect economic 
effects on employers’ decisions whether to offer health benefits.231  In 
Travelers, the Supreme Court posited that ERISA would preempt a 
226 See Fielder, 475 F.3d at 196. 
227 See Travelers, 514 U.S. at 664 (speculating that “an exorbitant tax” might leave 
employers “with a Hobson’s choice,” but holding that the tax at issue was not exorbitant). 
228 See Golden Gate, 546 F.3d at 660-61. 
229 See Brittain, supra note 61, at 110.  
230 See Travelers, 514 U.S. at 656 (using “reference to” as one definition of “relates to”); 
Dillingham, 519 U.S. at 325 (warning that laws may “relate to” ERISA plans by “act[ing] 
immediately and exclusively upon ERISA plans” or by making “the existence of ERISA 
plans essential to the law’s operation.”). 
231 Travelers, 514 U.S. at 668; Egelhoff, 532 U.S. at 146-48. 
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hypothetical state law that did not directly regulate ERISA plans, but still 
“produce[d] such acute, albeit indirect, economic effects … as to force an 
ERISA plan[‘]s” choice of substantive coverage or source of insurance.232  
This hypothesis may guide states’ calculation of the amount of a payroll tax.  
Set the payroll tax too low, and employers might may still want to provide 
health benefits to attract employees.  This could preserve a “meaningful 
choice” for employers, as in Golden Gate, but may compete with the state’s 
plan and erode the goals of single-payer.233  A higher payroll tax should make 
it less rational for employers to continue to offer its own health benefits and 
pay the tax, though still not run afoul of ERISA preemption by its indirect 
economic effects.  At some point, a payroll tax could become so “exorbitant” 
as to leave only a “Hobson’s choice.”234  But the Supreme Court has yet to 
define that point and the state single-payer laws surveyed here do not appear 
to approach it.        
For courts still tempted toward preemption by the indirect incentives of a 
payroll tax, Type A’s establishment of a state health insurance program 
should help it survive preemption under the reasoning of Golden Gate and 
Fielder.  While Maryland’s pay-or-play law created only one “rational” 
choice for employers because the “pay” option still left their employees 
without insurance,235  the establishment of a public insurance program in 
Golden Gate created the “meaningful alternative” essential to the pay-or-play 
law’s survival.236   
The Type A payroll tax has a third advantage over pay-or-play laws, 
which is that it is not tied to any particular benefit levels or coverage decisions 
232 The Supreme Court in Travelers speculated that an “exorbitant” tax would force a 
Hobson’s choice, but upheld a less-than-exorbitant one. Travelers, 514 U.S. at 668.   
233 Payroll taxes are all pay – the choice is either pay or pay-and-play.  The employer 
pays the state fund either way. 
234 Travelers, 514 U.S. at 664 (upholding a state surcharge of up to 24% on commercial 
insurance claims paid to hospitals). 
235 Fielder, 475 F.3d at 196.  The Fourth Circuit apparently ignored the fact that many 
Walmart employees would be eligible for Medicaid.   
236 Golden Gate, 546 F.3d at 661. 
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by employers.237 Circuit courts have upheld taxes of general applicability 
with indirect impacts on employer choices.238  And the ordinance in Golden 
Gate dictated that employers spend a certain amount on employee health care, 
allowed them to satisfy their expenditure by offering benefits, and gave them 
wide discretion about how to do so if they chose.  The Type A payroll tax 
does even less nudging than the Golden Gate ordinance because it does not 
dictate that employers spend funds on employees at all.  The payroll tax 
would thus have little or no impact on decisions about covered services, 
funding levels, or plan administration.   
Last, the payroll tax enjoys some advantage in that it because it does not 
impose additional administrative or compliance burdens on employers or 
their ERISA plans.  Instead, it might actually relieve some existing burdens.  
If an employer chooses to offer benefits and pay the tax, its benefits plan 
would not be subject to any additional compliance requirements in the single-
payer state.  If an employer chooses to pay the tax and drop coverage, it sheds 
some existing compliance burdens under both ERISA and state laws.  
Reliance on a state-program in one state creates “disuniformity” for 
multistate employers’ benefit plans, it does so in a way that would ease the 
employers’ burdens in the single-payer state, furthering a “primary objective” 
of ERISA to minimize administrative burden.239 Concerns for nationwide 
237 State taxes specifically targeting employee benefit plans or based on the value of 
benefits provided by a plan have been invalidated.  See Birdsong v. Olson, 708 F.Supp. 792, 
798-99 (W.D. Tex.1989) (state tax on the insurance company administrative fees for ERISA 
plans was preempted); National Carriers v. Heffernan, 454 F.Supp. 914, 915 (D. Conn.1978) 
(preempting state law imposing tax on employers maintaining employee benefit plans, based 
on the amount of benefits paid annually).  But see General Motors Corp. v. California Bd. of 
Equalization, 815 F.2d 1305, 1309-10 (9th Cir.1987) (premium tax on insurance companies, 
which included ERISA plans, not preempted under the savings clause).   
238 E.g., Self-Ins. Inst. of Am., Inc. v. Snyder, 827 F.3d 549, 553, 557-558 (6th Cir. 
2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 660 (2017) (holding that Michigan’s one–percent tax on all 
“paid claims” by “carriers” or “third party administrators” for services rendered was not 
preempted because the tax “does not directly regulate any integral aspects of ERISA.”). 
239 Compare FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 60 (1990) (“To require plan providers 
to design their programs in an environment of differing state regulations would complicate 
the administration of nationwide plans, producing inefficiencies that employers might offset 
with decreased benefits.”) with Retail Indus. Leaders Ass’n RILA v. Fielder, 475 F.3d 180, 
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uniformity and multi-state compliance burdens helped doom the pay-or-play 
law in Fielder, the anti-subrogation laws in FMC Corp., and the all-payer 
claims database in Gobeille, while Golden Gate found that some light 
recordkeeping and reporting did not rise to the level of concern.240   
 As the Supreme Court has recognized, “[a]ny state tax, or other law, that 
increases the cost of providing benefits to covered employees will have some 
effect on the administration of ERISA plans, but that simply cannot mean that 
every state law with such an effect is preempted by the federal statute.”241  
Despite strong arguments that a general payroll tax preserves employer 
discretion and decreases the burdens of providing benefits, its underlying 
intent to nudge employers to drop coverage in favor of the state’s single-payer 
plan has a whiff of employer choice to it such that states should expect 
litigation challenges.  The actual outcome of those challenges, especially in 
circuits other than the Fourth and Ninth,242 remains difficult to predict.   
2. Type B—Provider Restriction  
State laws that channel all payments to providers through the single-payer 
entity likewise should survive preemption, though their operation still raises 
some ERISA preemption concerns.  Type B legislation restricts providers 
from accepting payment from any third parties other than the state 
program.243 These provider restrictions avoid explicit “reference to” 
employer insurance244 and by targeting providers, rather than employers, 
191 (2007) (describing uniformity and minimizing administrative burden as ERISA’s 
“primary objective”). 
240 See Golden Gate, 546 F.3d. at 645, 657 (noting that employers providing self-funded 
health plans could use an average expenditure and not track actual per-employee spend, and 
that the ordinance’s recordkeeping and inspection requirements did not create conflicting 
directives that would burden employers or their plans because those recordkeeping 
requirements exist regardless of the ordinance).  But cf. Gobeille, 136 S. Ct. at 943  (holding 
claims data reporting requirements preempted despite that self-funded plan administrators 
already collected the required data). 
241 De Buono, 117 S.Ct. at 1753.520 U.S. at 816. 
242 And probably the Sixth, too.  Self-Ins. Inst., 827 F.3d at 553. 
243 See Part I.V.2, supra. The Type B proposals commonly contain an exception for 
federal programs that lack an approved waiver.  
244 Travelers, 514 U.S. at 656. 
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situate themselves in the realm of provider regulation that typically avoids 
ERISA preemption.245   
The provider restriction would, by design, have indirect influence on 
ERISA plans because those plans would no longer be able to find a network 
of providers who could accept their reimbursement.  Whether this influence 
crosses the preemptive coercion line from Travelers and DeBuono246 will 
determine the preemption question.  Prohibiting providers from accepting 
reimbursement from commercial payers, including employer plans, should 
effectively force employers to drop coverage,247 or at least to make major 
modifications in how they administer their plans.248  The shift wrought by the 
provider restriction could invite litigation based on the murky precedent on 
what constitutes an impermissible “connection with” ERISA plans.  The most 
logical reading of provider restrictions, however, is that they avoid ERISA 
preemption by targeting providers. 
3. Type C—Assignment, Subrogation, Secondary Payer  
The addition of a subrogation, assignment, or secondary payer provision, 
typically included in Type C legislation, mitigates the state law’s coercive 
impact by giving the employer plan a way to exist, funneling the plan’s 
reimbursements through the state single-payer entity. Although mostly 
similar in function, subrogation may prove slightly more suspect than 
assignment or secondary payer provisions due to some tricky precedent.249   
245 See, e.g., Travelers, 514 U.S. at 659-65; Dillingham, 117 S.Ct. at 840; De Buono, 
117 S.Ct. at 1747.  Cf. Mass. Med. Soc’y v. Dukakis, 815 F.2d 790, 790, 791–92 (1st Cir. 
1987) (holding that the Medicare Act did not preempt a state law prohibiting balance billing 
because provider regulation is traditionally a state concern). 
246 See, e.g., Travelers, 514 U.S. at 659-65; De Buono, 117 S.Ct. at 1747.   
247 See Travelers, 514 U.S. at 668.   
248 See Egelhoff, 532 U.S. at 148 (preemption laws that “govern[] a central matter of 
plan administration,” or “interfere[] with nationally uniform plan administration”). 
249 See id. at 147 (The “payment of benefits [is] a central matter of plan administration,” 
and at state law requiring plan administrators to go beyond the plan documents to determine 
beneficiaries is a preempted burden); FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 60-61 (1990) 
(holding that a state law prohibiting insurer subrogation from a tort claimant’s recovery was 
“related to” employer plans because it would interfere with the plan’s usual financial 
calculations in that state and “frustrate plan administrators’ continuing obligation to calculate 
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None of the Type C provisions change the amount the employer plan will 
spend on claims – by design, they maintain employer plans’ existing 
calculation of benefits.250  Secondary payer provisions also do not alter the 
process of payment, while subrogation and assignment provisions merely 
redirect the existing payments from providers to the state single-payer entity.  
Type C provisions thus minimize the impact on claims payment, though they 
pose some preemption risk because claim payment is a sacred and “central 
matter of plan administration.”251   
In Egelhoff, for example, the Supreme Court held ERISA preempted a 
state probate statute automatically assigning a beneficiary after divorce 
because the law created too much of an administrative burden on multistate 
employers.252  The majority in Egelhoff was particularly concerned that 
because of the state law, “[p]lan administrators cannot make payments simply 
by [reading] the plan documents” and “[i]nstead [] must familiarize 
themselves with state statutes” to determine whether state law has revoked 
the plan’s named beneficiary.253    
The secondary payer provisions in Type C preserve the status quo of 
claim payment for employers who choose to continue offering benefits and 
therefore do not implicate ERISA. The subrogation and assignment 
provisions in the Type C category in some circumstances redirect payments 
from an ERISA plan and therefore could invite litigation, though they, too, 
ought to survive preemption challenge under the logic of Supreme Court 
uniform benefit levels nationwide,” and that ERISA’s savings clause saved the state anti-
subrogation law only with respect to fully-insured plans because it “directly control[led] the 
terms of insurance contracts”).   
250 See, e.g., id., at 61.   
251 Cf. Gobeille, 136 S.Ct. at 945 (reporting claim information “intrudes upon ‘a central 
matter of plan administration’” and therefore is preempted) (quoting Egelhoff, 532 U.S. at 
148); Fort Halifax Packing Co. Inc., v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 9, (1987) (“making 
disbursements” is central to plan administration).  But cf. OR SB 631 (2017), § 15(2), (3) 
(explicitly referencing employer plans in subrogating the state entity “to the rights of any 
participant that has a claim against an . . . employer, third party administrator, … or any other 
person that may be liable for the cost of health services provided to the participant.”). 
252 Egelhoff, 532 U.S. at 150. 
253 Id. at 148-49. 
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precedent.  Type C provisions do not intrude on any provisions in ERISA 
plan documents as between the plan and its beneficiaries – they primarily 
govern the relationship between the single-payer plan and the individual, 
allowing the single-payer to assert the individual’s right to payment for 
covered services.254 They do not, therefore, “bind[] plan adminsitrators to a 
particular choice of rules for determining beneficiary status,” as Egelhoff had 
preempted.255  If, however, an ERISA plan contains a provision prohibiting 
the beneficiary from assigning rights, several Circuit Courts of Appeal 
recently held that these clauses enforceable, despite that ERISA itself “does 
not provide clear guidance” on the issue.256 
Further obscuring the arguments, the Supreme Court has opined that 
ERISA does not premept “trivial” burdens imposed on plan administration 
by the need to review different state law requirements.257  But it has not 
clarified principles for triviality, which invites litigation.  Type C’s 
assignment and subrogation provisions will redirect ERISA plan payments, 
but whether they may do so without significantly burdening plan 
administration in the eyes of a court remains unclear.   
Ultimately, the combination of the features of Types A, B, and C, like in 
Ohio’s bill, creates an even more “meaningful alternative” or “legitimate 
choice” for employers in the single-payer system. The existence of the 
subrogation mechanism in the unified provider payment system opens an 
avenue for employers to maintain their plans’ relationships with providers, as 
well as to make use of the state plan infrastructure supported by the payroll 
tax revenue. Further, combining the tax in Type A with a Type B provider 
254 Travelers, 514 U.S. at 661, 664.  
255 Egelhoff, 532 U.S. at 147-42.   
256 E.g., Univ. Spine Ctr. v. Aetna, Inc., Dkt. 18-2842 (slip op. at 6) (3d Cir. May 16, 
2019) (citing Am. Orthopedic & Sports Med. V. Independence Blue Cross Blue Shield, 890 
F.3d 445, 451 (3d Cir. 2018)).  Note also that subrogation does not create a preempted state 
remedy under § 502.  ERISA does not address the assignment of beneficiaries’ claims and 
the use of a state subrogation provision in these circumstances does not create inconsistencies 
with ERISA’s underlying policies., See, e.g., Brown v. American Intern. Life Assur. Co. of 
New York, 778 F. Supp. 912, 917 (S.D. Miss. 1991) (courts should develop federal common 
law of ERISA with the aid of state law, as long as state law is consistent with ERISA’s goals). 
257 E.g. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. at 151. 
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payment system enables a state to achieve the desired results with at a lower 
tax rate.  The lower the tax rate, the less likely it will be held to be 
“exorbitant” and therefore preemptively coercive of employer benefits 
decisions.258  At a lower tax rate, an employer could rationally choose to both 
pay the tax and continue offering its ERISA plan.   
While the arguments against preemption for subrogation, assignment, and 
secondary payer provisions are the stronger ones, the impenetrable pile of 
ERISA precedents and courts’ difficulty applying them frustrate 
predictability, while fueling litigation. 
4. Non-Duplication Provisions 
Many of the bills of all three Types contain nonduplication provisions 
prohibiting insurers from offering state-plan-covered health benefits.  These 
backstop provisions are intended to remove commercial competitors to the 
single-payer plan benefits and permit insurers only to offer “wraparound” 
services that supplement the single payer coverage. Nonduplication 
provisions directly target insurers, rather than employers, but have the 
intended effect of eliminating employer-based coverage and shifting covered 
employees to the single-payer plan. Employers still could choose to self-fund 
health insurance for their employees, or to rely on the state plan and offer 
wraparound insurance as a benefit.  Like other types of insurance regulation, 
the preemption analysis of states’ nonduplication provisions would diverge 
for fully insured and self-funded plans.  
Assuming a court would find nonduplication provisions have an 
impermissible connection to employer-sponsored insurance, ERISA’s 
savings clause would restore the nonduplication provision for those 
employers offering fully insured health benefits.  To avoid preemption, a state 
law must (1) be specifically directed toward entities engaged in insurance, 
and (2) substantially affect the risk-pooling arrangement between insurer and 
insured.259 The nonduplication provisions impose prohibitions on insurers, 
satisfying the first requirement. The prohibition on covering state-plan 
services and benefits substantially affects the risk-pooling arrangement by 
258 Travelers 514 U.S. at 664-65; De Buono, 520 U.S. at 815. 
259 Kentucky Ass'n of Health Plans, Inc. v. Miller, 538 U.S. 329, 334-38 (2003). 
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removing the state-plan services from coverable risks. The only risks an 
insurer may cover under nonduplication are those wraparound services not 
covered by the state plan.  While nonduplication provisions prohibit 
coverage, the savings clause logic saves them in precisely the same way that 
laws requiring coverage or underwriting have been saved.260  As long as state 
regulation of the insurance industry affects risk-pooling, it does not matter 
whether the law expands or contracts risks in the pool.   
As to self-funded plans, however, the nonduplication provision would 
remain preempted and therefore ineffective.  For example, California’s S.B. 
562 contained a nonduplication provision that prohibited “carriers” from 
offering coverage for services that are covered under the state’s single payer 
plan.261 The bill’s definition of “carrier” included insurers licensed by the 
state’s insurance department and “health care service plans” as defined under 
the state’s managed care law, the Knox-Keene Act.262 Prior cases have held 
that the Knox-Keene Act’s regulation of “health care service plans” is 
preempted by ERISA with respect to self-funded employer plans.263 With 
existing precedent carving self-funded employee health benefit plans from 
California’s definition of a “health care service plan,” SB 562’s 
nonduplication provision for health care service plans would also be 
inapplicable to self-funded ERISA plans.   
The application of the deemer clause means that employers could offer 
self-funded benefit plans that duplicate the state single-payer plan, as well as 
covering additional services.  If employers chose to continue self-funding 
under the state single-payer system, preemption would keep this significant 
segment of lower-risk people out of the state plan’s risk pool, threatening its 
260 See id. at 336 n.1; Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 747 
(1985); Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355, 370-87 (2002); Safeco Life Ins. 
Co. v. Musser, 65 F.3d 647, 648 (7th Cir. 1995); Pharm. Care Mgmt. Ass'n v. Tufte, 297 F. 
Supp. 3d 964, 982 (D.N.D. 2017).  
261 CA SB 562 (1006.12)(g) (nonduplication).  
262 CA SB 562 (100602(f)),  (definition of ‘carrier’ and Knox-Keene definition of health 
care service plan).  
263 Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Barnes, 425 F. Supp. 1294, 1300 (N.D. Cal. 1977), aff'd, 571 
F.2d 502 (9th Cir. 1978). 
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sustainability.264 Because of ERISA preemption, nonduplication provisions 
will not work to move self-funded employers to the single-payer plan. Thus, 
states must turn to other tools, such as the payroll tax in Type A or the 
provider restrictions in Type B to make the choice to self-fund benefits 
offered by the state plan considerably less attractive to employers, yet this 
meaningful choice would remain available in both theory and reality.   
___ 
Types A, B, and C logically should survive preemption, and 
nonduplication provisions may be preempted only as to self-funded plans.  
But the muddle of ERISA jurisprudence renders actual outcomes uncertain.  
The only certainty in ERISA preemption is that there will be litigation.   
C.  Drafting ERISA-Resistant Single-Payer Legislation 
A state single-payer proposal’s ability to survive an ERISA preemption 
challenge is an important consideration for financing the single-payer plan as 
well as for achieving the solidarity aims of single-payer coverage.   The most 
ERISA-resistant single-payer program would contain all three elements 
described above: (A) a funding plan; (B) a provider restriction; and (C) an 
assignment, subrogation, and/or secondary payer provision. The more 
diversified or redundant the state’s portfolio of policy tools to achieve single-
payer, the more resistant it may be to challenges to any one of the provisions.  
States would be well-served to exclude any explicit references to 
employers’ benefit plans in their employer contribution provisions,265 but 
courts ultimately will judge state efforts on how they impact ERISA plans.266        
264 Cf. Amy B. Monahan & Daniel Schwarcz, Will Employers Undermine Health Care 
Reform by Dumping Sick Employees?, 97 VA. L. REV. 125, 146-53 (2011) (explaining that 
even employers with large-group plans engage in risk selection among employees).  See 
generally MARILYN J. FIELD & HAROLD T. SHAPIRO, EDS., EMPLOYMENT AND HEALTH 
BENEFITS:  A CONNECTION AT RISK 167 (1993). (“In general, because large employers almost 
universally provide health benefits and have more predictable costs, large groups present 
fewer problems with risk selection than either individuals or small groups.”). 
265 E.g., Board of Trade, 506 U.S. 125, 130 (1992) (holding state law specifically 
referring to employee benefit plans preempted “on that basis alone”). 
266 E.g., Dillingham, 519 U.S. at 328 (holding that state law which can function 
irrespective of ERISA plans does not impermissibly “reference” ERISA plans). 
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A funding plan combining payroll and income taxes captures employer 
expenditures and individual spending, which provides incentives for both 
employers and employees to drop their employer-based coverage in favor of 
single-payer coverage. Payroll taxes should not be preempted by ERISA, but 
courts have reached contradictory conclusions, which invite litigation.  By 
combining individual income taxes, which are never preempted, with payroll 
taxes, state single-payer plans can set a lower payroll tax rate more likely to 
survive challenge.  
Provider restriction provisions create additional incentives for employees 
to drop their employer-plans by shrinking the network of participating 
providers in employer-based plans. ERISA generally does not preempt 
provider regulation, even if it has indirect effects on employee benefit 
plans.267 Compared with nonduplication provisions prohibiting the sale or 
offer of coverage that duplicates benefits covered by the single-payer, a 
provider restriction is less likely be preempted with respect to self-funded 
ERISA plans. If they survive, provider restrictions could fill an important gap 
created by ERISA preemption of nonduplication provisions, shrinking 
consumers’ demand for employer-based plans and creating incentives for 
participation in the single-payer plan. 
Provider restrictions become more powerful when paired with an 
assignment/subrogation/secondary payer provision to allow the single payer 
to capture additional employer and other third-party payers’ expenditures by 
seeking reimbursement for claims paid by the single payer for patients with 
dual coverage.268 There are strong arguments that the way 
assignment/subrogation/secondary payer provisions work in the single-payer 
context would not be preempted by ERISA.269 Thus, pairing a Type B 
(provider restriction) with a Type C (assignment, subrogation, secondary 
payer) provision would create additional mechanisms beyond tax incentives 
to pull individuals into the single-payer plan and to capture third-party 
267 See text accompanying notes 147-154, supra. 
268 See supra notes 81-98 and text accompanying notes. 
269 See supra notes 249-258 and text accompanying notes. 
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expenditures, both of which would be resistant to ERISA preemption.270  
A state may want to pursue an ABC, belt-and-suspenders approach to 
increase the overall durability of the plan through diversification of policy 
tools. For example, having elements B and C could preserve the single-payer 
system even if the payroll tax is preempted by ERISA.271  If a court 
erroneously invalidated a payroll tax, a severability provision in the state 
statute might permit conversion of the state’s mandatory single-payer payroll 
tax into a pay-or-play option, like the San Francisco ordinance upheld in 
Golden Gate.272 Under those circumstances, a state with a pay-or-play payroll 
tax would be better off if it also has a provider restriction and a 
subrogation/assignment/secondary payer provision, because the latter 
elements could take on more of the work of pulling enrollees and employer 
expenditures into the single-payer system. In a pay-or-play system, many 
more employers and employees would likely retain their employer-based 
coverage, so the incentives created by the Type B and C elements would 
become more critical to creating a broad and unified single-payer system.  
Given the tenuousness of the politics of establishing a single-payer 
system, a state legislature may be interested in building a redundant system, 
utilizing an A-B-C approach, that can continue to stand even if preemption 
erodes one mechanism to move money or enrollees into the system. The 
legislature may be better able to patch or fix a system that continues to 
function, even in a diminished form, rather than return to the voters and the 
floor of the chamber to design a new single-payer system from scratch. It is 
better to build a durable program that can withstand some degree of attack, 
letting the endowment effect of newly acquired benefits take hold to protect 
the system from political repeal in the face of a challenge.273   
 
270 See text accompanying notes 94-95, supra.  
271 We think this is the wrong result, as explained above, but ERISA jurisprudence is 
nothing if not incoherent and unpredictable.  
272 See text accompanying notes 178-191, supra. 
273 See, e.g. Erin C. Fuse Brown, Developing a Durable Right to Health Care, 14 MINN. 
J. L. SCI. TECH. 439, 481-85 (2013). 
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III. ERISA REFORM AS HEALTH REFORM  
The recent wave of state single-payer legislation painfully illustrates 
how ERISA preemption – and the uncertainty that swirls around it – 
undercuts states’ potential role in health reform.  This project focuses on state 
single-payer bills as emblematic of the kind of bold experimentation and 
testing-ground often associated with state law in a federal system,274 and on 
ERISA preemption’s subversion of that role.  Over the past 50 years, federal 
health care statutes have established a regulatory infrastructure with baseline 
protections and federal funding sources, inviting states to participate in 
implementation and experimentation.275 ERISA, meanwhile, prohibits state 
experiments largely without substituting a comprehensive federal scheme for 
employer-sponsored health benefits, leaving a regulatory void.   
ERISA preemption sets a federalism trap that can derail ambitious state 
reforms – particularly those state reforms focused on universal coverage and 
cost control.  After exposing the trap, we propose four potential federal 
reforms to ERISA that would pave the way for meaningful state health reform 
within the federal system.   
A.  The Federalism Trap 
Volumes have been written about the role of federalism in health care.276 
The debates often conceive of a scale of power between states at one pole and 
the federal government at the other and focus on either determining the 
optimal balance point between the poles or what legal or policy structures 
promote or inhibit federalism’s various goals.277  This Article sidesteps those 
274 See, e.g. Abbe Gluck & Nicole Huberfeld, What is Federalism in Health Care For? 
70 STANFORD L. REV. 1689, 1689 (2018); Kristin M. Madison, Building a Better Laboratory: 
The Federal Role in Promoting Health System Experimentation, 41 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 765, 
766 (2014). 
275 See Gluck & Huberfeld, supra note 274. 
276 See, e.g., Bagley, supra note 8; Bobinski, supra note 134; Gluck & Huberfeld, supra 
note 274; Greer & Jacobson, supra note 141; Jerry L. Mashaw & Theodore R. Marmor, The 
Case for Federalism and Health Care Reform, 28 CONN. L. REV. 115 (1995); Richard 
Nathan, Federalism and Health Policy, 24 HEALTH AFF. 1458 (2005); Wendy E. Parmet, 
Regulation and Federalism: Legal Impediments to State Health Care Reform, 19 AM. J.L. & 
MED. 121 (1993). 
277 Compare Bagley, supra note 8, at 4 (“For health reform, the federal government 
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federalism questions, and instead starts with an assumption that some degree 
of health care federalism—a division of power between the federal 
government and the states—is desirable to achieve health policy goals, 
whether they are increasing coverage, controlling costs, improving quality, 
or broader equitable aims.278  Federalism can improve policy by allowing 
states to innovate, test, and learn from experimental models.279 Federalism 
also can enhance democratic goals of self-governance, divided power, 
pluralism, and government responsiveness.280  
In health care, there are numerous political, economic, and historical 
reasons to prefer federal reforms.  Politically, state “health reform” cuts both 
ways – some states aim for universal coverage and patient protections, others 
pass health laws restricting access, perpetuating discrimination, and 
responding to inaccurate assumptions.281 Though federal legislation is not 
inherently prone to protecting access, federal baseline protections can guard 
against discrimination and codify evidence-based solutions, counteracting 
local prejudices.282  Economically, federal reforms enjoy the advantages of 
economies of scale and deficit spending, as well as cost-control power in 
really is the only game in town.”); with Mashaw & Marmor, supra note 276, at 117 (“What 
is both practical and desirable varies enough to make federalist variation both normatively 
attractive and politically wise as an alternative to national stalemate.”) 
278 See Gluck & Huberfeld, supra note 274, at 1788 (noting that access, costs, and quality 
are “some of many potential outcome metrics commonly used—and fought over—in health 
policy circles.”). 
279 New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262,  311 (1932) (Brandeis J., dissenting) 
(describing states as laboratories for experimentation).  
280 Robert R.M. Verchick & Nina Mendelson, Preemption and Theories of Federalism, 
in PREEMPTION CHOICE 32 13-14 (William W. Buzbee, ed., 2009). 
281 See, e.g., J. Craig Wilson & Joseph Thompson, “Nation’s First Medicaid Work 
Requirement Sheds Thousands from Rolls in Arkansas,” HEALTH AFFAIRS BLOG (Oct. 2, 
2018).  
282 See, e.g., Elizabeth Y. McCuskey, The Body Politic:  Federalism as Feminism in 
Health Reform, 11 ST. LOUIS U. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 303, 306 (2018); Valarie K. Blake, 
An Opening for Civil Rights in Health Insurance After the Affordable Care Act, 36 B.C. J.L. 
& SOC. JUST. 235, 275–76 (2016).   
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interstate markets.283  Historically, the decades before the ACA witnessed the 
widespread failure of state regulation to rein in cost and expand access to 
care, with the exception of Massachusetts’s bold universal coverage 
experiment and a handful of other state reforms.284  The ACA then built 
comprehensive federal reforms on the results of Massachusetts’s 
experiment.285  The decade since the ACA’s enactment has also witnessed 
some of federalism’s pitfalls, as a shift in the federal Executive has 
undermined the ACA’s core protections and encouraged states to pursue 
variations that contradict the purposes of federal laws, while receiving 
funding provided by those laws.286          
So, without deciding where the balance between state and federal 
authority should lie, we accept that some level of power-sharing between 
states and the federal government is normatively desirable both as an 
instrumental means to improve health of the population and as a democratic 
ideal of diffusion of power and allowing diversity of policy solutions to 
reflect a diversity of political preferences. 
This project’s central federalism concern is that ERISA is an extremely 
anti-federalist statute,287 which contravenes nearly all federal health care 
statutes by not allowing for state flexibility, variation, or indeed any state 
regulation of self-funded ERISA plans.288 In health care regulation, ERISA 
283 See Greer & Jacobson, supra note 141 at 217.  
284 E.g., Niraj Chokshi, “Historians take note: What America looked like before 
Obamacare,” WASH. POST. (March 26, 2014).  Some part of states’ historical struggles to 
effectively manage health care costs and access stems from ERISA’s preemption 
hamstringing system-wide reforms.  See Part II.A, supra. 
285 See Jonathan Oberlander, Implementing the Affordable Care Act: The Promise and 
Limits of Health Care Reform, 41 J. HEALTH POLITICS, POL’Y & L. 803, 805 (2016). 
286 See, e.g., Nicole Huberfeld, Can Work Be Required in the Medicaid Program?, 378 
N. ENGL. J. MED. 788-791 (March 1, 2018); Timothy S. Jost, “Using the 1332 State Waiver 
Program to Undermine the Affordable Care Act State by State,” COMMONWEALTH FUND 
BLOG (Oct. 30, 2018). 
287 Brendan S. Maher, The Benefits of Opt-In Federalism, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1733, 1765 
(2011) (“ERISA, in effect, lashes much of the country’s benefit rules to a single federal mast 
in a ship captained by judges. It is a classic piece of anti-federalism.”). 
288 See Part II.B., supra.  
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is an interloper.  ERISA was not originally intended to target health care, but 
the expansion of employer-sponsored health benefits to reach 49% of the U.S. 
population has wrought unintended consequences.289  Most federal statutes 
that intentionally regulate health care coverage, like Medicare, Medicaid, and 
the ACA, contain provisions that enable states to pursue policy experiments, 
while ERISA does not.290  For example, Medicare heavily favors federal 
control without obstructing states’ interests.291 By contrast, ERISA is both 
heavily federal and largely deregulatory for health care benefits,292 so the 
balance is struck not in favor of federal regulation over state regulation, but 
in favor of deregulation over state regulation.  
Indeed, as interpreted by the courts, ERISA preemption places self-
funded employer plans beyond the reach of all manner of state health 
regulation, not just those that seek to mandate health benefits, but also 
reforms that seek to increase health coverage, to control health care costs, or 
even to seek information about health care prices.293 While the rest of the 
federal health law infrastructure invites some level of state regulation, ERISA 
obstructs the potential benefits of state experimentation and diversity.  States 
289 See, e.g., Donald T. Bogan, Protecting Patient Rights Despite ERISA: Will the 
Supreme Court Allow States to Regulate Managed Care?, 74 TUL. L. REV. 951, 952-53 
(2000); Wooten, supra note 102, at 31-35. 
290 See McCuskey, Agency Imprimatur, supra note 21, at 1103-05.  Further, ERISA 
significantly affects the U.S. health care financing system, yet it is administered by the 
Department of Labor, rather than the U.S. Department of Health & Human Services. 
291 See Parmet, supra note 276, at 143. 
292 Id. at 135-136, 140. ERISA preemption has a particularly deregulatory tilt for health 
care benefits as opposed to pensions (which it heavily regulates), but federal preemption 
generaly has a deregulatory effect. ERNEST A. YOUNG, FEDERAL PREEMPTION AND STATE 
AUTONOMY, IN FEDERAL PREEMPTION: STATES’ POWERS, NATIONAL INTERESTS 263 
(Richard A. Epstein & Michael S. Greve eds., 2007) (“[P]eemption will generally have a 
deregulatory impact”).  The ACA diluted ERISA’s deregulatory effect on employee health 
benefits by extending several health plan benefit and administrative rules to employer-based 
health plans as well as increasing state regulatory authority over non-group plans. See 
Brendan S. Maher, Radha A. Pathak, Enough About the Constitution: How States Can 
Regulate Health Insurance Under the ACA, 31 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 275, 276-277 (2013). 
293 See Erin C. Fuse Brown & Ameet Sarpatwari, Removing ERISA’s Impediment to 
State Health Reform, 378 NEW ENG. J. MED. 5, 6 (2018).  
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that seek to enact reforms to expand access or rein in their health care costs 
are needlessly hamstrung because ERISA preemption places a large portion 
of the market entirely beyond their regulatory reach.294  ERISA preempts 
state reforms without regard to policy or party – if, for example, a state 
wanted to pass a law prohibiting employers from offering contraceptive 
coverage, ERISA would preempt that, too.  But ERISA preemption’s effects 
have a lopsided impact on state efforts aim at at expanding access to 
insurance. 
One risk of ERISA’s federalism trap is regulatory failure for health 
care—particularly stasis and a system that fails to reflect the preferences of 
the states’ citizens.295 If the federal government fails to act, ERISA’s broad 
preemption means the states cannot step in to solve the problem. Broad 
federal preemption eliminates beneficial institutional diversity from 
federalism: “[i]f one set of regulators fails to address the problem, another set 
provides an alternative avenue for relief.”296  
Further, ERISA preemption’s 1974 concerns for multisatate employers 
and interstate commerce have had the effect in health reform of elevating the 
interests of private, employers above those of a sovereign state: in essence, 
placing Walmart’s preferences above California’s and giving private 
businesses the power to veto state laws in the absence of Congressional 
294 See Borzi, supra note 214, at 661 (noting that even as of the 1990s the half of covered 
workers who were in self-insured plans were “beyond the reach of state insurance 
regulators.”); Parmet, supra note 276, at 135-36 (noting ERISA’s preference for interstate 
uniformity and antiregulatory bias creates doubt as to the viability of state single-payer health 
reform.).  Note, however, that many other forces complicate states’ ability to achieve these 
goals, such as the federal tax preference given to employer-sponsored health insurance and 
many states’ inability to deficit spend in times of recession due to balanced-budget laws.  
See, e.g., Bagley, supra note 8, at 4. 
295 See William W. Buzbee, Asymmetrical Regulation: Risk, Preemption, and the 
Floor/Ceiling Distinction, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1547, 1576 (2007)(noting that with regard to 
“broad federal preemption . . . recent ceiling preemption assertions create heightened risks 
of dysfunction and stasis.”) 
296 Robert A. Schapiro, From Dualism to Polyphony, in PREEMPTION CHOICE 344 
(William W. Buzbee, ed., 2009). See also, Buzbee, supra note 295, at 1576 (critiquing broad 
federal preemption for how it “displaces multilayered institutional arrangements offering 
different actors, venues, and modalities for addressing a social problem.”) 
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action.297   
The common policy justification for ERISA’s sweeping preemption is 
that nationally uniform employee benefit rules enable multi-state employers 
to offer health coverage.298   But this emphasis on national uniformity is 
overblown and outdated.  As Justice Blackmun recognized in Metlife, state-
by-state disuniformities “are the inevitable result of the congressional 
decision to “save” local insurance regulation.”299  ERISA’s legislative history 
does not indicate that Congress intended total national uniformity for health 
benefit plans, or for multi-state employers to defeat this traditional area of 
state regulation for such a broad swath of the population.300  To the extent 
that Congress thought about health benefit plans at all when it drafted ERISA, 
it would have assumed that the vast majority of employers would continue to 
use fully-insured plans and be subject to varying state insurance laws under 
the savings clause.301 Over time, interpretations of the deemer clause have 
left almost 30% of the population’s health coverage untouchable by state 
laws, including state health reforms.302   
297 Broad schemes of federal preemption tend to benefit the deregulated industry while 
sacrificing the preferences of states.  See Buzbee, supra note 295, at 1590-92. Congress 
could, of course, remedy these failings by imposing federal regulations.  Thus subsequent 
Congresses should share some of the blame for this failure. 
298 Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355, 402(2002) (Thomas, J., 
dissenting) (“[T]he Court would do well to remember that no employer is required to provide 
any health benefit plan under ERISA . . .  [The state law]  independent review provisions 
could create a disincentive to the formation of employee health benefit plans, a problem that 
Congress addressed by making ERISA's remedial scheme exclusive and uniform.”). 
299 Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 747(1985). 
300 See, e.g., Borzi, supra note 214, at 663; Donald T. Bogan, Protecting Patient Rights 
Despite ERISA: Will the Supreme Court Allow States to Regulate Managed Care?, 74 TUL. 
L. REV. 951, 952-53, 964-65 (2000). 
301 See Borzi, supra note 214, at 661 (“[E]ven if some in Congress had thought about 
the effect on health plans, they probably would have believed that the insurance savings 
clause in ERISA’s preemption provisions would have been sufficient to address any future 
problems. ”) 
302 Kaiser Family Foundation, supra note 51 (noting that 49% of the population has 
employer sponsored coverage); GARY CLAXTON ET AL., supra note 51, at Section 10 (noting 
that 61% of those with employer-sponsored coverage are in self-funded plans). So 49% * 
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Just as the 1974 Congress did not contemplate the exemption of self-
funded employer health plans when it passed ERISA, it likewise responded 
to very different employer incentives to provide health benefits in the first 
place.  In the past four decades, the ACA’s national employer mandate, the 
creation of a sizeable tax-break for employers’ health benefits, and shifting 
labor market demands cast doubt on the assumption that employers will 
abandon health coverage in response to state regulations.303 Further, many 
single-state and small-size firms self-fund to take advantage of the regulatory 
vacuum without any claim to the advantages of multi-state uniformity.304 
In sum, ERISA elevates the convenience of employers over state 
sovereignty and sacrifices the federalism benefits of states as engines of 
policy innovation.305 The upshot of courts’ voluminous and tortured ERISA 
preemption jurisprudence is that it is so concerned with shielding multi-state 
employers from having to comply with 50 states’ employee benefit 
regulations that it is willing to trade away the ability of a sovereign state to 
shape the health care system for its millions of citizens.   
 
61% =  29.89% of the U.S. population). 
303 See, e.g., Michelle Long et al., Kaiser Family Foundation, Trends in Employer-
Sponsored Insurance Offer and Coverage Rates, 1999-2014, at 5, 8 (Mar. 2016), 
http://www.nationaldisabilitynavigator.org/wp-content/uploads/news-items/KFF_trends-in-
employer-sponsored-insurance_March-2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z7X7-AV2H]. 
304 See, e.g., Jay Greene, Even Small Employers Are Striking Out on Their Own, 
Managed Care Magazine, May 28, 2019, 
https://www.managedcaremag.com/archives/2019/6/even-small-employers-are-striking-
out-their-own (last visited Sept. 12, 2019). Indeed, because of the ready availability of stop-
loss insurance, smaller employers can self-fund for an extremely narrow band of risk, in 
order to take advantage of the deemer clause. Id. 
305 There are critiques of the “state sovereignty” account of federalism. However, even 
critics acknowledge that states’ play a key democratic role in today’s federalism.  See, e.g., 
Heather Gerken, Federalism 3.0, 105 CAL. L. REV. 1695, 1722 (2017): 
The state’s democratic role is just as important as its regulatory one. To be sure, 
states aren’t independent mini-polities, resolving their own questions entirely as 
they see fit. But they aren’t just convenient polling places for national debates, 
either. Instead, states are the front lines for national debates, the key sites where 
we work out our disagreements before taking them to a national stage. States 
aren’t pushed aside by national politics; instead, they fuel it. 
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B.  Clearing a Path for State Health Reform 
ERISA preemption is a federal problem that demands a federal solution 
to clear the way for meaningful state health reforms.  We explore four 
possible solutions targeting health benefits – three legislative and one 
jurisprudential. First, Congress could replace ERISA’s broad “any and all” 
preemption with conventional “floor preemption,” congruent with other 
federal health care statutes.  Second, Congress could eliminate ERISA’s 
deemer clause for health benefit plans to remove the impenetrable barrier of 
preemption that currently shields self-funded employer-based plans from any 
state health regulation. Third, Congress could add a statutory waiver 
provision to ERISA that would allow states to apply to the federal 
government for approval to deviate from federal requirements in provision of 
health coverage. Fourth, as a fallback option if the first three legislative 
solutions are unavailing, courts could curtail the scope of ERISA preemption 
and reinvigorate the “presumption against preemption” for state authority 
over health care regulation in a way that is closer to Congress’s original 
legislative intent for ERISA. The first solution, ERISA floor preemption, is 
the most elegant and would restore state flexibility and remove ERISA’s 
barriers to state innovation and health reform. However, the third solution, 
ERISA waiver, might be the most politically achievable.  
1. Altering ERISA’s Preemption Provisions  
Congress could address these problems by heeding the frequent calls to 
amend ERISA’s regulatory preemption provision, § 1144 (also known as 
§ 514) in a couple ways.  These statutory fixes ultimately are elegant but 
likely not politically feasible in the foreseeable future.   
The first potential amendment would be for Congress to replace ERISA’s 
broad “relates to” express preemption with traditional floor preemption.306  
306 To implement floor preemption in ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) could be amended as 
follows: 
 Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, the provisions of this 
subchapter and subchapter III  shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they 
may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan described in section 
1003(a) of this title and not exempt under section 1003(b) of this title. This section 
shall take effect on January 1, 1975.only to the extent that such State laws actually 
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Floor preemption allows the federal government to establish a national 
standard that displaces less stringent state laws, but it permits more stringent 
state regulation.307 Floor preemption acts as a “one-way ratchet,” preserving 
only those state laws more protective than the federal floor.308 By contrast, 
ERISA’s current express preemption provision displaces “any and all” state 
laws that “relate to” employee benefit plans,309 which means all state laws 
that make reference or bear a connection to employer-based health plans are 
preempted, whether or not they conflict with federal requirements.310  
Floor preemption would restore some power-sharing between the state 
and national authorities and would be more consistent with other federal 
health care statutes’ approaches to federalism and preemption.311 It also 
allows a degree of federal uniformity in the setting of the floor, but balances 
this federal standard with state flexibility, so long as the state laws are 
consistent with and no less protective than the federal floor. Floor preemption 
offers a more desirable solution than broad federal preemption because 
multiple levels of governments bring institutional diversity, more 
opportunities for regulatory reexamination, and can serve as antidotes to 
regulatory stasis or failure.312 In the context of single-payer health care, 
changing ERISA preemption to floor preemption would allow states with the 
political will to reform their health care systems to do so, for other states and 
conflict with the provisions of this subchapter and subchapter III.  State laws that 
impose requirements in addition to the provisions of this subchapter and subchapter 
III shall not be superseded. 
307 See Buzbee, supra note 295, at 1554 (“Federal floors preclude less stringent state and 
local regulation, but allow for additional and more stringent regulation and typically are 
accompanied by savings clauses and cooperative regulatory structures.”). 
308 See Buzbee, supra note 295, at 1566.  
309 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a).  
310 See Fuse Brown & Sarpatwari, supra note 293, at 6-77.  
311 See McCuskey, Agency Imprimatur, supra note 21, at 1122-1123 (discussing the use 
of conflict preemption—a type of floor preemption—in the ACA, HIPAA, and other federal 
statutes). 
312 See Buzbee, supra note 295, at 1576 (suggesting that floor preemption, as an 
alternative to ceiling preemption, utilizes institutional diversity and is less likely to risk 
dysfunction)..  
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the federal government to learn from these state experiments, and for 
diversity in policy choices that may better reflect the desires of the people in 
those states. Floor preemption also increases interaction between the federal 
and state governments, which improves policymaking through joint 
regulation, mutual learning, regulatory improvement, and regulatory 
competition.313 
To be sure, there are critics of floor preemption, namely from the business 
community. One critique is that floor preemption sacrifices the uniformity 
and certainty of a single national standard. Broad federal preemption often 
tilts toward deregulation, particularly if the federal law acts as a ceiling—a 
regulatory maximum—rather than as a floor.314  If the national standard 
serves as a floor and not as a ceiling, then it eliminates the possibility that 
states will engage in pro-business deregulatory competition.315 Thus, 
businesses may abandon their position in favor of states’ rights if the states 
are only able to innovate in a pro-regulatory direction under the one-way 
ratchet of floor preemption.  Of course, the ordinary workings of conflict 
preemption doctrine would still preempt state regulations that contradict 
federal law in ERISA, and our floor preemption proposal could state so 
explicitly.316 
Second, Congress could amend ERISA’s deemer clause to eliminate its 
applicability to health benefit plans.317  This could be accomplished by 
simply deleting 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(B), or by adding language to the 
clause stating that it does not protect employers’ self-funded health benefit 
plans. 318 
313 See Gerken, supra note 305, at 1720. 
314 See Buzbee, supra note 295, at 1579.  
315 See Michael S. Greve, Business, The States, and Federalism’s Political Economy, 25 
HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 895, 903 (2002). 
316 See n.306, supra; John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Harris Trust & Savings Bank, 
510 U.S. 86, 99 (1993) (finding “traditional preemption analysis” applies even in context of 
ERISA’s express preemption language). 
317 See Bobinksi, supra note 134, at 342-343.  
318 For example, 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(B) could be revised to read: 
Neither an employee benefit plan described in section 1003(a) of this title, which is not 
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Either revision would close the deemer clause’s loophole in the savings 
clause, the-exception-within-an-exception that shields self-funded health 
plans from state insurance regulation. Thus all health benefit plans, whether 
self-funded or fully insured, would be subject to state insurance laws that are 
saved by ERISA’s savings clause. The deemer clause, as interpreted by the 
Court, deems self-funded health benefit plans to operate outside the business 
of insurance, and exempts them from state insurance regulations.319 As noted 
above, when Congress wrote ERISA and the deemer clause in 1974, most 
employer-based health plans were fully insured, not self-funded.320 
Moreover, the text of deemer clause is not a model of clarity and was only 
interpreted to exempt self-funded plans from the state insurance regulation 
by the Court more than a decade after ERISA was passed.321  
Eliminating the deemer clause would not automatically open up 
employer-based plans to all state regulation—only to those state laws 
regulating insurance.322 In the context of state single-payer, eliminating the 
exempt under section 1003(b) of this title (other than a plan established primarily for the 
purpose of providing death benefits), nor any trust established under such a plan, shall be 
deemed to be an insurance company or other insurer, bank, trust company, or investment 
company or to be engaged in the business of insurance or banking for purposes of any law 
of any State purporting to regulate insurance companies, insurance contracts, banks, trust 
companies, or investment companies.  This provision shall not apply to any “employee 
welfare benefit plan” established or maintained by an employer that provides medical care 
for participants or their dependents directly or through insurance, reimbursement, or 
otherwise. 
319 See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 471 U.S. at 747, 105 S. Ct. at 2393 (“[O]urWe are 
aware that our decision results in a distinction between insured and uninsured plans, leaving 
the former open to indirect regulation while the latter are not. By so doing we merely give 
life to a distinction created by Congress in the “deemer clause,” a distinction Congress is 
aware of and one it. . . has chosen not to alter.”); FMC Corp., 498 U.S. at 61 (“We read the 
deemer clause to exempt self-funded ERISA plans from state laws that ‘“regulat[e] 
insurance’” within the meaning of the saving clause.”) 
320 See text accompanying note 301. 
321 See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 471 U.S. 724, 739-40 (1985); FMC Corp., 498 U.S. 
at 6152.  
322 This is because the deemer clause is an exception from the savings clause, which 
only saves state insurance regulation from preemption. See Part II.A.2.c, supra.  
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deemer clause’s distinction between self-funded and fully insured plans 
would allow the non-duplication provision to avoid preemption and could put 
the subrogation/assignment/secondary payer provisions on surer footing.323 
However, it is less clear whether an employer mandate to participate in the 
state single-payer plan or payroll taxes would be considered health insurance 
regulation.  
The main drawback of eliminating the deemer clause for health benefit 
plans is the loss of regulatory uniformity, which could increase the costs of 
these plans by exposing self-funded plans to state insurance laws, such as 
benefit mandates (e.g., to cover fertility services) and state premium taxes.324 
This conventional policy argument in favor of broad ERISA preemption for 
self-funded plans is not clearly supported by the empirical literature. 325 State 
benefit mandates’ effect on firms’ decision to self-fund their health benefits 
is mixed,326 and self-funded premiums are not necessarily cheaper than 
premiums for purchased insurance.327 Other factors beyond avoiding state 
regulations also drive employers’ decisions whether to self-fund or purchase 
insurance.328 In short, it is unclear that exposing self-funded health plans to 
state insurance laws would increase the costs of these plans. Without a 
deemer clause, employers could still self-fund their health plans to take 
323 See discussion in Parts II.B.3 and II.B.4, supra.  
324 Roger Feldman, Why Do Employers Self-Insure? 37 GENEVA PAPERS 696, 697 
(2012). According to industry self-report, the other incentive to self-fund is to retain the 
“float” of interest on funds not paid as premiums to an insurer. Id. 
325 See, e.g., id.  
326 Christina M. Dalton & Sara B. Holland, Why Do Firms Use Insurance to Fund 
Worker Health Benefits? The Role of Corporate Finance, 86 J. RISK & INSURANCE 183, 1875 
(2017).  
327 Feldman, supra note 324, at 708.  
328 For example, firm size, the ability of employers to engage in risk-assessment to 
negotiate fees with third-party administrators, and the availability of external capital to fund 
firm investments may contribute to decisions to self-insure. See Dalton & Holland, supra 
note 326, at 1853 (explaining that “when firms face costly external finance, they are more 
likely to purchase insurance. Purchasing insurance reduces the risk that health benefit 
payouts will tie up internal funds and force the firm to raise additional outside investment 
capital.”); Feldman, supra note 324, at 709.   
128
advantage of nonregulatory financial incentives; they would just be subject 
to state health insurance laws. There is no evidence that the employers would 
drop coverage altogether given labor market demands, favorable tax-
treatment of health benefits, and the ACA’s employer mandate.329 
Nevertheless, large, self-funded firms argue that their costs would increase if 
their health plans were subject to state regulation.330 
A more practical concern is the political difficulty of convincing 
Congress to eliminate the deemer clause’s applicability to self-funded health 
plans.  Large, multi-state employers would oppose any change to ERISA that 
would expose them to additional state regulations. This group’s powerful 
lobby would argue that any alteration to ERISA preemption that subjects 
employers to multiple state regulations would increase their administrative 
burden and stifle private market forces.331 
2. Adding an ERISA Waiver 
Alternatively, Congress could preserve ERISA’s preemption baseline, 
but add a statutory waiver mechanism authorizing the Secretary of Labor to 
waive ERISA preemption provisions for states pursuing health care reforms.  
A statutory waiver would not clear the path for all state reforms; it would lift 
the gate for certain state efforts, based on review and approval by federal 
agencies.  And it would complement the waivers in other federal statutes 
(notably Medicaid and the ACA) necessary to fully fund a state single-payer 
plan.332      
Congress has used statutory waivers with increasing frequency over the 
past few decades to infuse statutory structures with flexibility,333 to mitigate 
329 See Long et al., supra note 303, at 5 (noting that data from the National Health 
Interview Survey does not indicate that employer coverage is “diminishing in its importance” 
despite the changes that accompanied the Affordable Care Act)).  
330 See Self-Insurance Institute of America, Self-Insured Group Health Plans, 
https://www.siia.org/i4a/pages/Index.cfm?pageID=4546 [https://perma.cc/4VXF-4UAU].  
331 See Bagley, supra note 8,  at 12. (“[B]ecause of the intensity of the business lobby's 
resistance to limiting ERISA's preemptive scope, Congress is very unlikely to amend the law 
to address the concern”). 
332 See, e.g., Wiley, supra note 50. 
333 See David J. Barron & Todd D. Rakoff, In Defense of Big Waiver, 113 COLUM. L. 
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the federalism impacts of nationwide rules,334 to encourage supervised state 
experimentation,335 and sometimes to suspend preemption.336  Waivers may 
support state experiments with federal funding, as well as access to the 
nationwide perspective and substantive expertise of federal agencies,337 a 
model frequently employed in federal health care coverage statutes.  
Amending ERISA to add a statutory waiver mechanism for its preemption 
provisions in 29 U.S.C. § 1144 could accomplish all of these goals. 
ERISA currently has no waiver provision and arguably delegates no 
waiver authority to the Department of Labor over state regulations.338  
Although ERISA allows the federal agency to coordinate with states on 
enforcing the federal statute,339 ERISA does not expressly delegate the power 
REV. 265, 278 (2013) (identifying the phenomenon of “big” waivers that suspend the core 
tenets of federal statutes). 
334 See id.; Martin A. Kurzweil, Disciplined Devolution and the New Education 
Federalism, 103 CAL. L. REV. 565, 567–68 (2015) (discussing waivers in federal education 
law). 
335 E.g., 42 U.S.C. §§1315, 1396n (2012) (Medicaid’s state experimentation waivers); 
42 U.S.C. § 18052 (Affordable Care Act’s “State Innovation” waiver).  See McCuskey, 
Agency Imprimatur, supra note 21, at 1127-36 (describing the purposes and effects of the 
ACA’s State Innovation waiver); Nicole Huberfeld et al., Plunging into Endless Difficulties: 
Medicaid and Coercion in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 93 B.U. 
L. REV.1, 29 (2013) (discussing the role of waiver in Medicaid); Sidney D. Watson, Out of 
the Black Box and into the Light: Using Section 1115 Medicaid Waivers To Implement the 
Affordable Care Act's Medicaid Expansion, 15 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y & ETHICS 213, 
214(2015) (discussing the 1115 waiver’s role in Medicaid).   
336 Cf. 49 U.S.C. § 5125(e) (Federal Highways Act); 42 U.S.C. § 6297(d) (Energy Policy 
and Conservation Act); 42 U.S.C. § 7543(b) (Clean Air Act).  
337 See McCuskey, Agency Imprimatur, supra note 21, at 1151-56. 
338 ERISA does not expressly provide authority for the federal agencies to waive 
statutory requirements on behalf of states.   ERISA does, however, authorize the Secretaries 
of Labor and Treasury to waive certain substantive and administrative requirements on 
behalf of employers, plans, and participants.  See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 1023(a)(3)(A), (4)(A); 
§§ 1082(c) - 1084; § 1132(c)(10); § 1132(l)(3); § 1202(b); § 1203(a); § 1202a(a); 
§ 1025(a)(2)(A) (Notes).  And the statute expressly saves a few specific categories of state 
laws on insurance and fraud.  E.g., 29 U.S.C. §§ 1144a; § 1150; § 1191(a)(1), (b)(1) & (b)(2). 
339 29 U.S.C. § 1136(a) (2012). 
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to waive its preemptive effects, as many other statutes have done.340  Absent 
such an express delegation or waiver, an agency’s power to waive preemption 
is hazy at best;,341 despite that an agency’s views on the preemptive effect of 
its substantive regulations may merit some deference.342  The statute does 
contain one exemption for Hawaii’s 1974 health reform law, which does not 
operate as a waiver.  On June 12, 1974 – three months before ERISA was 
enacted343 – Hawaii passed a law requiring employers in the state to provide 
health coverage for employees, either by purchasing a state-approved plan or 
funding their own.344  In 1983, Congress amended ERISA to exempt 
Hawaii’s 1974 law from the “relates to” preemption provision, but narrowed 
the exemption with several corollary provisions.345  No other state has a 
340 Cf.  21 U.S.C. § 360k (Medical Devices Amendments); 42 U.S.C. § 7543 (Clean Air 
Act); 42 U.S.C. § 6297(d) (Energy Policy and Conservation Act);  49 U.S.C. § 5125(e) 
(Federal Highways Act). Cf. 21 U.S.C. § 360k (Medical Devices Amendments). 
341  Cf. Nicholas F. Bagley, “The Labor Department and Liberty Mutual v. Gobeille,” 
THE INCIDENTAL ECONOMIST BLOG (Jan. 6, 2016), 
https://theincidentaleconomist.com/wordpress/the-labor-department-and-liberty-mutual-v-
gobeille/ [https://perma.cc/E73U-VVRH] (arguing that Justice Breyer’s suggestion “that the 
Labor Department should have a say in whether [state] law is preempted” is correct and “that 
Scalia’s concerns about the Labor Department’s authority are misplaced”).   
342 E.g., Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 577 (2009) (applying Mead and Skidmore to 
conclude that “[t]he weight we accord the agency's explanation of state law's impact on the 
federal scheme depends on its thoroughness, consistency, and persuasiveness”).  See 
Catherine Sharkey, Products Liability Preemption: An Institutional Approach, 76 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 449, 471-72 (2008) (illustrating that Supreme Court decisions since 1992 on 
products liability preemption have “aligned with the relevant underlying federal agency’s 
take on preemption”). 
343 President Ford signed ERISA into law on September 2, 1974 (Labor Day).   
344 See Hawaii Prepaid Health Care Act, HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 393-3(8), 393-11 (1974).  
Hawaii employers must pay “at least one-half of the premium” and the employees’ remaining 
share cannot exceed 1.5% of their wages. HAW. REV. STAT. § 393-13.   
345 See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(5)(A) (stating that the “relate to” preemption “shall not apply 
to the Hawaii Prepaid Health Care Act”).  First, the Hawaii exemption applies only to the 
original 1974 state law and administrative updates to it. § 1144(b)(5)(B). Second, the Hawaii 
exemption does not extend to “any State tax law relating to employee benefit plans.”  § 
1144(b)(5)(A).  Third, the Hawaii exemption states that ERISA reporting requirements and 
fiduciary responsibilities do supersede the Hawaii Act, but notes that the Department of 
Labor may use its “cooperative arrangements” delegation to “assist” Hawaii “in effectuating 
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statutory exemption from ERISA. Without a state waiver mechanism, the 
issue of state flexibility mostly mostly gets hashed out in the chaotic and 
reactive realm of preemption litigation.346   
An ERISA preemption waiver could mirror some of the substantial 
flexibility in other federal health care statutes, including Medicare, Medicaid, 
and the ACA, emphasizing the value of state policy innovation by allowing 
states to apply to the federal government for approval to deviate from federal 
standards.347  These waivers delegate to an agency the power to suspend 
certain core statutory rules by approving state applications for waivers.348  To 
receive a waiver, states typically must demonstrate the ways in which their 
proposed variations would further federal goals.349  An ERISA waiver could 
create a process whereby states apply to the Department of Labor for a waiver 
of any or all of § 1144’s preemption provisions to pursue state reforms.  To 
focus an ERISA waiver on health reform,350 the provision could specifically 
apply only to state laws impacting employee welfare benefit plans, excluding 
pension plans.  Our proposed statutory revision, adopted by the National 
Council of Insurance Legislators and available at their web page, provides an 
example of how to reform ERISA with a waiver.351 
the policies” of those state provisions still subjected to preemption. § 1144(b)(5)(C). 
346  See discussion in Part II.B., supra. See generally McCuskey, supra note 21, at 1153-
57. 
347 See 42 U.S.C. § 18052 (providing the ACA’s waivers for State Innovation) Barron 
& Rakoff, supra note 333, at 278 (describing paradigm “big” waivers); 42 U.S.C. § 18052 
(providing the ACA’s waivers for State Innovation); McCuskey, Agency Imprimatur, supra 
note 21, at 1127-37.   
348 See McCuskey, Agency Imprimatur, supra note 21, at 1127-37. 
349 See id.  Cf. Christen Linke Young, Pay or Play Programs and ERISA Section 514:  
Proposals for Amending the Statutory Scheme, 1 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y, L. & ETHICS 197, 
235 (2010) (arguing that “any system of federal agency de-preemption would require 
statutory criteria by which state or local programs could be evaluated”). 
350 And potentially to diminish objections to the amendment based on pension concerns. 
 351 NCOIL Health Insurance and Long Term Care Issues Committee, “Health Reform 




From a federalism perspective, an ERISA waiver offers several 
theoretical benefits. Federal baseline regulation with an option for state 
waivers restores some of states’ autonomy and ability to experiment with 
policy solutions to benefit their citizens.352  From an institutional competence 
perspective, an ERISA preemption waiver would shift some of the authority 
over state health reform options from courts to agencies, relying on agencies’ 
substantive expertise rather than courts’ preemption precedents.353  This shift 
portends benefits not only in the availability of state health care reforms, but 
also in the transparency, participation, and federalism dimensions of health 
care regulation.354  Because Congress initiates the statutory waiver, this 
mechanism also has advantages over agency preemption clarifications or 
rulemaking,355 namely that it explicitly authorizes the agency action and 
conclusively effectuates the suspension of preemption for approved 
applications.356 
To maximize these benefits, the statutory waiver should provide for 
coordination between the Departments of Labor, Treasury, and Health & 
Human Services for purposes of both expertise and efficiency. A 
coordination provision would enable Labor to draw on the health insurance 
and market expertise of HHS in determining which waiver applications 
satisfy the substantive criteria.357  And, a provision for cross-referencing state 
ERISA waiver applications with their ACA, Medicaid, and Medicare waiver 
applications would enable states to pursue all the waivers needed for 
352 See Part III.B, supra. 
353 See, e.g., McCuskey, supra note 21, at 1153-56, Meltzer, supra note 110, at 39; 
Thomas W. Merrill, Preemption and Institutional Choice, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 727 (2008). 
McCuskey, Agency Imprimatur, supra note , at 1153-56. 
354 See McCuskey, Agency Imprimatur, supra note 21, at 1162-64. 
355 See, e.g., Michael Serota & Michelle Singer, Maintaining Healthy Laboratories of 
Experimentation:  Federalism, Health Care Reform, and ERISA, 99 CAL. L. REV. 557, 600-
04 (2011) (arguing for DOL clarification of preemption via guidance or rulemaking).   
356 See McCuskey, Agency Imprimatur, supra note 21, at 1157-62 (detailing the 
reviewability and review of the ACA’s 1332 waiver).  Cf. Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555 
(2009) (refusing deference to agency’s statement about the preemptive intent of its 
authorizing statute and the preemptive effect of its own regulations).   
357 See McCuskey, Agency Imprimatur, supra note 21, at 1155. 
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transformative health system changes, while giving the federal agencies a 
comprehensive view of the state’s proposal.358   
Of course, the details of legislative drafting will matter enormously, and 
the guardrails imposed on agency discretion to grant or deny state waiver 
applications will determine the ultimate efficacy of any waiver 
mechanism.359  As the administration of Medicaid and ACA waivers have 
illustrated, an agency’s discretion in granting waivers may prove exceedingly 
political and threaten the statute’s core infrastructure.360  Yet this may prove 
less of a concern in the context of ERISA preemption waiver because the 
provision being waived – preemption of additional state regulatory efforts – 
arguably threatens only the uniformity of regulation large employers enjoy, 
and does not threaten ERISA’s regulations protecting employee benefits. 
Proposals to add a waiver to ERISA are neither new, nor entirely 
academic.  In the early 1990s, as states pursued reforms to deal with rising 
health care costs and growing ranks of uninsured citizens,361 several members 
of Congress introduced proposals for ERISA waivers that would permit 
specific universal coverage reforms in their own states,362  reminiscent of the 
358 Cf. 42 U.S.C. § 18052(a)(5) (providing for combined Medicaid 1115 and ACA 1332 
waiver applications to go to HHS).  But see McCuskey, Agency Imprimatur, supra note 21, 
at 1152-53 (warning about allowing the ACA 1332 waiver’s expansive outlook to “bleed 
over” into consideration of the narrower Medicaid 1115 waiver); Marea B. Tumber, The 
ACA's 2017 State Innovation Waiver: Is ERISA a Roadblock to Meaningful Healthcare 
Reform, 10 U. MASS. L. REV. 388 (2015).   
359 See McCuskey, Agency Imprimatur, supra note 21, at 1151-53.  E.g., NCOIL Health 
Reform Waiver Proposal, supra note 351324. 
360 See, e.g., McCuskey, Statutory Sabotage, supra note 2; Rachel Sachs, “Medicaid 
Expansion Through Section 1115 Waivers: Evaluating The Tradeoffs,” HEALTH AFFAIRS 
BLOG (Mar. 15, 2016) 
https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20160315.053925/full/ 
[https://perma.cc/3XDX-SXT2]; Watson, supra note 335.  
361 See generally Lawrence D. Brown & Michael S. Sparer, Window Shopping:  State 
Health Reform Politics in the 1990s, 20 HEALTH AFF. 50 (2001) (articulating three phases of 
state health reform from 1990 to 2000).   
362 See Devon P. Groves, ERISA Waivers and State Health Care Reform, 28 COLUM. 
J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 609, 635-44 (1995) (cataloging legislative proposals by Senators and 
Representatives from Washington, Vermont, Kentucky, Minnesota, New York, and  
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Hawaii exemption Congress had enacted in 1983.363  Others introduced more 
ambitious legislation that would catalyze and fund state universal health care 
efforts, supported by administrative waivers of ERISA.364  When those bills 
stalled, House members from Hawaii, New York, Minnesota, and Maryland 
tried to pass two-year ERISA waivers for their states’ reforms,365 but those 
stalled, too.366 After the Clinton Administration’s efforts at federal health 
reform failed in 1994,367 a bipartisan group of senators introduced another 
bill that would fund state reform efforts, supported by expansion of the 
savings clause and specific preemption waivers for Hawaii, Oregon, 
Minnesota, Washington, and Connecticut.368 That bill also died in 
Congress.369 
The Affordable Care Act era has seen some recent revival of ERISA 
waiver legislation, couched in efforts to tweak the ACA’s Section 1332 
waiver process.  In 2018, a group of Democratic Representatives introduced 
Maryland, which would have waived aspects of ERISA – all of which “failed miserably” to 
pass in 1992-1993).  
363 29 U.S.C. §S 1144(b)(5)(A)-(C).    
364  E.g., State Care Act of 1992, S. 3180, 102d Cong. (1992) (introduced by Senators 
Patrick Leahy (VT) and Ron Wyden (OR)); The State-Based Comprehensive Care Act of 
1992, H.R. 4218, 102d Cong. (1992) (introduced by Washington Rep. Jim McDermott) 
[supported]. See Groves, supra note 362, at 640.   
365 H.R. Rep. No. 103-111, at 109-12 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993). 
366 See Groves, supra note 362, at 634-44. 
367 See Jonathan Oberlander, Learning from Failure in Health Reform, 357 N. ENG. J. 
MED. 1677 (Oct. 25, 2007) (describing the failure of the Clinton Health Security Act); Walter 
A. Zelman, The Rationale Behind the Clinton Health Care Reform Plan, 13 HEALTH AFF. 9 
(1994) (describing the plan before its failure).   
368 E.g., Health Innovation Partnership Act, S. 2452, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994), 
reprinted in 140 Cong. Rec. S13, 354-70 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 1994) (discussed in Groves, 
supra note 362, at 648). 
369 See H.R. 54119, 103d Cong., (1994) (not enacted),   
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/103/hr5119; H.R. 5119, 103d Cong., (1994), 103 
H.R. 5119 (ProQuest Congressional) (https://congressional-proquest-
com.proxy.library.upenn.edu/congressional/result/congressional/congdocumentview?accou
ntid=14707&groupid=95549&parmId=16C25586CB9&rsId=16C25583428#69) 
[https://perma.cc/5Y8Y-ZTT4] (showing that the Bill has not been enacted).  
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the "State-Based Universal Health Care Act” (SBUHCA) which would, 
among other provisions, add an ERISA preemption waiver within the ACA’s 
1332 waiver infrastructure.370 The ACA’s existing 1332 waiver provision 
already permits the Department of Health & Human Services to waive the 
ACA’s federal employer mandate under certain circumstances,371 but the 
proposed SBUHCA modification would give the Department of Labor some 
authority to suspend ERISA preemption for states enacting ACA-
replacement legislation.372 Couching the ERISA preemption waiver within 
the ACA 1332 infrastructure would slightly limit the scope of the preemption 
waiver because the state’s application must be part of an effort to replace the 
ACA, and the Department of Labor’s grant of any such waiver must stay 
within the “guardrails” established by the ACA.373 SBUHCA, too, died in 
Congress without a vote.374 
 Despite these efforts, ERISA preemption stands untouched as an 
obstruction of health care federalism, and an obstacle to state health reform 
efforts – even to those that further the aims of existing federal law.  As our 
research illustrates, the post-ACA wave of state single-payer proposals 
interacts with ERISA preemption obstacles in some ingenious ways.375  But 
the indeterminacy of ERISA’s preemption language, the opacity of ERISA 
preemption jurisprudence, and the centrality of employer-based health care 
funding force state legislation to contort and wriggle through exceedingly 
narrow pathways with the expectation of a potential challenge through 
370 H.R. 6097, 115th Cong., (2018), https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-
congress/house-bill/6097. 
371 26 U.S.C. §4980H (enacting the federal employer mandate). See McCuskey, Agency 
Imprimatur, supra note 21, at 1129, 1131-33 (explaining the ACA’s 1332 waiver authority 
over to the insurance mandates, as well as limitations on that authority). 
372 H.R. 6097 (a)(2)(J), 115th Cong., (2018), https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-
congress/house-bill/6097/text  
373 See McCuskey, Agency Imprimatur, supra note 21, 1133-37 (articulating the 
limitations on agency discretion in the ACA 1332 waiver process).        
374 H.R. 6097, 115th Cong., (not enacted), https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-
congress/house-bill/6097/all-actions. 
375 See Part I.B, supra. 
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litigation.376  An ERISA preemption waiver would alleviate some of the 
pressure of ERISA preemption for promising state experiments, while 
maintaining a federal baseline of preemption.377   
As with any statutory revision, its implementation depends on political 
will.378  Recent Congresses with majorities politically opposed to the ACA 
have shown increased appetite for statutory waiver and state experimentation, 
at least rhetorically.379  But the current administration has granted statutory 
waivers in ways that erode statutory goals, arguably exceeding the delegated 
authority.380  Additionally, the ACA’s imposition of a nationwide employer 
mandate and other insurance-related requirements draw from some of the 
baseline arguments about ERISA’s deregulatory “uniformity” function for 
the majority of fully-insured plans.381  And the ACA’s creation of 
opportunities for pass-through funding and other statutory waivers for states 
signals that waiver and state experimentation are core features of ongoing 
reform efforts.382  Amending ERISA with a statutory waiver for preemption 
seems even more urgent and more feasible at this moment in health reform. 
376 See Part II.B, supra. 
377 Note that we have not proposed the case-by-case statutory exemptions granted to 
Hawaii and sought by Massachusetts and other states in the early 1990s.  Cf. Sidney D. 
Watson, et al., The Road from Massachusetts to Missouri:  What Will It Take for Other States 
to Replicate Massachusetts Health Reform?, 55 U. KAN. L. REV. 1331 (2007). 
378 Cf. Linke Young, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 221 (arguing that 
debate of the ACA in 2010 offered an opportunity and “legislative vehicle” for altering 
ERISA).   
379 See McCuskey, Agency Imprimatur, supra note 21, at 1139-40, 1164-67; McCuskey, 
Statutory Sabotage, supra note 2, at 233-36. Cf. Exec. Order 13,765, 82 Fed. Reg. at 8351 
(emphasizing state flexibility and instructing HHS to exercise its waiver authority “to the 
maximum extent permitted” by law). 
380 See, e.g., Sidney D. Watson, Medicaid, Work, and the Courts: Reining in HHS 
Overreach , 46 J. L. MED. & ETHICS, 887, 888-89 (2019); Nicole Huberfeld, Can Work Be 
Required in the Medicaid Program?, 378 N. ENGL. J. MED. 788-91 (2018).  
381 See, e.g., Travelers, 514 U.S. at 657; Retail Indus. Leaders Ass’n v. Fielder, 475 F.3d 
180, 191 (2007) (emphasizing uniformity); McCuskey, Agency Imprimatur, supra note 21, 
at 1144-45 (describing how the ACA filled some of the regulatory void ERISA had created.   
382 See McCuskey, Agency Imprimatur, supra note 21, at 1101-08, 1155-57. 
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3. Shoring up ERISA Preemption Jurisprudence 
Even without Congressional intervention, courts could strike a better 
balance between federalism and national uniformity in ERISA preemption by 
restoring some gestalt principles of ERISA preemption jurisprudence.  As 
described in Part II, courts could more precisely apply the Supreme Court’s 
ERISA precedent from Travelers383 by limiting “relates to” preemption only 
for those state statutes that eliminate all meaningful choice of health benefits 
for employers,384 rather than extending preemption to state laws that merely 
make one choice less economically desirable than another.385 
And courts could return to some jurisprudential principles which mitigate 
in favor of state regulation, namely the presumption against preemption and 
the broader intent behind the ERISA statute.  Supreme Court ERISA 
jurisprudence since Travelers has framed preemption analysis with the 
longstanding presumption against preemption, which the Supreme Court has 
acknowledged applies with even greater force to regulation in historical 
spheres of state authority, such as insurance and health care.386   While the 
presumption against preemption does not itself save state laws,387 it should 
favor preservation of historically state authority – such as regulation of 
insurance, health care providers, and raising general revenue – in close 
cases.388   Self-funded plans, however, remain nearly unreachable by state 
laws under existing interpretations of deemer and savings clauses, despite the 
383 Travelers , 514 U.S. 645. 
384 E.g., Golden Gate Restaurant Ass’n v. City and County of San Francisco, 546 F.3d 
639 (9th Cir. 2008). 
385 E.g., Retail Industry Leaders Association v. Fielder, 475 F.3d 180, 193 (4th Cir. 
2007). 
386 See, e.g., Travelers, 514 U.S. at 654-55; De Buono, 520 U.S. at 814. 
387 See, e.g., Retail Indus. Leaders Ass’n v. Fielder, 475 F.3d at 191 (holding a state law 
preempted, but “recognizing that ERISA is not presumed to supplant state law, especially in 
cases involving ‘fields of traditional state regulation,’ which include ‘the regulation of 
matters of health and safety’”) (quoting De Buono, 520 U.S. at 814 n. 8). 
388 See McCuskey, Body of Preemption, supra note 106. See, e.g., Golden Gate, 546 
F.3d at 647-48. 
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presumption against preemption.389   
On a more fundamental level, courts could interpret ERISA’s preemption 
provisions with greater fidelity to the statute’s context and history, which 
suggest that employee benefit protection and the preservation of state 
insurance laws ought to feature more prominently than the current obsession 
with uniformity. Congress’s primary concern in enacting ERISA was 
“promot[ing] the interests of employees and their beneficiaries in employee 
benefit plans”390  To gain support from large employers toward that broader 
goal, ERISA included the employer-friendly preemption clause designed “to 
permit nationally uniform administration of employee benefit plans.”391  The 
inclusion of the savings clause, however, explicitly contemplated a regulatory 
regime embracing state-by-state “disuniformities” in the law of health 
insurance.392  Courts analyzing preemption often focus on the goal of 
employer-friendly uniformity and neglect both the savings clause and the 
statute’s broader employee-protection goal.393  Courts would do well to 
recognize the import of ERISA’s savings clause and the statute’s broader 
389 See FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 62 (1990).  
390 Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 90 (1983); see also 29 U.S.C. § 1001(c); 
120 Cong. Rec. 29,193 (Aug. 20, 1974) (statement of Sen. Biaggi describing ERISA "an 
emancipation proclamation" for employees); Massachusetts v. Morash, 490 U.S. 107, 112, 
115 (1989). 
391 Travelers, 514 U.S. at 657.  See Wooten, supra note 102. 
392 Metropolitan Life, 471 U.S. at 747.  See also Self-Ins. Inst. of Am., Inc. v. Snyder, 
827 F.3d 549, 555 (6th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 660 (2017) (“ERISA, in other 
words, does not ‘create a state–law–free zone around everything that affects an ERISA 
plan.’”). 
393 Compare Travelers, 514 U.S. at 657 (emphasizing uniformity), FMC Corp., 498 U.S. 
at 60 (“To require plan providers to design their programs in an environment of differing 
state regulations would complicate the administration of nationwide plans, producing 
inefficiencies that employers might offset with decreased benefits.”), and Retail Indus. 
Leaders Ass’n v. Fielder, 475 F.3d 180, 191 (2007) (describing uniformity and minimizing 
administrative burden as ERISA’s “primary objective”), with Andrews-Clarke, 984 F. Supp. 
at 56 (lamenting that “in the health insurance context, ERISA has evolved into a shield of 
immunity which thwarts the legitimate claims of the very people it was designed to protect”), 
and Self-Insurance Institute, 827 F.3d at 555 (contesting the notion that ERISA could fully 
shield ERISA plans from state regulation).   
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employee-protection goal, as measured against the bounded uniformity in the 
concession to employers.   
In the end, we see little reason to expect that courts can fix the dysfunction 
they have added to a dysfunctional statutory provision.  While these 
jurisprudential adjustments might help clear some way for state single-payer 
reforms without legislative intervention, they lack the clarity and 
predictability that statutory revisions can offer.394  Most of the necessary 
jurisprudential adjustments would need to come from new Supreme Court 
opinions,395 which is an unlikely prospect.396  And jurisprudential changes 
deal only with the symptoms of ERISA’s obstructionism, not the root cause:  
the statute’s wording, which courts so frequently have lamented and called 
on Congress to revise,397 as we do now. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The Affordable Care Act has catalyzed a new era of health reform 
momentum in state and local governments, as evidenced by the voluminous 
and robust state single-payer legislation catalogued here.  While states may 
successfully contort their health reform efforts to avoid ERISA preemption, 
they should not have to do so any longer.  ERISA preemption has outlived its 
utility as applied to health insurance and has elevated the preferences of 
394 See Sharpe, supra note 111, at 230. 
395 Cf. Egelhoff v. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. 141, 152-53 (2001) (Scalia, J., and Ginsburg, J., 
concurring) (lamenting in dissent that Supreme Court precedents provide no clear guidance 
and recommending a return to “ordinary preemption jurisprudence” instead of ERISA 
exceptionalism).  
396 Cf. Egelhoff v. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. 141, 152-53 (2001) (Scalia, J., and Ginsburg, J., ) 
(lamenting in dissent that Supreme Court precedents provide no clear guidance and 
recommending a return to “ordinary preemption jurisprudence” instead of ERISA 
exceptionalism).   
397 See, e.g., Andrews-Clarke v. Travelers Ins. Co., 984 F. Supp. 49, 53 (D. Mass. 1997) 
(Young, J.) (“This case, thus, becomes yet another illustration of the glaring need for 
Congress to amend ERISA to account for the changing realities of the modern health care 
system. Enacted to safeguard the interests of employees and their beneficiaries, ERISA has 
evolved into a shield of immunity that protects health insurers, utilization review providers, 
and other managed care entities from potential liability for the consequences of their 
wrongful denial of health benefits.”). 
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private businesses above the interests of sovereign states in ways that subvert 
federalism.  The time has come to remove ERISA’s obstructions and to 
unlock states’ capacities as laboratories of health reform. 
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Legend: A=Funding Plan; B=Provider Restriction; C=Assignment, Subrogation, Secondary Payer 
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APPENDIX B – SEARCH METHODOLOGY TO IDENTIFY STATE SINGLE-PAYER BILLS 
 
State single-payer bills were identified through multiple searches, conducted between June 
2018 and September 2019, of four Westlaw databases: (1) proposed legislation; (2) enacted 
legislation; (3) historical proposed legislation; and, (4) historical enacted legislation. The first two 
contain bills and sessions laws, respectively, from states’ current or most recent legislative 
sessions, whatever those dates may be. The second two contain materials from prior sessions going 
back to 2005 or before.  
Within each database two sets of search terms were used: << advanced: (single-pay*r OR 
(universal +7 (access OR coverage)) /p health-care) & DA(aft 03-24-2010) >> and << advanced: 
(all /5 (residents +7 eligib!) AND health) & DA(aft 03-23-2010) >>. After the initial search in 
June 2018, the "date after" term was updated to the date of the prior search, to capture new bills 
on a rolling basis over the study period. 
Applying the search terms to the four state legislative databases in June 2018 yielded 572 
results. Because the databases are continually updated with recent legislation,  repeating the search 
today using the initial search strings today may return a different number of results..  
From the set of results, we first removed duplicate entries that were found by both sets of 
search terms. Then, we removed duplicate bills that either were given different designations as 
they moved through the legislative process (but that were otherwise identical), or substantially 
similar bills introduced in different chambers in the same state legislative session.  Next, using 
metadata, abstracts, and longer textual reviews where necessary, we then excluded those bills 
captured by our search terms that did not purport to be a single-payer plan. The most common 
alternative purposes of such bills were  to (1) call for a study, commission, or some other clearly-
prefatory inquiry into the form or feasibility of a single-payer plan; (2)  propose a health care 
reform initiative where the sponsors explicitly disavowed an intention to create a single-payer 
system; (3) call for the state legislature to support some proposed national single-payer effort; (4) 
attempt to thwart national reform efforts, which were often characterized as a “first-step” toward 
a single-payer system; (5) attempt a less-than-comprehensive health system reform or to effect 
universal access to some specific service (e.g., HIV prevention, primary care, mental health 
services); or, (6) establish exchanges or otherwise implement aspects of the ACA, such as those 
designating a single state agency for the coordination of care. 
The above search, removal, and exclusion steps were performed each time a search was 
conducted during the study period. 
After exclusions, 66 proposals remained and were analyzed for their provisions to capture 
employer health expenditures and/or move individuals with employer-based coverage into the 
single-payer plan. While comprehensive, this set is not necessarily a census of all unique 
legislative proposals during this period. Some bills may have been missed during the initial search 
and others erroneously removed during the subsequent exclusion process. 
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